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Foreword
The Naval War College has expanded its expertise in the Asia-Pacific Rim region in re-
cent years largely in response to the growing significance of the region to U.S. national
security. The College has actively hired prominent scholars and hosted a number of con-
ferences, workshops, and guest speakers focusing on the problems and possibilities facing
the Pacific Rim. South and Northeast Asia, after all, are home to some of the world’s fast-
est-growing economies and close American allies, as well as several potential political
and diplomatic flashpoints. Even more to the point, China is an ascending economic
and military power both in the region and on the world stage. The U.S. Navy plays a
leading role in maintaining stability in the region with its strong presence and ability to
guard the freedom of navigation in vital sea lines of communication.
The efforts of the Asia-Pacific Rim specialists at the Naval War College in some ways
represent a case of “back to the future.” One of the proudest episodes in the College’s
history came in the 1930s when Newport played a central role in developing the mili-
tary plans necessary to cope with the ascendance of another Asian economic and mili-
tary power—Japan. Although we expect that wise diplomacy and national self-interest
will prevent a reoccurrence of similar difficulties in the coming decades, there is no
substitute for military preparedness and well-thought-out international and regional
strategies for dealing with the important region. The Naval War College Press has done
its part in providing its readers with many excellent articles on regional security in Asia
in the Naval War College Review; an important book—Jonathan Pollack, editor, Strate-
gic Surprise? U.S.-China Relations in the Early Twenty-first Century (released March
2004); and now Newport Paper 22.
Professor Lyle Goldstein of the Strategic Research Department of the College’s Center
for Naval Warfare Studies has been at the forefront of recent research into China’s fu-
ture. In this project he has guided a handful of naval officers through the puzzle of
China’s ongoing nuclear modernization programs. With the able assistance of Andrew
Erickson, these sailor-scholars have examined various aspects of nuclear moderniza-
tion from ballistic missile defense to nuclear command and control. In general the
chapter tells a cautionary tale; the progress of China’s nuclear modernization docu-
mented here should give pause to those inclined to dismiss China’s military modern-
ization. Steadily and with relatively little attention the People’s Republic continues to
improve its technologies and weapons systems. As the authors emphasize, no
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“Rubicon” has been crossed, but potentials are already apparent that, if realized, the
U.S. Navy as now constituted would find challenging indeed.
We can look forward in the coming years to still more research and analysis of China’s
reemergence in global politics from the Naval War College. Professor Goldstein, his
colleagues, and the students from all U.S. military services will be closely observing the
changing politics, economics, and security arrangements across the Pacific in the com-
ing years. The Naval War College Press stands ready as always to help publish such pro-
jects in the interests of the U.S. Navy, the American national security community, and
interested parties across the globe.
P E T E R D O M B R O W S K I
Editor, Naval War College Press
Newport, Rhode Island
vi T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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Introduction
LYLE J. GOLDSTEIN
Relations between Washington and Beijing improved swiftly in the wake of the 9/11
terrorist attacks, especially in comparison to the nadir that had been reached during
the April 2001 EP-3 incident.1 This new tide of cooperation has included
counterterrorism initiatives, regional partnership in such complex situations as Af-
ghanistan and North Korea, and even some modest agreement on the importance of
maintaining the status quo with respect to Taiwan’s status.2
A strong foundation for this strategic cooperation is, of course, a burgeoning trade re-
lationship, which received a further boost from China’s entry into the World Trade Or-
ganization in November 2001. In 2003, trade between the United States and China
amounted to $191.7 billion, up 23.2 percent from 2002. Remarkably, the total for 2003
was more than double the figure for 1998. The United States is China’s second most
important trading partner nation (Japan is first).3 Many reasonable strategists, observ-
ing this data, consider armed conflict between Washington and Beijing impossible, given
the economic losses that both would incur almost immediately. Unfortunately, history
has not been kind to the school of theorizing, known as commercial liberalism, which
holds that economic interdependence prevents conflict. Indeed, the belligerent powers
prior to both world wars had achieved impressive levels of economic interdependence.4
Despite noteworthy progress in since 2001 in relations between the United States and
the People’s Republic of China (PRC), there are lingering tensions and disquieting
signs that possible difficulties may loom on the horizon. Concerning the volatile Tai-
wan issue, assertive moves toward independence by Taipei (concerning, for example,
the “peace referendum,” constitutional reform, the flag, and names of diplomatic enti-
ties) in 2003–2004 prompted a series of relatively open rebukes from Washington,
which seeks strict adherence to the status quo by both Taipei and Beijing.5 If the unex-
pected defeat of the pro-independence forces in the December 2004 Taiwan parliamen-
tary elections offered hope for a stabilizing cross-Strait situation, this optimism was
quickly tempered by Beijing’s pronouncement that the National People’s Congress
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would press ahead with “anti-secession” legislation, a step many observers saw as a pre-
cursor for a firmer line by China against Taiwan.
Even aside from this thorny issue, some sensed an increasing rivalry in the 2004 APEC
(Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) conference. President George W. Bush’s arrival in
Santiago, Chile, prompted violent public protests and a rather serious diplomatic blun-
der;6 President Hu Jintao of the PRC, in contrast, made successful visits to both Argen-
tina and Brazil, as well as Cuba.7 More significantly, bilateral cooperation on the is-
sue of North Korea also appeared to be essentially stalled in 2004. Likewise, major
differences appeared to be emerging in Sino-American relations regarding policy
toward Iran.8
Indeed, the prospect for strategic rivalry between the United States and China in the
twenty-first century and beyond remains—and certainly cannot be ruled out. There is
deep unease in the United States concerning Beijing’s lack of progress in the arena of
political reform and a trade deficit that is said to threaten U.S. manufacturing jobs, not
to mention the seemingly accelerating pace of China’s military modernization. Suspi-
cion is also palpable on the Chinese side, where it is feared that the “War on Terror” is
simply a cover for policies that justify increases in American military expenditures that
could in turn enable Washington to cement its position of global hegemony. Given the
persistence of these underlying tensions and suspicions, it is simply prudent for U.S.
analysts to observe closely China’s military modernization and the strategic implica-
tions that could follow from its true emergence as a major power.
PRC military modernization has received ample attention during the last decade, and
these studies show a pattern of increasing sophistication. However, China’s nuclear
modernization is one neglected component of Beijing’s broad effort to improve its
armed forces. Certainly, this is largely the result of the extreme opacity of the data
available on Chinese nuclear forces and their future development. Another explanation
could be perplexity concerning the overall significance of a nuclear force that is so dif-
ferent from that of the United States.
This study comes at an opportune moment, insofar as China’s nuclear forces appear to
be on the threshold of a new qualitative level. According to the 2003–2004 issue of the
IISS Military Balance, one brigade (eight missiles) of the long-anticipated DF-31 inter-
continental ballistic missile (ICBM) is now deployed, with more presumably to follow
in relatively short order.9 One gains some appreciation of Beijing’s perspective on the
significance of this new weapons system when one realizes that the Chinese first re-
vealed it to the world on 1 October 1999, the fiftieth anniversary of the communist
state.10 While this is not the first road-mobile, solid-fuel missile deployed by China, it is
the first one capable of striking the continental United States. A related major
2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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development in late 2004 was the revelation in the U.S. media that the first of China’s
second-generation nuclear missile submarines, called Type 094, had been launched in
July 2004.11 As a platform for the new JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM), the 094 may well be able to strike the continental United States from China’s
territorial waters. For China, these are very significant, if long anticipated, steps toward
finally establishing credible nuclear deterrence. It is also notable, from the standpoint
of China’s nuclear weapons policy, that during the reform of the Central Military Com-
mission in September 2004 the commanders of both the Second Artillery Corps and of
the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) were, along with the Air Force, accorded
new seats the CMC, in China’s highest military decision-making body.
At the same time, rather wide disagreement remains among American analysts and
military strategists regarding the meaning of China’s nuclear modernization for U.S.-
China relations. Some have asserted that nuclear weapons are the best guarantee of
peace and stability for Washington and Beijing. These weapons help to stabilize the re-
lationship, so the logic goes, because they infuse each side with extreme caution; one
close observer of Chinese nuclear strategy goes so far as to describe this condition as
“nuclear peace.”12 A second school of thought holds that China’s arsenal will remain
relatively small and primitive. In such circumstances, Beijing’s nuclear weapons would
be either wholly irrelevant to U.S.-China strategic interaction or even give Washington
a tool for pressuring Beijing. This rather relaxed approach was implied by a 1995 com-
ment by Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye: “If deterrence prevented 10,000 So-
viet missiles from reaching the United States, it baffles me as to why it wouldn’t prevent
20 Chinese missiles from reaching Alaska.”13
C H I N A ’ S N U C L E A R F O R C E M O D E R N I Z A T I O N 3
DF-31
Source: Chinese Defence Today
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Many analysts are considerably less sanguine, however. These include specialists on
China and also experts on nuclear strategy. Thomas Christensen and Richard Betts, for
example, have asked, “How would the U.S. respond if China used a nuclear weapon
against elements of the 7th Fleet in the context of a Taiwan scenario?”14 Brad Roberts
has conducted the most detailed and thoughtful research on this subject to date. Dis-
turbingly, his 2001 study concludes: “It certainly also seems to be the case that nuclear
deterrence would be unreliable. Given the asymmetry of stake and [China’s] willing-
ness to bear costs, U.S. nuclear threats may simply lack credibility in many phases of [a
U.S.-China] war.”15 He further observes: “In China there has been an active debate
about nuclear uses that might fall below Washington’s perceived retaliation threshold. . . .
In response to PRC escalation, some Chinese analysts argue that the U.S. does not have
many good response options.”16
Chinese strategists have openly discussed the “nuclear shadows on high-tech warfare.”
Thus, Major General Wu Jianguo, writing in the premier PLA journal Junshi Kexue
[Military Science], observes a new “flexibility of nuclear use in actual operations.” He
explains: “When countries possessing nuclear weapons and high-tech conventional
weapons are involved in a war in which the conflict is intensifying, the possible use of
nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. . . . [They are] still a trump card.” In the end, he
strenuously argues in favor of China’s nuclear modernization, citing Mao Zedong’s
metaphor, “What is he holding in his hand? It is a knife. What is the use of a knife? It can
kill a person. . . . The Chinese people also have hands, and they can hold knives too.”17
Given the concerns outlined above, this study examines select aspects of China’s nu-
clear modernization. It is deliberately not comprehensive. This topic is far too broad,
and the available data is not sufficiently reliable to allow complete and definitive judg-
ments at this stage. We have elected to capitalize upon our own comparative advan-
tage—that the U.S. Naval War College (NWC) teaches some of the nation’s most
promising graduate students in the field of national security studies. Unlike many
comparable civilian institutions, NWC students bring with them a “hands on” under-
standing of military operations and strategy. This study leans heavily on the military
experience of its authors.
Indeed, the backgrounds of the given students have had a major influence on the selec-
tion of topics for this study. Thus, Lieutenant Stephen Polk, USN, an aviator with exten-
sive background in nuclear command and control (NC2), contributes the first essay, on
developments in Chinese NC2. Next, Lieutenant Chris McConnaughy, USN, a subma-
riner with experience on strategic missile boats (SSBNs), describes the significance of the
recent launch of a new generation of Chinese SSBNs. The third paper, concerning the in-
fluence of China’s space program on strategic nuclear modernization, was written by
4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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Commander Dominic DeScisciolo, USN, an air defense specialist now commanding
USS Rentz (FFG 46) in the Pacific. The final essay, addressing the crucial topic of Chi-
nese countermeasures against U.S. ballistic missile defense, was written by Andrew
Erickson, a Princeton Ph.D. candidate with fluency in Chinese and specializing in Chi-
nese aerospace development.
Collectively, these researchers paint a portrait of a strategic modernization program
that is making steady strides. Beijing appears determined to upgrade its nuclear pos-
ture, even as it simultaneously prepares for local war under high tech conditions.
This study is intended to lay the essential foundation for further and deeper investiga-
tions into the U.S.-China nuclear relationship. In time, the issue may emerge as one of
the most important quandaries confronting twenty-first-century strategists. It is un-
doubtedly essential to the future shape of the U.S. Navy.
A number of people and institutions were crucial to this project and its completion.
First and foremost were the contributors, who did not shy away from the intimidating
and complex challenge that China poses for researchers. Their determined and disci-
plined efforts have paid off. A secondary goal of this project was to increase awareness
of China among a select group of future U.S. military leaders (including the student
authors), and in this it has undoubtedly succeeded. Thanks are also due to the authors’
families, who have graciously parted with their loved ones during many weekends of
research and writing.
Andrew Erickson, in addition to his written contribution, superbly assisted the editor
in the crucial final stages. This study additionally benefited from advice and consulta-
tion from the faculty and leadership at NWC, including Captain Richard Suttie, and
Professors Stephen Downes-Martin, William Murray, Jonathan Pollack, Andrew Ross,
and Peter Dombrowski. Professor Catherine Kelleher, Elizabeth Davis, and members of
the NWC Press provided invaluable support as well. Finally, and crucially, this project
was partially funded by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, to which the editor ex-
presses particular thanks.
C H I N A ’ S N U C L E A R F O R C E M O D E R N I Z A T I O N 5
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China’s Nuclear Command and Control
STEPHEN POLK
Since China became a nuclear-weapons state in 1964, the intricacies of China’s nuclear
forces and policies have proven mysterious to outsiders. There was only one near cer-
tainty: China would follow its own nuclear path, and one likely to depart significantly
from the route taken by the superpowers during the Cold War. An independent Chi-
nese path was clearly established with the announcement of a “no first use” policy
shortly after the first test in 1964. This defensive posture would eventually place signifi-
cant pressure on both superpowers, as it spawned worldwide calls to limit the costly
and dangerous nuclear arms race.
But today Beijing faces a dramatically different set of choices. No longer the scrappy out-
sider, China is now a “nuclear insider,” supporting many arms control initiatives, such as
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Of much greater concern today, however, is that
China no longer faces the material constraints that once obliged it to build nuclear forces
on a shoestring budget. Severe financial constraints required China to make a number of
unique decisions regarding the structure and operations of its nuclear forces.
By contrast, contemporary China is able to lavish sizeable resources on its military mod-
ernization program. It is suggested that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Second Ar-
tillery Corps is “clearly a favored force of the PLA, and can be expected to grow in
resources, personnel . . . and weaponry.”1 Indeed, the commander of the Second Artillery,
General Jing Zhiyuan, was accorded a special seat, along with those of the Navy and Air
Force, in the Central Military Commission in September 2004. Yet there is no consensus
among Western analysts about where China’s nuclear modernization is headed.
The three chapters that follow examine the pace of China’s nuclear modernization un-
der the sea and in space, as well as its relationship to U.S. missile defense initiatives.
This chapter will systematically evaluate the overall strategic integration of China’s nu-
clear forces, focusing on the issue of nuclear command and control (NC2). Perhaps
even more than the companion papers in this volume, such an effort necessarily relies
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studies on the need for defense analyses that probe the people, institutions, and doc-
trines that stand behind the weapons themselves. Indeed, at a time when there are dra-
matically diverging estimates concerning the future dimensions of China’s nuclear
forces, such a “software” approach may be most appropriate.
An NC2Primer
U.S. military doctrine defines NC2 as “the exercise of authority and direction by the
President, as Commander in Chief, through established command lines, over nuclear
weapon operations of military forces”2 NC2 concerns not only the authority to execute
nuclear operations but also the mechanism by which that authority is transferred to
the forces that execute nuclear missions.
The essence of NC2, therefore, is in effect a simple network of communications links
and a delineated and recognized chain of command for the devolution of power. The
NC2 challenge is daunting, of course, because this network must be built to survive un-
der the most stressful conditions imaginable—nuclear war. Indeed, NC2 is highly theo-
retical discipline, because no such network has ever been put to a true test.
During the Cold War, the dilemmas associated with NC2 drove each of the superpow-
ers toward “Strangelovian” extremes of contingency planning. In the 1950s, scrambling
to reduce its vulnerability to a perceived danger of a Soviet nuclear first strike, Wash-
ington built an enormous structure of early warning radars, in addition to the famous
North American Air Defense (NORAD) Command at Cheyenne Mountain in Colo-
rado. Today, in the post–11 September world, the Cheyenne Mountain facility—with
blast doors that can withstand 1.5 million tons of TNT, three miles of tunnels, and fif-
teen large buildings, all inside a mountain atop more than a thousand large under-
ground springs (enabling the base literally to bounce under impact)—is now enjoying
a revival of sorts. However, according to the criterion that applied when it was built—
ability to fight a nuclear war against the Soviet Union—the facility was virtually obso-
lete by the 1970s, when Soviet nuclear warheads achieved accuracy and yield sufficient
to destroy it. Eventually, U.S. command and control (C2) moved away from the strat-
egy of “digging deep” toward dispersing NC2 units throughout the United States and
abroad on a rotating schedule of twenty-four-hour alert periods (often airborne). So-
viet NC2 planning appears to have been no less strenuous and elaborate.3
Both sides genuinely feared the possibility of nuclear “decapitation”—that the other side
might be able to accomplish a “splendid first strike,” effectively disabling the adversary by
surprise. The most important element of such a blow would have been strikes against po-
litical and military leadership. To kill the snake, it was reasoned, aim for the head. Such
concerns were not merely military “worst-casing” or even unchecked bureaucratic
8 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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momentum; both sides did in fact actively plan to undertake preemptive first strikes—a
much more “rational” strategy than attrition warfare, under nuclear conditions.
Robust nuclear command and control during the Cold War was a requirement, there-
fore, if only to prepare for a scenario that both sides deemed logical. The most impor-
tant goal of NC2 is to enhance survivability, preserving the ability to retaliate. Only
confidence that an adversary is convinced that nuclear preemption—and especially de-
capitation—is impossible gives assurance that it will not resort to that strategy in a cri-
sis. Thus, successful NC2 may be viewed as an essential foundation of “second-strike”
forces—that is, assured retaliation—and of strategic stability in general.
During the 1990s, academic discussion of nuclear proliferation brought forth an illumi-
nating debate about the impact on strategic stability of potentially backward command
and control arrangements in new nuclear states. Paralleling the prevailing logic of the
Cold War, “proliferation pessimists” argued that unstable civil-military relations or irra-
tional deployments could result in “hair-trigger” postures, encouraging either preemptive
strikes or escalation. The “proliferation optimists” sought to allay such concerns, arguing
that NC2 for small arsenals and simple nuclear strategies was much simpler than for the
huge arsenals and complex strategies of the superpowers.4 Today, since the dimensions of
China’s nuclear arsenal in some respects resemble more closely those of “emerging nu-
clear states” than of the superpowers, this debate remains highly relevant.
Also relevant are two specific objectives of any NC2 system. Preemptive strategies,
short flight times, and immensely complicated warning networks prompted concern
during the Cold War that nuclear hostilities might break out by accident. Scholars
have revealed, for example, a number of potentially dangerous occurrences during
the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis—for example, a test launch of an intercontinental bal-
listic missile (ICBM) from Vandenberg Air Force Base without specific authorization
from the Pentagon. Such an incident could have caused uncontrollable escalation, es-
pecially if the Soviets had possessed better early warning data than was the case at
the time.5 Nuclear command and control, therefore, must minimize the risk of such
inadvertent escalation. Relatedly, it must also strive to eliminate the possibility that a
“rogue” commander could gaining access to nuclear weapons. This problem is con-
sidered to be most serious in states with unstable civil-military relations, but the risk
might be inherent in civil-military relations generally, if, as has been suggested by
some scholars, military officers tend to be more inclined to offensive doctrines than
their civilian counterparts.6
A third and final goal of any state’s NC2 is considerably more controversial—to en-
hance the state’s capacity for not only nuclear coercion short of use (“muscle flexing”)
but also limited nuclear warfare. Nuclear muscle flexing became a common feature of
C H I N A ’ S N U C L E A R F O R C E M O D E R N I Z A T I O N 9
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diplomacy during the Cold War. From the Berlin Crisis of 1948 to the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan in 1979, the United States frequently resorted to movements of nuclear
forces, combined with presidential rhetoric, to convey its intentions and capabilities.
Such weapons movements require proper coordination if they are to send exactly the
right message—adequately ominous but not so threatening as to alienate world opin-
ion or precipitate further escalation. The role of NC2 in a limited nuclear conflict
would be analogous, but several orders of magnitude more important. In such circum-
stances, if one can imagine them, there would be an extraordinary necessity to “signal”
effectively so as prevent an “all-out spasm of violence,” wherein both states launch all
their weapons. For example, a limited counterforce strategy (that is, against missile
launchers, etc.) could spiral out of control if “value” (that is, urban) targets were inad-
vertently struck instead through a failure of NC2. Under such circumstances, and de-
pending on the magnitude of hostilities, control over one’s own forces could pose a
substantial challenge.
A paradox thus emerges for the role of NC2 within strategic rivalries. On the one hand,
its complete development is clearly beneficial to all parties, since it increases survivabil-
ity and prevents accidents, enhancing crisis stability. But on the other hand, robust
NC2 can also open the door to more complex forms of nuclear coercion, including
limited war, simply by improving the overall coordination, reliability, and effectiveness
of a state’s nuclear forces.
Historical Development of Chinese NC2
Chinese NC2 is a product of the broader Chinese experience with nuclear weapons,
and also with command and control in wartime. In its early history, the PRC was a fre-
quent target of nuclear coercion: first in the Korean War, subsequently during the Tai-
wan Strait crises, and again during the 1969 Sino-Soviet conflict. Thus, Chinese leaders
had a close familiarity with nuclear threats—the limits of such pressure but also the in-
herent possibilities for catastrophe. It is likely that these searing experiences, so proxi-
mate to the founding of the new state, had a powerful impact on the status of nuclear
weapons policy in the new state, a status today reflected in the very high profile of the
Second Artillery in Chinese military modernization. In its present relation to nuclear
weapons, Beijing might be compared to an adult who was abused as a child.
The PLA’s molding experiences under fire with respect to command and control
should also be briefly considered. In the Korean War, the young Chinese army fought
the United States to a draw, albeit at a horrendous cost in casualties. Major problems
with command and control surfaced during that conflict. Mao’s inclination to direct all
major operations personally despite his distance from the front (and consequent pau-
city of information) yielded in the spring of 1951 a debacle in which the PLA exceeded
1 0 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
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its “culminating point” and very nearly threw away the stunning military successes of
the previous winter. Other command and control failures in this conflict included in-
ability of units to communicate and coordinate across Korea’s difficult terrain and also
a basic incapacity to coordinate warfare specialties, especially artillery and logistics
with infantry.
The PLA proved fairly adept at correcting these mistakes during the stalemate that fol-
lowed the initial Chinese thrusts.7 During the next significant armed conflict that
Beijing faced, a successful border war with India in 1962, improved command and con-
trol arrangements served the PLA well in combat. Senior leaders made timely and ef-
fective decisions, and regional commanders were given substantial leeway in execution,
making well coordinated attacks.8
During the 1960s, Beijing proceeded with its nuclear weapons program mindful that it
was vulnerable to decapitation. Before the development of an actual NC2 system, Mar-
shal Nie Rongzhen, commander of the nuclear weapons project, dispersed scientists
and laboratories so that they could not be eliminated in a single strike.9 The Second Ar-
tillery, comprising the PRC’s “strategic rocket forces,” was founded in mid-1966, just as
the Cultural Revolution was plunging China into a new period of turmoil. Though the
goals of the otherwise immensely wasteful “Third Front” were not entirely antithetical
to effective nuclear command and control, recent research by Nathan Busch persua-
sively argues that great instability occurred in Chinese NC2 development during this
period.10 For instance, an unprecedented test of a missile armed with a nuclear warhead
on a flight path that took it over numerous population centers was executed in October
1966 under pressure from Red Guards, who supported an aggressive testing regime and
dismissed the safety concerns of Nie, then de facto leader of the Second Artillery.11 The
strategic weapons test center at Lop Nur was threatened on two occasions during
1966–67 by forces external to China’s NC2 system, first by General Wang En-Mao,
commander of the Xinjiang region, who had fallen into a serious dispute with Mao.
The test center and its associated weapons were threatened once again when Mao’s
nephew Mao Yuanxin led a group of Red Guards across the country to assault Lop Nur.
Fortunately, these incidents were defused without any substantial breach.
Only three years after the Second Artillery was established, it faced a significant test in
a major nuclear confrontation, the Sino-Soviet border crisis of 1969. Moscow made
specific nuclear threats, backed by operational preparations detected by U.S. intelli-
gence, strongly hinting at the possibility of exploiting the “opportunity” to destroy
China’s nuclear arsenal before it could grow even more menacing. This episode re-
mains much more murky than most other Cold War crises, making it difficult to assess
the effectiveness of China’s early NC2. Preliminary evidence, however, suggests that
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China’s nuclear weapons infrastructure was extremely vulnerable. According to per-
haps the preeminent Russian expert on the crisis today, “Soviet intelligence possessed
the requisite targeting information to carry out a disarming first strike.”12 This is not
terribly surprising, given that the Soviets had helped build much of China’s nuclear
weapons infrastructure. Indeed, a substantial portion of that infrastructure had been
deliberately built near the border, so as to take full advantage of Soviet assistance pro-
grams, which were fully abandoned only in 1960. It is noteworthy that in the most de-
tailed account published to date of the negotiations between Soviet premier Alexei
Kosygin and Chinese premier Zhou Enlai that eventually resolved the crisis, Zhou did
not highlight China’s nuclear capability but rather “conceded that China was incapable
of fighting a nuclear war because of the weakness of its arsenal.”13 The Chinese leader-
ship took the extreme measure of evacuating senior personnel from Beijing and other
cities at the conclusion of the crisis, further suggesting the rudimentary state of the
state’s early warning capability and nuclear command and control.14 Indeed, the Sino-
Soviet crisis of 1969 was probably a “wake-up call,” following the ebullient optimism
that had flowed from China’s first nuclear test and subsequent successful testing regi-
men (which included thermonuclear detonations). This crisis appears to have brought
home to PRC strategic planners the fact that tests in and of themselves do not readily
translate into leverage in a severe crisis, whereas survivability and, perhaps above all,
robust NC2 are crucial.
It is likely that the 1969 crisis precipitated a major effort in these areas over the
course of the 1970s. According to Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, testifying be-
fore Congress in 1974, “The Chinese are clearly sensitive to the importance of second-
strike capabilities and are making a considerable effort to minimize the vulnerability
of their strategic offensive forces.”15 One part of this effort was adopting a doctrine of
“in-cave storage/preparation and out-cave erection/filling/firing” for China’s me-
dium range missiles, a step that was apparently ordered by Mao in May 1975.16 Ac-
cording to John Lewis and Xue Litai, by the mid-1970s, “Chinese missile
commanders . . . and their leaders within official councils quietly expressed confi-
dence that they now deployed a formidable and relatively invulnerable retaliatory ar-
senal.”17 However, “in 1975, China dismissed the option of launch-on-warning
because it was unable to build a reliable early warning system.”18 Although research
on large phased-array radars (LPARs) appears to have begun in 1970, the program
did not yield results for more than a decade.19
The 1980s witnessed modest progress in modernizing China’s nuclear deterrent. To be
sure, there were some dramatic successes, such as the first successful launch of a sub-
marine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in 1982. But severely depressed defense
funding, reflecting Deng Xiaoping’s determination to improve the Chinese economy,
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meant that such improvements were being made on shoestring budgets. China suc-
ceeded in launching its first communications satellite in 1984.20 The first LPAR appears
to have been deployed by 1986, situated to warn of a Soviet attack.21 As of 1987, Beijing was
still said to lack the permissive-action link (PAL) technology that is crucial for NC2.22
The Tiananmen Square crisis in June 1989 fueled questions regarding Chinese NC2.
Specifically, there were signs of major fissures within the PLA. In fact, various revered
figures within the Second Artillery itself, including both Nie Rongzhen and Zhang
Aiping, were said to oppose the use of force against the protesting students in the
square.23 It may have been concern about NC2 during the Tiananmen Square crisis that
later prompted Chinese leaders to express interest in American PAL technology in 1994.24
Chinese NC2 Today and Tomorrow
The 1990s witnessed a gradual but significant escalation in Chinese defense expendi-
ture. It is now apparent that in that decade and subsequently, China’s military modern-
ization effort has been both broad and deep. One expert on the PLA recently suggested
that in the future we will look back on the present as a period of extraordinary growth
in the PLA’s aptitude and capabilities.25 Not surprisingly, NC2 is improving in the con-
text of an extensive effort to revamp PLA command and control generally.
Nonetheless, it must be understood that Chinese NC2 is improving from a very low
level of development—one that might be described even as primitive. For most of its
history, Chinese NC2 has had a fundamentally defensive orientation, relied on man
rather than technology, contended with unwieldy liquid-fueled missiles, stored war-
heads and weapons separately, could expect little or no warning of an attack, rarely ex-
ercised its nascent sea-based deterrent, and assumed delay and extended reaction times.
It seems, however, that most of these problems are today being solved, in the context of
China’s nuclear modernization. Let us now turn to the most fundamental issues cur-
rently confronting Chinese NC2.
Who Has Final Release Authority?
China’s NC2 network appears to be highly centralized under the rubric of the Central
Military Commission (CMC). The Second Artillery Corps is not a separate branch of
the armed services, but it is said to have direct links with the CMC. Operational com-
mand, however, apparently is exercised by the General Staff Directorate (GSD). Ac-
cording to David Shambaugh:
It is not certain exactly how the communication to launch missiles is conveyed via the GSD, but it is
believed that there are also separate and secure communications lines from the CMC to Second Artil-
lery headquarters and thence to all launch brigades. It is also understood that a launch brigade must
receive separate communications from the CMC and GSD before a launch is authorized.26
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CMC offices are apparently now located on the top floor of the new downtown Beijing
offices of the Ministry of Defense, which were completed in 2000.27 The GSD maintains a
hardened facility in Xishan (in the western suburbs of Beijing), from where the PLA lead-
ership controls its strategic missile forces.28 All operational orders originate from there.29
The Second Artillery headquarters complex is located not far away, in Qinghe.30 Given the
increasing profile of China’s sea-based deterrent (see chapter 2), it is notable that sea-
based strategic systems do not seem to be under the command of the Second Artillery.31
In light of the heretofore rudimentary state of Chinese NC2, it is widely speculated that
operational units have been given predelegated launch authority under certain
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conditions. Moreover, when time is not of the essence, there may be no operational
problem with low-tech, but politically reliable, “messengers” for launch authorization.
However, in terms of the chances of accidental nuclear war, such primitive NC2 proce-
dures would be problematic.
A relatively new and potentially difficult issue concerns the continuing bifurcation of
military and political elites within China’s leadership. To a large extent, this tendency
simply reflects the increased professionalization of the PLA over the last two decades—
an evolution that clearly tends toward more effective NC2. However, a major problem
arose during 2002–2003 because China’s most senior leadership was split between the
Politburo of the Central Committee, headed by President Hu Jintao, on the one hand,
and the CMC, chaired by ex-President Jiang Zemin. Jiang’s retirement from the Central
Military Commission in September 2004 reduced the confusion, but the Politburo re-
mains almost entirely civilian in composition, while the CMC is almost entirely mili-
tary. There is as yet no fusion of military and civilian policy makers, as in the U.S.
National Security Council. This bifurcation raises profound questions for the NC2
structure, not all of which were resolved by Hu’s ascendance to chairmanship of the CMC.
Apparently the differing roles of the Politburo and the CMC have caused command-and-
control friction before—for example, during the 1979 war with Vietnam.32
Alert Status
Beijing is deliberately opaque regarding all aspects of its nuclear force: quality; quan-
tity, and alert status. What is clear, however, is that the Chinese force has been and re-
mains significantly smaller than either the American or Soviet arsenals, even after
major post–Cold War reductions by Washington and Moscow. Also Chinese nuclear
weapons have traditionally been maintained on a much lower alert status.
In general, the missiles of the Second Artillery are neither fueled nor mated with nuclear
warheads.33 Many are stored in caves or in silos. The DF-4 is stored in caves but evidently
cannot be fueled there, because “the skin is too thin for it to be filled with propellants in
this [horizontal] position without causing serious body damage.”34 The DF-5, which is ca-
pable of striking the United States, is stored in silos. Aside from standard
hardening, these missiles are apparently protected by a large number
of bogus silos that have been constructed as decoys.35 The DF-5 is pro-
pelled by storable liquid fuel, but this fuel is corrosive after twenty-four hours, for which
reason the fuel is stored in tanks near the silos. Most of the Second Artillery’s current road-
mobile weapons are tactical missiles. Regarding its perhaps 150 gravity bombs, it is unclear
whether they are distributed to bomber bases or kept in a central
stockpile. It is well known, however, that China’s single nuclear-
powered ballistic-missile submarine (SSBN), the Xia, has rarely
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sortied from port and has never made a deterrent patrol versus the United
States. To do so, it would have to deploy to the central or eastern Pacific, as
its JL-1 missiles have a rather restricted range, 1,700 kilometers.36
However, major weapons systems now in the final stages of testing will dramati-
cally alter the alert status of China’s nuclear forces. This “great leap” has been en-
abled by, on the one hand, miniaturization of the warheads, and on the other hand,
by success with solid fuels. These advances have been incorporated into the new
road-mobile DF-31, which the PLA is now in the early stages of fielding. A truly in-
tercontinental missile, the longer range version DF-31A (reportedly under devel-
opment) will bring the continental United States into range from China itself.
Meanwhile, the extended range of a new, second-generation SLBM will allow
China’s new SSBNs (see chapter 2) to remain in the western Pacific, and perhaps
even permit the pierside shots of which Soviet SSBNs were capable by the end of
the Cold War.
Technology Upgrades
To network this new generation of advanced platforms, the PLA is fielding a panoply of
advanced communications technology. China has the capabilities and components of a
communications network: switching systems, fiber optics, satellite-to-ground and
ground-to-satellite communications, microwave communications, cellular telephones,
and pagers. Moreover, China has demonstrated at least partial capabilities in many im-
portant communications applications, including the ability to manufacture and deploy
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communication systems.37 The laying of fiber-optic lines has been an especially high
priority for the PLA in recent years.38 In 1997, the signal unit of the Second Artillery
began preliminary deployment of digital microwave communications, further enhanc-
ing all-weather connectivity between units.39 New shortwave systems are now also be-
ing deployed in the Second Artillery.40
The Second Artillery has additionally undertaken significant efforts to develop a
“paperless” network-centric system for distributing information. This process of
“informatization” enables real-time monitoring of personnel, vehicles, support equip-
ment, and weapons systems. A massive effort to educate Second Artillery cadres in
computer technology has been required.41 Other expected advantages of the new sys-
tem may be accelerated training activities, more efficient logistics management, faster
transmission of meteorological data, and reduced personnel at storage facilities.42
Communication satellites are a major priority for the PRC at present, and Chinese strate-
gic forces will no doubt benefit from this aspect of overall command and control mod-
ernization. In 1997 China successfully launched the first of its second-generation DFH-3
communications satellites. Apparently having a strong resemblance
to the GE Astro Space 5000 series, this satellite represents a major
improvement over its predecessors, with up to twenty-four tran-
sponders with uplink/downlink frequencies of 6/4 gigahertz and an operational life of
eight years.43 Beijing put its first explicitly military communications satellite into orbit in
January 2000, the Feng-Huo-1 (FH-1). According to one source, the PLA “has been using
the DFH series communications satellite as a part of its national C4I
[command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence]
systems for over a decade, but the FH series will provide new capabili-
ties, which will allow commanders to communicate with and share data with all forces
under joint command at a theater level.”44 A follow-on generation of communication sat-
ellites will enable the PLA to “transmit tailored data . . . maps, pictures, and enemy de-
ployments . . . to hundreds of units simultaneously . . . without the need for ground
station rebroadcast.”45
Despite these advances, there is reason to believe that communications satellite pro-
duction capacity is insufficient to satisfy current and future demand. Therefore, Beijing
continues to purchase foreign-built satellites and to lease capacity. In 2002 Beijing con-
tracted with a French company to build the Apstar-6 communication satellite, which is
scheduled to be launched in April 2005.46 In addition, Israel will supply two satellites, to
be received in 2005–2006.47
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Training
A revolution in PLA training has gradually become evident over the last decade. Most
fundamentally, it has involved a transition from rote, scripted exercises to more objec-
tive “red-versus-blue” engagements that are designed to force commanders to adapt to
circumstances on the spot, and to spur the development of new doctrine and tactics.
The new approach is referred to as “confrontational training,” and it is no surprise that
the elite Second Artillery has taken it up with vigor.48
Second Artillery training appears to occur regularly under challenging conditions—for
example, in remote deployment areas or at night—under the guiding philosophy, “If
you fear risk on the training field, when it comes to the battlefield you might lose your
head.”49 Enhanced communications technology is playing an essential role. For exam-
ple, increased connectivity has been crucial to the development of simulation technol-
ogy, at a time when “10 thousand liang of gold is spent [for each] cannonball [that] is
fired.”50 A network or “online equipment clinic” linking maintenance battalions with
research institutes and manufacturers now enables “technical personnel . . . [to] . . . re-
view the ‘medical history’ and prescribe the right medicine” to make speedy repairs.51
There is additionally a degree of recognition in the Second Artillery that the human di-
mension should not be neglected in the vast effort to integrate information technology
into the force. Thus, noncommissioned officers have been singled out for special atten-
tion in training regimens, and Second Artillery leaders have concerned themselves
about the psychological conditioning of their troops.52
A further, and essential, element of Second Artillery training is that no sharp separa-
tion exists within the corps between conventional-missile and nuclear-armed units. In
other words, the same command provides both the personnel who man the conven-
tionally tipped short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) opposite Taiwan and the custodi-
ans of China’s nuclear deterrent. Undoubtedly, the SRBM forces have proved an
invaluable teaching resource for the nuclear forces. Mobile SRBM units have been ob-
served to operate at high tempo and with impressive levels of proficiency, stealth, and
readiness; one can reasonably assume that the lessons they learn spread rapidly and ef-
ficiently throughout the nuclear modernization process.
NC2 for SSBN Operations
To this point, this chapter has mainly addressed NC2 as a problem for the Second Artil-
lery. However, as the next chapter will suggest, it is quite conceivable (contingent on the
success of the “094” project) that the sea leg of China’s nuclear triad will receive renewed
impetus in the new century. We now turn briefly to the specific problem of communicat-
ing with strategic submarines.
1 8 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
T:\Academic\Newport Papers\Newport Paper 22\Ventura\NP22a.vp
Friday, March 11, 2005 9:20:03 AM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
Notes
A long-range submarine communications tower proved to be a major bone of conten-
tion during the Sino-Soviet dispute of the late 1950s. Mao resented as high-handedness
a request by Moscow to build a naval communications facility on Chinese sovereign
territory. After the Soviet technical advisers withdrew from China in 1960, however,
Beijing pressed ahead with the long-wave station for its own use, using with materials
and plans left behind. This facility began routine communications with PLAN subma-
rines in mid-1965.53
PRC researchers apparently made good progress in very-low-frequency (VLF) commu-
nications; Mao himself approved the construction of an extremely high-powered VLF
station. Research was undertaken at Institute 722 in Wuhan, and completed in 1982;
soon “the navy felt confident that its headquarters could communicate by VLF with its
strategic submarines in all proposed operating zones.”54 (Given the extremely limited
operations of the Xia over the last two decades, however, that supposition seems
doubtful.) Apparently anxious about the ability of advanced navies to home in on long
transmission bursts, the PLAN also pursued “a high-powered microwave system that
could communicate via space satellites.”55 Accordingly, the General Staff and the Navy
were given highest priority for satellite channels when China launched its first series of
communication satellites in the mid-1980s.56
Data on contemporary PLAN submarine communications practice is sparse. If China
goes the route of other submarine powers, it is likely to pursue total redundancy for
submarine command and control, relying on multiple means employing different
physical principles. Extremely low frequency (ELF) communications have the advan-
tage that messages can be received at depths of two to three hundred meters,
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maximizing submarine stealth and survivability. There are major problems with ELF in
practice, however, and it is not clear that China has mastered that technology. In reality,
most SSBN (peacetime) communications are, for efficiency’s sake, conducted by high-
frequency and very-high-frequency radio; submarines receive messages at periscope
depth or by floated antennas. China will likely create a dedicated maritime aircraft
squadron for communications with its submarine fleet, if it has not already done so. A
lengthy profile in the Chinese journal of naval warfare, Jianchuan Zhishi, of the U.S.
“Take Charge and Move Out” (TACAMO) air fleet,
which supports American SSBN operations, supports
the general conclusion that Beijing is determined to per-
fect its communications with its submarine fleet, as it launches a new generation of nu-
clear vessels.57
Conclusion
It is evident that China now places a high priority on the command and control of its
military forces. This emphasis reflects not only careful analysis of American military
successes over the last decade but also occasionally painful lessons from China’s own
military history. Having a special sensitivity on nuclear matters that undoubtedly
springs from having itself been subjected to nuclear threats, Beijing is poised to adopt a
more robust NC2 posture.
There are very significant unknowns, one of them whether China will make the kind of
investments in early warning that would be consistent with a launch-on-warning doc-
trine. A plethora of new strategic platforms and capabilities (ranging from mobile, solid-
fueled ICBMs to a new generation of SSBNs), intensive training, and a wide variety of
new communications technologies, together imply a shift to that strategic posture.
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Certain strategic benefits of upgraded Chinese NC2 should be particularly noted. The
risk of accident, launch by rogue elements, or proliferation of technology to third par-
ties is likely to be significantly reduced under the new, more sophisticated NC2 regi-
men. Conceivably, a Chinese nuclear deterrent that is more in conformity with
superpower or peer-competitor practices, one that moves from minimal deterrence to
credible deterrence, might make Beijing more amenable to arms control and moderate
in its crisis behavior, based on observing the “principles” of mutually assured destruc-
tion. What is troubling, however, is the possibility that a more muscular nuclear posture,
afforded additional flexibility by enhanced command and control, could encourage Chi-
nese proponents of nuclear coercive and even limited war-fighting strategies.
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China’s Undersea Nuclear Deterrent:
Will the U.S. Navy Be Ready?
CHRISTOPHER MCCONNAUGHY
We will have to build nuclear submarines even if it takes us 10,000 years!
MAO ZEDONG, 1959
There is a general consensus that China is rapidly modernizing is military. However,
there is no clear consensus on what this modernization means to the United States.1
While some analysts argue that focusing on specific Chinese nuclear capabilities with-
out looking at the nuclear strategy debate behind those capabilities is too narrow, at
some point capabilities must be reviewed to assess potential threats in order to provide
a solid foundation for future force structure planning.2 China’s newest nuclear-powered
ballistic-missile submarine, known as the Type 094, is no exception. The revelation in
the open press during the late fall 2004 that the first prototype had been launched in
July of that year underlines the imperative for such analyses, although the boat is not
yet operational;3 that is especially true given that “the advent of truly reliable SSBNs
capable of regular long patrols . . . would revolutionize [China’s] second strike nu-
clear capabilities.”4
There are no absolutes in the world of international relations and politics. It is, there-
fore, prudent to ask whether the United States will be prepared to counter given
weapon systems. Defense planners cannot sit on the sidelines and wait for the resolu-
tion of a debate over a potential adversary’s intentions.
Under many circumstances, the deterrence provided by SSBNs is a significant and
credible strategic threat. From a purely military perspective, they have the capacity,
quite literally, to change the world, by exacting severe destruction on whole societies.
From a geopolitical perspective, by the threat of a strike from an SSBN skilled and de-
termined statesmen can force another state to deal with their own on a level playing
field however backward their own economy and ideology may seem to the other. In
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U.S.-China crisis. For China’s navy, “the development of nuclear-powered subma-
rines [has been] the chief objective of [the twentieth] century.”5 All indications are
that this priority on nuclear submarines will continue and even accelerate in the
twenty-first century.
The United States advertises its ballistic-missile submarine fleet as the most survivable
component of its nuclear arsenal, and for good reason. Nuclear power enables ballistic-
missile submarines to stay submerged for weeks and even months, the only limiting
factor being food for the crew. The submerged endurance of an SSBN allows it to pa-
trol quietly in locations known only to its commanders, greatly complicating the track-
ing problem for those interested in knowing where they operate.
In principle, there are two methods for neutralizing the threat from a submarine-
launched ballistic missile.6 The first is to employ a nuclear-powered attack submarine
(SSN) to track and trail an SSBN and, at the instigation of hostilities, to destroy it be-
fore it can launch its nuclear weapons. In the unlikely event of an unexpected missile
launch, the SSN would immediately eliminate the SSBN to prevent further launches.
This method requires having available a sufficient number of SSNs (relative to the
number of the enemy’s SSBNs) to devote to such an undersea warfare campaign. The
second method of countering SLBMs would be to establish a ballistic-missile-defense
system to destroy any missiles after their launch. Significant advantages that the SSN
enjoys over a ballistic-missile-defense system in this scenario include the facts that the
SSN is proven technology and does not have to contend with decoys deployed by the
ballistic missile.7
However, only a few nations, since the demise of the Soviet Union, possess the capabil-
ity to track and trail an SSBN in blue water, and no nation can guarantee the destruc-
tion of intercontinental ballistic missiles in flight.8 SSBNs, accordingly, when properly
operated and supported, provide a very robust, highly assured second-strike—or even
preemptive nuclear strike—capability. For any state that seeks to have its voice heard in
the world and does not want to be subjected to nuclear coercion, SSBNs are prized
commodities—albeit so expensive that they are feasible only for the most determined
and advanced aspirants.
Much has been written within the last decade on China’s defense modernization, as if it
had only recently begun. To the contrary, while China’s defense modernization has not
progressed equally within all areas, and its pace has been inconsistent—with a more
rapid pace seen in the last decade, due to a newly opened intellectual climate and in-
creased economic capacity—China has been modernizing and improving its strategic
nuclear forces since their inception over four decades ago. As the editors of a recent
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publication on the People’s Liberation Army observe, “The Chinese military is any-
thing but stagnant.”9
China is only now reaching the point in the development of its nuclear arsenal that it
can strike globally. The present articulation of the U.S. triad recognizes that today’s
conventional capability—through better technology—may be able to accomplish what
would have previously required a nuclear strike.10 However, the United States cannot
lose sight of the fact that nations like China lack the awesome, global, conventional
strike capability that the U.S. military enjoys and so still place significant emphasis on
their strategic nuclear forces. China recently achieved a limited capability to threaten
the continental United States from deep in the central Pacific. Now a new, more capa-
ble SSBN, with a new SLBM of far greater range and accuracy, will be able to strike the
United States from the relative safety and security of proximate waters.
Still, it is easy to discount Chinese efforts at SSBN development
and the threat that they may pose.11 Currently, the Xia—which has
recently emerged from an extended overhaul—is the only opera-
tional Chinese SSBN; The 094 is expected to become operational in the next few years—
contingent on the successful development of the JL-2 SLBM.12 Nevertheless, China’s de-
fense modernization must be viewed in terms of contemporary China,
not the backward political and economic practices of the past; the China
of today is not that of yesteryear. China is enjoying a relatively stable so-
cial and political environment; its economy is thriving.13 In contrast with the period
when China built its first generation of nuclear submarines, today its defense moderniza-
tion is receiving a substantial amount of assistance from Russia. Naturally, China is trying
to play catch-up. The U.S. Navy already had a strong conventional submarine program
when it made the decision to build nuclear-powered submarines, and only when it had a
firm footing in nuclear propulsion did it embark on submarine-launched ballistic mis-
siles. China initially tried to do it all at the same time; now, however, it has emerged from
those dark days.
There has been little written on China and its ballistic-missile submarine program,
which is not surprising, given its slow progress and how little information there is
upon which analysts can draw. In China’s Strategic Seapower, however, John Wilson
Lewis and Xue Litai provide a remarkably detailed and insightful analysis into the ex-
treme challenges that China’s nuclear-powered submarine (both SSN and SSBN) and
SLBM projects faced. Lewis and Xue’s work is a neglected resource that deserves the
careful attention of American naval strategists. It makes the divergence between the China
of the past and that of the future acutely clear. China’s capabilities are changing—from its
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aggressive and widely watched, overarching,
defense modernization efforts to the recent in-
troduction of its newest nuclear-powered fast
attack submarine, to China’s first manned
space flight, to a more mobile, more secure,
and more lethal nuclear strike capability. The
China of tomorrow will be radically different.
China wants a secure nuclear-strike capa-
bility and to do this is investing in road-
mobile ICBMs and SSBNs. In 1997, Gen-
eral Liu Huaqing of China’s Central Mili-
tary Commission stated, “Fewer than ten
percent of China’s land-based missiles would
survive a large-scale nuclear first strike; the
less vulnerable SLBMs would preserve our
nuclear counterattack capabilities.”14 China is
displaying a patient and steady determination to produce a modern military with a viable
and credible land-mobile and undersea nuclear deterrent that is worthy of focused study.
This chapter is written in two basic sections that reflect the distinct dichotomy between
the struggling China of the past and the emerging powerhouse. The first part examines
the development of China’s nuclear-powered submarine program and, more specifi-
cally, the development of its first SSBN, the Xia. Relying heavily on the path-breaking
research of Lewis and Xue, it offers technical detail to illustrate the tremendous diffi-
culties China experienced in the production of its first submarines. Some would argue
that it was an exhibition of gross incompetence in the Chinese defense industry; it
would be more accurate to say that these were the first faltering steps of amateurs, not
outright ineptitude. It is a safe and logical bet that Chinese technology will only con-
tinue to improve. The Xia experience was neither a great success nor a total failure.
Above all, it was a down payment on China’s robust nuclear future. Although the Xia
has, for the most part, remained alongside the pier, China is now in a position to capi-
talize on the investment; it now has an indigenous capability to design and construct
SSBNs and their SLBMs. China’s future in submarines looks bright.
The second part of the chapter is a look at what the future may bring if a Sino-U.S.
maritime and nuclear rivalry becomes more intense. Accordingly, it asks whether the
U.S. Navy will be prepared to resume a more aggressive strategic ASW posture in the
event that China does deploy a substantial SSBN force, as has been projected. Future
advances in Chinese attack submarines, improvements in the education and training of
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the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the number of Chinese submarines that already ex-
ist today, the geographic constraints of the Asia-Pacific region, the decline of the U.S.
Navy’s antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability, and the expected reduction in the
number of American SSNs are all variables here. This chapter reaches the preliminary
conclusion that the U.S. Navy will be ill prepared to execute strategic ASW against
China in the coming decades unless the atrophy of its ASW assets is not only stopped
but reversed.
China’s First Generation SSBN: Failure or Foundation?
It is true that our country is very poor. But even a poor man needs a
stick to drive away a dog.
CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER CHEN YI, 1962
A Grand Vision
I felt that the Bureau of Ships had in the past been so restricted in their design studies by contradic-
tory instructions concerning characteristics that it was impossible for them to produce the best sub-
marines. . . . First, they designed a hull and then every person in the Department began to stuff it from
both ends. In the old days, design became a four ring [sic] circus. The Bureaus of Ordnance, Engi-
neering, Navigation and Construction and Repair all vied with one another to get their own pet pro-
jects included.15
Rear Admiral Charles B. Momsen made this statement in 1948, during the design of
the USS Albacore, the U.S. Navy’s first submarine with a teardrop-shaped hull. His ob-
servation reflects how bureaucratic organizations can unnecessarily complicate what
should, ideally, be a purely scientific endeavor. China’s first experiences in submarine
design were different only in the extremes to which the domestic and organizational
politics interfered.
The pace of the Chinese SSBN and SLBM programs has been excruciatingly slow by
Western standards. On the other hand, when viewed within the context of a developing
nation that at the beginning of its quest possessed only a rudimentary indigenous de-
fense industry and no capacity for nuclear reactor, submarine, or ballistic-missile pro-
duction, the performance is rather remarkable. China has built—from square one—a
formidable, albeit still incomplete, military-industrial base in less than half the time
that the United States and other Western powers have had to develop their own.
Great Leap, Cultural Revolution, and Third Front
The Chinese defense industry owes its existence to the SSBN and strategic weapons
programs.16 In July 1958, a nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine project (Project
09) and submarine-launched ballistic-missile project (the JL-1, Project 05) were autho-
rized, though China did not possess the military, industrial, or scientific capacity for
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such ambitious undertakings.17 If the lack of both intellectual and physical resources
were not enough, from 1958 to 1960 China had to endure Chairman Mao Zedong’s
misguided Great Leap Forward, in which Mao set aside all rationality in an attempt to
exceed British industrial production levels within fifteen years. The social turmoil just
before and during the Great Leap severely impacted the SSBN and SLBM projects, to
the point that their “defense scientists and engineers were devoting less than half the
day to professional work.”18
On the heels of the failed Great Leap, from 1966 to 1976, came Mao’s Cultural Revolu-
tion. Supported by Mao, “radicalized technicians and workers in the research organs
under the [Defense Science and Technology] commission berated, persecuted, and
then sundered the relations between senior scientists and leadership cadres, between
the technical community and the policy makers.”19 Political upheaval, social unrest, and
cuts in spending were not the limits of the damage done by the Cultural Revolution.
Mao, in an effort to purify the Chinese Communist Party, demanded that “reactionary
leading academic figures” be tracked down.20 The violence resulted in numerous casual-
ties in the submarine and ballistic-missile research communities, including the director
of Institute 703, Yao Tongbin, who was responsible for JL-1 materials testing.21 Mao’s
Cultural Revolution was to blame for the suicide and killing of personnel involved in
the strategic weapons programs, lack of funding for equipment and facilities, poor
working conditions and diet, the destruction of equipment, distrust in political leaders,
poor quality in materials and workmanship, and outright warfare among technicians.22
In 1966, defending the premises of the Cultural Revolution, Lin Biao, Vice Chairman of
the Central Committee, stated, “It stands to reason that a cultural revolution should
accelerate production, and this has been borne out by the facts.”23 Quite to the contrary,
China’s Cultural Revolution, in addition to the enforced geographic separation of vari-
ous organizations involved (as will be seen below), resulted in a ten-year stagnation of
the JL-1 project.24 Mao’s belief “that men equipped with correct political ideas were
more important in war than weapons” turned the Chinese defense industry on its head
and cost China dearly.25 Mao is generally regarded as a military genius—historians
place him alongside the likes of Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, and Jomini—but his capability as
a leader in war did not translate well into success as a statesman. With respect to na-
tional security, Mao’s methods were, ironically, of greater benefit to China’s potential
adversaries than they were to China.
As if political, social, and economic turmoil were not enough, the research and devel-
opment phases of the SSBN and SLBM projects were fraught with inefficiency and
contradiction. Mao ordered the creation of a “Third Front,” by which virtually the en-
tire Chinese defense industry was moved to the interior, far from the coasts, to guard
against attack.26 This effort began in earnest in 1965; ultimately 483 factories and
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ninety-two research academies were constructed “on the Third Front,” and 1.6 million
workers were transferred to China’s interior from the coastal areas.27 The economic
costs and the delays resulting from the Third Front effort were staggering.
Marshal Nie Rongzhen, in overall charge of the strategic submarine and missile pro-
grams, appears to have severely underestimated their magnitude and complexity. The
talent and expertise required to design and produce an SSBN is not abundant in the
most technologically advanced societies today, let alone the relatively backward China
of the 1960s. Nevertheless, Nie chose to pursue a competitive strategy, assigning two
separate organizations to perform research and development. This diluted the small
pool of scientists and engineers as well as of material resources.28
From 1958 until the first successful submerged test launch of the JL-1 SLBM in 1988,
the various organizations involved went through countless restructurings.29 This was
part of a larger pattern in which China’s political system favored organizational “solu-
tions” for R & D problems. Yet the reorganizations were often ineffective: they failed to
get to the root cause of the problem and did not produce the desired progress: “The
logic of the times was to destroy the system in order to save it.”30
If China has been persistent in its efforts to produce both nuclear-powered attack and
ballistic-missile submarines, that desire has wavered at times. When it was recognized
that design and production were not going to be speedy, some demanded that the pro-
jects be discontinued. General Luo Ruiqing, the director of the National Defense In-
dustry Office (NDIO) wanted to see Project 09 terminated, arguing in a remarkable
moment of candor that China could not produce a diesel-powered submarine, let
alone a nuclear-powered one. Opposing Luo, the Chinese foreign minister, Chen Yi, ar-
gued that for the sake of national security the effort should continue, regardless of the
time it required.31 Project 09 research continued but was downsized substantially in
August 1962. Unrestricted design and production did not resume until August 1965.32
Research and Development
Considering that China was creating its technological and industrial base from scratch,
and on the back of the strategic weapons program, it is not difficult to see why the
learning process was painfully long.33
Nuclear Power. Aside from the political climate, Project 09 engineers faced daunting
obstacles in the design and development of the first submarine nuclear reactor plants.
The work was as problematic as one might expect an initial foray into nuclear-reactor
design and construction to be. The first reactor design was completed in 1960 and then
went through numerous iterations.34 The two organizations tasked by Nie for reactor
plant design, the Qinghua University Institute of Nuclear Energy Technology and the
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Reactor Engineering and Technology Institute (Institute 194), under the Second Minis-
try of Machine Building (nuclear industry), gathered what information they could on
foreign designs and made separate proposals. Qinghua University promoted a design
based on a German nuclear-powered ship, the Otto Hahn; Institute 194 favored a design
based on the Soviet icebreaker Lenin.35 The decision between the two proposals was based
not on their merits and suitability for submarine operations but on the political clout of
the two agencies. Institute 094 had more, and in 1965 the Lenin design was selected.36
The Institute 194 designers were to encounter difficulties with, among other things,
control-rod drive mechanisms, nuclear instruments, reactor instrumentation, and the
steam generator.37 The physics calculations were completed by hand, which required an
extraordinary amount of time; they had to be repeated with each successive modifica-
tion to the plant design.38 The uranium-235 fuel concentration for the reactor plant
was enriched to only 3 percent, meaning that the Chinese submarine would require
more frequent refueling than American submarines.39
The initial stages of the reactor development, under Institute 194’s Reactor Engineering
Research Section, were difficult at best. Working conditions were poor; worse, “young
and inexperienced technical personnel . . . [were] left . . . to their own devices, without
any data, experimental equipment or computers.”40 Counting on Soviet assistance,
China had placed little emphasis on the development of indigenous support capability
for nuclear research and manufacturing. When Soviet assistance was withdrawn in
1960, the Chinese were no longer able to focus exclusively on production and instead
had to step back and try to fill the void left by the departed Soviets.
Successful operation of a prototype reactor, to verify the validity of the design, was a
prerequisite to the installation of a submarine unit.41 The sense of urgency in Project 09
to get the first attack submarine to sea is amply evident in the fact that China opted
to design and build prototype and submarine reactor plants simultaneously.42 From
an engineering perspective, failure to evaluate a design properly prior to the manu-
facture and operation of the final product is an invitation to disaster. This is espe-
cially true in the world of nuclear engineering, as the Chinese apparently learned the
hard way at an early stage.43
The exact dates are unclear, but sometime around 1970 the prototype reactor was
tested at its full rated power.44 The engineers experienced difficulties with test instru-
mentation, pulse tube leaks, and secondary valves. Further design problems were en-
countered with the reactor safety set-points, which apparently caused several
unwarranted automatic shutdowns.45 The design, construction, and testing of China’s
first prototype nuclear reactor was to take twelve years.
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China also had, from the beginning, major difficulties with the submarine reactor
plant. Initial criticality of the SSN reactor plant and the maiden voyage of the attack
submarine on which it was fitted, the Han, occurred in 1971. During sea trials (which
were not completed until 1974) and thereafter, “severe problems”
were encountered with the reactor plant.46 These included high radia-
tion exposure to the crew; leakage in the steam generator from the
primary water circuit to the secondary, with the result that radiation was detected in
the secondary system drains; primary system valve leakage; and steam line ruptures.
These persistent problems—as well as corrosion, steam leaks from the steam genera-
tors, and defective pumps, main condensers, and main reduction gears—demonstrated
that the Project 09 engineers had much to learn about materials and precision design
and construction.47 The PLAN accepted the Han—designated hull number 401—in Au-
gust 1974, but it could hardly be considered fully operational. China incorporated design
modifications in the second Han-class unit, hull number 402, commissioned in 1977, but
many of the original problems persisted.48
The Submarine: Hull and Interior Arrangement. The design and construction of the
submarine itself was no less difficult. China decided to complete its first nuclear-
powered submarines as attack boats, due to the time required to develop the JL-1 mis-
sile and an SSBN launcher system.49 When the Soviet Union terminated its assistance in
submarine design and construction, the Chinese, as in the reactor project, turned to
other external sources to fill the void. Huang Xuhua, the chief designer for Project 09,
summed up their attitude: “To derive nourishment from others’ experiences . . . you
can get twice the result with half the effort if you know how to pick others’ brains.”
(Some argue that this practice continues to this day, as is consistent with a Chinese
proverb, “Stones from the other hills may serve to polish the jade of this one—advice
from others may help one overcome one’s shortcomings.”)50 Accordingly, Chinese engi-
neers adopted the teardrop hull shape of American and Soviet nuclear submarines and
chose to construct a double hull similar to those of Soviet boats.51
High-quality welding, to conjoin hull plates and attach interior and exterior equipment
and fittings to the hull, is absolutely critical to the survival of a submarine. Chinese en-
gineers and shipyard welders had serious difficulties; numerous weld failures on the
hull resulted from improper welding techniques and equipment. The engineers might
have been expected to determine the causes of the defective welds and provide solution
to the welders, but they did not; the welders were left to conduct experiments on their
own and devise a method for heat-treating steel hull plates.52 China’s first submarine
hull, accordingly, was not a product of exceptional Chinese engineering or first-rate
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ship construction; quite to the contrary, China’s first nuclear submarine hull was a
product of trial and error.53
In keeping with the trial-and-error “principle,” engineers at the Bohai Shipyard (Plant
431) did not have a sound plan to fit out the submarine. In fact, construction of the
hull commenced before the layout of interior subsystems had been completed. The risk
was not to the basic hull shape but to the configuration of compartments, hull open-
ings, bulkhead penetrations, and interior supporting structures. Although limited use
was made of a wooden scale model, pipefitting was completed and subsystems were in-
stalled by the “best guess” method. Not surprisingly, in view of the inevitable numer-
ous rearrangements, the builders encountered a great degree of difficulty in calculating
the boat’s center of gravity and center of buoyancy.54 In general, the manner in which
the Chinese constructed their first nuclear-powered attack submarine suggests a deep
urgency in the minds of the Chinese leadership, which continued to push forward re-
gardless of unresolved technical issues.
The Submarine: Sound Silencing and Combat Systems. The stealthiness of a subma-
rine—its ability to stay hidden from an adversary—depends a great deal on the noise it
emits. The engineering, manufacture, and operation of the submarine determine how
much or how little noise it will radiate into its environment. The Project 09 engineers
recognized the need for silencing and took measures to limit the noise level of their
submarines, such as mounting equipment on pedestals and covering the equipment
with sound-absorbent material.55 Other factors considered were the number of hull
openings, flow noise through internal piping and over the hull, and screw cavitation.56
Ideally, weapons systems are designed to meet particular needs, specified prior to con-
struction. This was not the case in China’s SSN and SSBN development. For the SSN, it
was not until 1966, eight years after the decision to build the nuclear submarine, that
China’s Defense Science and Technology Commission identified the type’s desired
functions. Neither was the SSBN the product of a rational strategic debate. Mao saw in
the unlimited Soviet assistance then available simply an opportunity to acquire a weap-
ons system that might prevent other states from taking further advantage of China.57
Failure to identify specific capabilities required of the submarines proved detrimental
to their development.
One area in which this failure would manifest itself was in combat systems. Torpedoes
were the raison d’être of SSNs. The principal mission of the an attack submarine is at-
tack, and to carry out an attack, it requires torpedoes.58 China’s torpedo development,
however, lacked focus. Gas-powered torpedoes, electric-powered torpedoes, rocket-
assisted aerial torpedoes, torpedoes with passive acoustic homing, torpedoes with ac-
tive and passive acoustic homing, torpedoes for surface targets, and torpedoes for
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deep-water submerged targets—all were given consideration at one point or another
from the early 1960s until 1989, when China believed it had finally fielded a weapon
comparable to Western torpedoes, the Yu-3.59 As a further example, the director of
China’s Seventh Academy (and subsequently commander of the PLAN), Liu Huaqing,
instructed his engineers “to copy a Soviet model torpedo for missions against surface
targets. Although Liu’s experts understood that the principal prey for the torpedoes of
the future would be submarines, not surface ships, they accepted the assignment and
made it one of their top priorities.”60 The consequence of this haphazard approach to
the torpedo—the sine qua non of the SSN—was that the Han did not have a capable
torpedo until 1989, fifteen years after its commissioning. 61
The Ballistic Missile Submarine and the JL-1. A preliminary design for the SSBN was
completed in 1967, with the intention of launching a boat in 1973.62 The major differ-
ence between the attack submarine and the ballistic-missile submarine, of course, was
the addition of the missile compartment. For that reason, China’s first SSBN encoun-
tered many of the same problems, with the reactor plant and combat systems, that the at-
tack submarine endured in addition to those of the launching system and the SLBM itself.
By March 1964, when the JL-1 project was initiated, China had been working on mis-
sile technology for nearly eight years.63 In 1967 China, perceiving the vulnerability of
its fixed land-based strategic-missile systems to satellite reconnaissance, decided to fo-
cus more of its efforts on road-mobile missiles and SLBMs.64 Today, China’s basic mis-
sile technology seem fairly robust and at least moderately successful.65 At the time,
however, the crucial differences between an SLBM and a land-based missile created
technological hurdles that the PLAN could not easily or quickly overcome. Like the
U.S. Navy, China explored liquid fuel for its first SLBM.66 When the Soviets withdrew,
China, noting the progress of the U.S. Polaris Missile Program, decided to pursue
solid-propellant technology for the JL-1. Solid rocket propellant, therefore, was one of
the first obstacles the program encountered.67
Unlike a land-based missile, an SLBM must be ejected from the missile tube underwa-
ter to a point above the surface, from a depth that can vary with each launch. More-
over, if a ballistic missile is to strike a target, its guidance system must be given the
precise location from which it is being launched. For a land-based missile this is for the
most part a static problem; even with a road-mobile system, technicians can determine
the launch location with relative ease. In contrast, the SLBM requires dynamic infor-
mation; its position is continuously changing up to the moment of launch.68 Lastly,
once the missile is above the surface, its motor must ignite. At that point, as for its
land-based counterpart, guidance and flight control systems must put the missile on
target with an accuracy inversely proportional to the yield of its warhead.69
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China’s initial work on solid rocket propellant began in 1956; the designs for the JL-1,
including the motor, were finalized in 1967.70 As for the SSBN, the work on the JL-1
proceeded by trial and error, and it was not until 1980 that the Chinese engineers de-
veloped a satisfactory motor.71 Chinese engineers working on the project moved
through a series of stages, starting with a sixty-five-millimeter-diameter design and
then trying 300 mm and 654 mm approaches before settling upon the 1,400 mm de-
sign ultimately utilized in the first- and second-stage motors of the JL-1.72 The design-
ers had to overcome challenges presented by the motor’s chemical composition, the
star-shaped hollow core needed for even burning, case-bonding of the propellant to
the motor casing, plastics, high-strength steel, heat shields, adhesives, nozzles, and
thrust-vector control—to name only a few problem areas.73
Chinese engineers chose “to copy foreign models as best they could” for the JL-1’s
guidance system, but finally adopted the guidance system of the JL-1’s land-based DF
variant.74 The guidance system, which used inertial navigation, was capable of in-flight
course corrections only in the boost phase, not in the missile’s ballistic phase.75 China’s
choice to shoot the SLBM from a moving (vice a hovering, static) submarine created
additional problems.76 The flow of water over the hull during a launch sequence sub-
jects an SLBM to forces perpendicular to the desired direction of travel. The designers
apparently found that the missile could be pushed as far as sixty degrees from the verti-
cal; they had to ensure that the launcher and the missile’s flight controls could com-
pensate for the induced error.77 The functional gyros this required were not completed
until 1976, and an adequate attitude-control system was not available until 1980.78 Two
years later, the JL-1 was successfully launched from a surfaced Golf-class submarine.79
The End Result
As a result of such technological challenges, as well as of political and organizational
upheavals, China did not conduct a successful submerged launch of the JL-1 from the
Xia until 1988—a full thirty years after the decision to build China’s first SSBN, and fif-
teen years after the intended launch date of the Xia.80 The question remains of China’s
ability to effectively operate such a complex piece of machinery—especially in the face
of advanced ASW forces. It is believed that the Xia has had very little time at sea and
that, hence, its operational readiness is highly questionable.81 It seems that the years of
struggle to provide China with a more secure nuclear strike capability produced in the
end a submarine of marginal value, an SSBN that has been brushed off as a nonthreat.82
The Xia itself, as a weapons platform, is much less significant than the process by which
China built it, developing a physical and intellectual infrastructure that have enabled
the state to continue its forward progress. The launch in December 2002 of the Type
093 attack submarine, the successor of the Han class, and in July 2004 of the first follow-
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on to the Xia are telling indicators of how far China’s technology has advanced—
though the boats’ true capabilities are likely to remain a mystery for some time.
Strategic ASW and the U.S. Navy Today
One would like to destroy these missiles or the means of launching them
before they are launched, if possible, and if so launched we would like to
destroy the missiles immediately and then get those that have not been
launched. In other words, missile destruction is considered as associated
with the antisubmarine warfare program.
ADMIRAL HOOPER
DIRECTOR OF ASW RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, 1965
Strategic ASW
During the Cold War, American and Soviet submarines engaged in a high-stakes un-
derwater contest.83 Nuclear-powered attack submarines pursued ballistic-missile car-
rying submarines. The mission of the SSNs, in the event of hostilities between the
United States and the Soviet Union, was to destroy the SSBNs—preferably before any
SLBMs were launched. Owen R. Coté, Jr., labels the period of time between 1945 and
1990 the “Third Battle” of undersea forces, one in which both the United States and
USSR invested heavily in undersea technology, each side trying to maintain qualita-
tive or quantitative advantages.84 Coté describes the little-studied topic of strategic
antisubmarine warfare—ASW directed specifically at submerged strategic weapons
carrying platforms, the SSBNs. Generally, ASW involves, as the term suggests, the de-
tection, location, and destruction of submarines; it has been pursued in a variety of
ways since the introduction of the submarine. Strategic ASW, however, is a product
of the nuclear age.
Were hostilities to break out between two countries in possession of SSBNs, the goal of
their respective attack submarines would be to eliminate the other’s SSBNs—that is,
the SSNs would be conducting strategic ASW. Conversely, the goal of the SSBNs would
be to remain undetected and able to launch their SLBMs if so ordered. Strategic ASW
requires SSNs to shadow SSBNs, to track them continuously, utilizing cues from such
sources as satellite imagery, antisubmarine aircraft, and fixed, passive underwater
acoustic arrays.85 Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S. Navy has not had to
face a peer competitor underwater, and consequently its ASW skills and capabilities
have atrophied.86 They have also declined, in part, due a reduction in funding as in-
creased emphasis is given other mission areas, such as power projection ashore.87 Today
the U.S. Navy is forcing a greater emphasis on antisubmarine warfare by the creation of
a new Fleet ASW Command, but funding remains a critical issue. For example, the
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Navy recently announced that it will reduce the size of its P-3C Orion maritime patrol
aircraft fleet by one-third, due to funding shortfalls, airframe fatigue, and the need to
fund the next-generation ASW aircraft—the Multimission Maritime Aircraft (MMA).88
September 2003 remarks of the Commander, Naval Submarine Forces, reflected the
U.S. Navy’s shift from open-ocean ASW to operations in contested littorals and to
strike warfare.89 In the words of Owen Coté, “Geopolitics and technology are conspir-
ing to pull the Navy ashore from the sea, without eliminating the traditional and irre-
ducible need for a navy that is capable of controlling the sea.”90
Scholars, analysts, and government officials all seem to believe that the years 2005–10
will see the emergence of China’s newest SSBNs. It is time to give antisubmarine war-
fare once again the energy it had during the Cold War, to ensure that the United States
has an adequate number of submarines and other ASW assets in the coming decades to
ensure its security. Once the new Chinese Type 094 SSBNs become operational, world
events could oblige the United States to hold them at risk of immediate destruction, as
was once done against the Soviet Union, when strategic ASW was a national mission of
extreme importance.91 In those years, sizeable resources were sunk into developing and
deploying attack submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, surface-ship ASW capability,
and undersea sound monitoring. For much of the Cold War, these resources were em-
ployed (as will be seen in more detail below) in an effort to create a barrier that would
prevent Soviet SSBNs from coming close enough to the continental United States to
launch a nuclear strike that would arrive on short notice. American strategic ASW ca-
pability evolved through improved technology and better operational practices that op-
timized all components that could be brought to bear—air, surface, and subsurface.
The American civilian leadership and the Navy recognized the nature and seriousness
of the threat and, accordingly, gave a high priority to strategic ASW. Today there is a
danger that U.S. strategic ASW capabilities, so formidable a few decades ago, will not
be up to the task if called upon again.92
China’s Advance
Since 1991, when the Soviet Union dissolved, the U.S. Navy has enjoyed the benefits of
its Cold War investment in ASW, because there has been no serious competitor for un-
dersea dominance. Today that situation is changing. China is gradually emerging as a
serious undersea power. As U.S. ASW capability has withered, Chinese diesel subma-
rines are becoming extremely difficult to detect and, consequently, more lethal. In the
world of nuclear-powered submarines, China’s technology is also improving. Unlike
the notoriously noisy Han class, the Type 093 is estimated to be acoustically compara-
ble to the Soviet Victor III.93 Certainly, the 094 will benefit from the improvements in
the 093.94 The introduction of the Victor III in the mid-1980s, it has been argued,
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marked the end of the U.S. Navy’s “happy time”: “The Victor III was the first Soviet
submarine that surprised the Navy with its acoustic stealth, and its deployment was a
harbinger of worse to come.”95 The Soviet Victor III was the forerunner of the Akula,
“the first Soviet submarine that approached or achieved acoustic parity with its Ameri-
can contemporaries.”96
Granted, that was two decades ago; the U.S. Navy has continued since then to upgrade
its own submarine technology while China is still trying to catch up. Nonetheless, it is
likely that the second generation of Chinese nuclear submarines will represent a “great
leap forward.”
Limits, and Narrowing the Margins
There are limits to the levels of quietness and sound detection that can be achieved,
due to the nature of technology and the inherently noisy environment (especially in
the littorals) in which submarines operate. The improvements seen today in submarine
technology today are minor compared to the enormous advances between the USS
Holland and the USS Los Angeles.97 An analogy can be drawn with advances in automo-
bile racing cars over the last century. The world saw in the vehicle that propelled A. J.
Foyt to his seventh national Indianapolis 500 car championship in 1979 major ad-
vances in performance over the cars that Henry Ford raced in the early 1900s—so it
was with the Los Angeles and the Holland. However, the difference in performance be-
tween the car that A. J. Foyt drove and those raced today is minor—hundredths of a
second rather than the hours that would have separated Ford and Foyt had they raced
against one another. The difference between winning and losing comes down to driver
experience and proficiency. Likewise, in an undersea contest between two modern sub-
marines, experience and proficiency are likely to be the decisive factors. In a compari-
son between the United States and China, the U.S. Navy still has a major advantage,
but, as with racing cars, occasionally a rookie pulls off a win. Barring some unforeseen
technological breakthrough, the days of major advances in acoustic detection are gone;
designers now tweak systems to gain that “hundredth of a second” advantage.
China’s purchase of advanced Russian-built Kilo-class diesel submarines (SSK) repre-
sents much more than a mere increase in its number of attack submarines; it has af-
forded China the opportunity to improve the silencing and combat systems of the
indigenous Song-class diesel boats and, surely, its new nuclear-powered boats as well.98
Unlike during its first foray in nuclear submarine design and con-
struction, China is now receiving assistance from Russia—a great
deal of it—and its SSBNs will certainly benefit.99 Even without Rus-
sian assistance, however, advanced computer technology is widely available today. The
last two decades’ exponential improvement in microprocessor performance has
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allowed designers rapidly to shrink margins in performance. According to the Defense
Department’s 2003 annual report to Congress on the PRC, “China will continue pur-
chasing foreign technology to improve quieting, propulsion, and submarine design.
China also will benefit from the maturation of its domestic submarine research and
development infrastructure to achieve a capability to design and manufacture modern
submarines domestically.”100 The Chinese defense industry that is building the 094
SSBN is without a doubt far more capable than the one that struggled with the Xia.
What We Know and What We Don’t Know
Regarding intelligence estimates, Michael I. Handel asks, “How can anyone know, in a
world of secrecy, deception, and subjective perceptions, that his estimates of the en-
emy’s strength are correct?”101 Not surprisingly, estimates concerning China’s future
SSBNs vary considerably, but they are all in agreement that China will have an improved
undersea nuclear strike capability in the very near future.102 Nonetheless, Handel’s point
is well taken, in the sense that the consequences of not being prepared to hold a future
Chinese SSBN fleet at risk make it prudent to hedge one’s bets.
If China’s early SSBN and SLBM programs suffered from political and social upheaval
and a lack of physical and intellectual infrastructure, this is not the case today. China
enjoys political and social stability, its economy is blossoming, and the costs of the nec-
essary infrastructure have been paid. These factors enable China to pursue, at the con-
struction and design levels, its own highly competitive “Indy car.” China is making
parallel improvements in both its officer and enlisted training. Also, notably, a
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submariner, Admiral Zhang Dingfa, now leads the PLAN, which suggests that a greater
emphasis will be placed on the submarine force.103 Further, in the fall of 2004 Admiral
Zhang was given a seat on the Central Military Commission, and as a result a submariner
now has a voice in China’s most important national security decision-making body.
The U.S. Defense Department reported in 2003 that “training and exercise activity [of
the PLAN] in 2002 was robust”; exercises were conducted in the South China Sea uti-
lizing air, surface, and subsurface assets. Close observers of China’s submarine force
have stated that the PLAN is in fact undergoing a training revolution—joining the rest
of the PLA in moving from rote, scripted exercises to “confrontational training” that
encourages innovation and on-the-spot decision making.104 To become effective and
potent, the PLAN submarine force needs to make regular use of instrumented ranges
for weapon shots at sea, and its crews—both of attack and ballistic-missile boats—
need, when not deployed, regular sessions in attack training centers in realistic simu-
lated environments.105 This would be especially important for China’s SSBN crews, who
currently have little, if any, time at sea. Indeed, China has established training centers
where PLAN personnel, including submariners, can train ashore in their respective war-
fare areas.106
Should Washington Be Concerned?
The increased emphasis within the U.S. submarine force on strike, special operations,
and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance raises the question of whether the
U.S. Navy will able to perform strategic ASW missions adequately in the future. Given
enough time, however, it is easier to train than acquire an adequate force structure;
therefore, the U.S. Navy’s ASW forces are the real question mark. Because it is impossi-
ble to predict the future, it cannot be said with any certainty what the future holds for
Sino-U.S. relations. The United States could, however, confront a China that seeks a
much more prominent position on the world stage and is not willing to bend to Wash-
ington’s wishes. Indeed, initiatives by the pro-independence movement in Taiwan dur-
ing the winter of 2003–2004 led China once again to make very public and deliberate
statements that it is willing to go to war to prevent Taiwanese independence, even if
that means suffering a setback in its economy and sacrificing the 2008 Olympics, which
are to be held in Beijing. This seeming willingness to bear such costs is contrary to
what some analysts have argued.107
It is widely agreed that a war between Taiwan and China could involve the United
States, although it is entirely possible that the United States and China will never come
to blows—and, yes, China’s economic growth and integration into the world could lead
to peaceful and prosperous coexistence between the United States and China.108 Still,
the cost of preparedness for strategic ASW would be minuscule compared to the
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catastrophic costs of being surprised by a potent new Chinese SSBN capability—espe-
cially in the midst of a crisis.
A Worthy Opponent?
There is a certain apparent reluctance to take the Chinese submarine force seriously.
Regarding the current and future capabilities of the American submarine force vis-à-
vis China, one U.S. submarine captain wrote, “You can buy the very best subs, you can
study the lessons learned by others and utilize the training methods of the very best,
but still it will take many years of internal growth to produce an effective submarine
force.”109 With respect to a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan,
he writes, “China could put its entire [submarine] force to sea around Taiwan and the
U.S. will still be at risk to lose one or two platforms (if only to bad luck). However, our
[the U.S.] submarine force alone would easily be able to go in and destroy the Chinese
sub force.” He believes that China will not, within the next ten years have a submarine
force capable of competing with the U.S. submarine force as a peer competitor al-
though, “the [submarine] force they are building will increase the risk of U.S. losses . . .
in the future.”110 Referring to a possible conflict over Taiwan and to the recent purchase
of eight Kilo-class submarines, he states, “If the political will of the U.S. holds and
there is a willingness to accept the loss of a few ships or submarines, then the out-
come of the battle is not in question—[the United States would triumph]. But if U.S.
[leaders] are not willing to have even one U.S. submarine or ship [sunk] then we
have already lost the battle and they [the Chinese] might as well stop at four Kilos
vice eight.”111
The latter point, concerning losses, is an important one that deserves careful consider-
ation in light of the impending deployment of larger, more capable Chinese SSBN fleet.
It implies that were a conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan to
erupt when China possesses more capable attack submarines, American SSNs and
other antisubmarine assets might not be able to guarantee the safety of high-value
forces, such as aircraft carriers. If the SSNs could not protect aircraft carriers, it is likely
that they could not perform strategic ASW either. For that reason, though confidence
in the capabilities of the U.S. submarine force is not unwarranted—it is undeniably the
strongest submarine force in the world today—a note of caution is prudent and necessary.
Simply in terms of numbers alone, the entire Chinese submarine fleet—currently
numbering approximately sixty-nine—could put the U.S. submarine force to the ulti-
mate test.112 Other significant complications would be knowledge of the local acoustic
operating environment, the shallow water of the Chinese littorals, a hostile merchant
and fishing fleet, and mines. The experience of the Royal Navy during the Falklands
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War provides ample evidence of the difficulty that diesel-electric submarines represent
for antisubmarine forces.
In 1982, Argentina possessed four submarines of varying capability. Only one, the San
Luis, could conduct offensive operations against the British task force. Facing that sin-
gle submarine were elements of NATO’s North Atlantic ASW force, Antisubmarine
Group 2, arguably one of the most experienced in the world at the time. Nonetheless,
the Argentinean boats were able to conduct two attacks on the British task force (both
of which failed, but only due to weapon malfunctions). Local acoustic conditions ren-
dered British forces helpless; they released over 150 weapons but scored no hits. Ac-
cording to the captain of the San Luis, “There was no effective counter attack. I don’t
think that they knew we were there until they heard our torpedoes running.” The implica-
tion is that every weapon expended in the British ASW effort was fired at false targets.113
The Royal Navy was fortunate in that the weapons of the lone Argentine submarine
failed. In a face-off with China, odds are that not every weapon on every PLAN subma-
rine would do so. The U.S. submarine force would be further stretched to its limits if
Chinese SSBNs were involved. The United States would undoubtedly prevail, albeit at
some cost, in a series of sub-on-sub engagements. If, however, China chose to threaten
the United States with nuclear weapons—even if as a bluff—the U.S. Navy could have
difficulty, with the number of attack submarines it is projected to have, in holding even
a small Chinese SSBN force at risk.
The United States cannot afford to become overconfident in its ability to cope with
China. Prominent analysts like David Shambaugh believe that China will be hard
pressed to catch up to the technology of the West;114 certainly, China’s submarine force
would pose a greater threat to the U.S. Navy were its capabilities equal. However, be-
cause of the nature of undersea warfare, with its complexities and variables, and of
SSBN operations in particular, China does not have to catch up with the West to be a
serious threat to the United States in a conflict.115
Is Ballistic Missile Defense the Answer?
It will be many years before U.S. ballistic-missile defense (BMD) will be capable of pro-
viding the level of protection required to counter the Chinese nuclear forces of today,
let alone those of ten or twenty years from now. The JL-2 SLBM, as well as other mobile
land-based Chinese ICBMs, will have (or already have) multiple independently targeted
reentry vehicles (MIRVs).116 Multiple warheads on each missile and the dozens of ballistic
missiles that China is already capable of launching could deliver an attack that any BMD
system would find exceedingly difficult to counter with 100 percent accuracy.117 Even
were a future ballistic-missile defense system thought capable of intercepting all
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attacking ballistic missiles, with their multiple warheads and decoys, it would be folly
to rely on that technology alone—the United States would be putting all of its eggs in
the BMD basket. Perhaps when U.S. BMD becomes a reality, American SSNs could in-
crease its effectiveness in a conflict by containing the Chinese submarine force within a
geographic area, such as the Yellow Sea, enabling the defenses to focus on that single
vector. But until that time, it is incumbent upon U.S. planners to ensure that the de-
fense against ballistic missiles is a layered one, in which strategic ASW is the first line.
In the words of President John F. Kennedy, “Until technology permits the deployment
of an effective defense against submarine-launched ballistic missiles, the principal
measures of protection should be provided by the capability to attack prior to
launch.”118 Kennedy advocated the ability to hold Soviet SSBNs at risk of destruction
through a stronger ASW capability, and his words still have relevance today.
Will the U.S. Navy Be Ready?
Despite the advances in submarine technology and antisubmarine warfare over the
past fifty years, the conclusions of a study conducted in the 1950s still hold true today.
“Confronted with quiet submarines of long endurance, a sufficiently accurate means of
navigation, and suitable weapons, a defense against shore bombardment by submarines
becomes a huge problem. Even the partial defense of a long coastline requires a very
large effort.”119 It would be a mistake of the greatest magnitude for the United States to
allow itself to be caught shorthanded and unprepared, especially where China’s decid-
edly mobile and capable nuclear forces are concerned. If the United States itself does
not want to be subjected to the “nuclear blackmail” that Mao complained of so bitterly,
whether today or in the future, Washington must once again elevate strategic ASW to a
national mission.120
The recently retired commander of naval submarine forces, Vice Admiral John J.
Grossenbacher, believes that if at least two Virginia-class boats are not built per year,
the U.S. Navy’s fleet of SSNs will decline to thirty submarines.121 Vice Admiral
Grossenbacher argues that American SSNs would then no longer be able to meet the
demands placed on them. As of early 2005, leadership of the Defense Department ap-
pears to have made a definitive decision against this plan, and has opted to build a sin-
gle SSN each year.122 In the defense arena, a significant amount of time is needed to make
ideas reality. The time to begin construction of a larger, more robust fleet of nuclear-
powered attack submarines has already arrived.
If relations between the United States and China deteriorate, will there be enough SSNs
to maintain continuous contact with a growing fleet of Chinese SSBNs? Many factors
must be considered. How many SSBNs would China be able to keep deployed simulta-
neously? How long would they stay deployed? Would each SSBN have two crews, like
4 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
T:\Academic\Newport Papers\Newport Paper 22\Ventura\NP22a.vp
Friday, March 11, 2005 9:20:08 AM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
Notes
the U.S. SSBNs, and so be able to sortie more frequently? Where would they operate
from, and where would they patrol? Would the United States have assets other than
SSNs that could assist in tracking them? How robust would Chinese SSBN defenses—
protection by diesel or nuclear attack boats—be?
If maintenance support for its SSBN was robust and each boat had two crews, it is con-
ceivable that China could keep four of six SSBNs deployed continuously, the remaining
two undergoing maintenance between deployments.123 To maintain close contact with
the four deployed SSBNs, up to twenty SSNs would be required—nearly half of the
current inventory.124 Even that rough estimate illustrates that a substantial commitment
would be required of a submarine community that is already turning missions away
due to a lack of resources. Even if the PLAN does not make such a significant transition
(from a single SSBN that rarely goes to sea to a fleet of six that stay deployed 60 percent
of the time) and only one or two SSBNs were on patrol, the U.S. Navy would still re-
quire five to ten SSNs to hold them at risk.125
China may choose to use the Yellow Sea as a bastion, in order to provide better protec-
tion for its SSBNs; that could significantly complicate matters. The Yellow Sea is, rela-
tively speaking, extremely shallow. Shallow water places substantial restrictions on
submarine maneuverability, and its poor acoustic environment degrades ASW. China
would have the advantage of greater familiarity with the theater. High traffic density
further restricts submarine maneuverability, to avoid collisions; it also produces high
ambient noise, which makes passive acoustic detection extremely difficult at best. It
would also be a challenge for the most proficient U.S. SSNs to gain access undetected to
such a bastion. China can employ a barrier strategy, as the United States did during the
Cold War. Existing shore-based defenses on the Yellow Sea would be to China’s advan-
tage; its aircraft would enjoy short transit times and, accordingly, longer periods on sta-
tion than would U.S. aircraft, if without shore bases of their own. If China were to use
the Yellow Sea as a bastion, therefore, an ability to stage naval and air ASW operations
from South Korea, the Philippines, and Guam would be essential.126
Venturing out into the Pacific or other oceans, however, would require Chinese SSBNs
to be sufficiently quiet to avoid U.S. Navy ASW assets—perhaps clustered to form a
barrier along the “first island chain” (an arc from the Kuriles through Japan, the
Ryukyus, Taiwan, and the Philippines to the Indonesian archipelago).127 China recog-
nizes the threat to its nuclear deterrent posed by the ballistic-missile defense initiatives
of not only the United States but also Japan and Australia.128 China will seek to negate
any advantages that the Washington and its allies may have in the region in order to
maintain a credible second-strike capability.
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China has reportedly begun construction of a submarine base on Hainan Island from
which its SSBNs could operate in the South China Sea.129 It would provide China’s
SSBNs with immediate access to the South China Sea and put them much closer to
the Indian Ocean. For political reasons, basing SSBNs on Hainan Island, in its South
Sea Fleet area of operations, makes sense for China, because the United States is not
China’s only concern in the Asia-Pacific region. Additionally, if Chinese SSBNs were
to operate from two bases about 1,600 nautical miles apart, U.S. ASW assets would
be denied the opportunity to concentrate in a particular area.130 Furthermore, an ad-
ditional base would afford China more pier space. Whether or not China would actu-
ally launch JL-2 SLBMs from the Indian Ocean, its SSBNs might operate there, and
elsewhere, simply to complicate U.S. ballistic-missile defense and tie up more anti-
submarine assets.131
During the first three decades of the Cold War, prior to introduction of the Soviet Delta
SSBN, the U.S. Navy relied on a barrier strategy to detect Soviet SSBNs. Pre-Delta Soviet
SSBNs were forced to pass through geographic choke points, such as the “Greenland-
Iceland-U.K. Gap,” in order for their SLBMs to be able to reach the United States. The
barrier strategy took advantage of this weakness; fixed passive acoustic arrays, subma-
rines, and land-based ASW aircraft made it quite successful.132 The Delta SSBN, how-
ever, could threaten the continental United States from Soviet territorial waters. This
effectively negated the U.S. barrier strategy, since the Deltas could strike the United
States without having to cross the barriers—the Deltas used bastions.133 In light of the
eventual deployment of possibly up to six Chinese SSBNs, the American response to
the Soviet Deltas is worthy of consideration.
The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, favored an emphasis on sea con-
trol to ensure the ability to reinforce Western Europe.134 Focusing on the defense of Western
Europe, Zumwalt argued, would avoid a potentially costly diversion of naval assets to Soviet
SSBN patrol areas, which could escalate a conflict between the United States and the Soviet
Union from a strictly conventional to a nuclear level. The alternative viewpoint was that “an
explicit attempt should be made to go forward and hold Soviet SSBNs at risk.”135 The argu-
ment was that the destruction of Soviet SSBNs would change the strategic nuclear balance
and therefore possibly decrease the will of the Soviets to escalate in the event of a stalemate.
Furthermore, holding the Soviet SSBNs at risk in their bastions was held to be beneficial to
the U.S. mission of sea control, in that it would force the Soviet Navy to divert assets in an
attempt to deny access to American SSNs—a strategy that worked during the Cold War.136
The same logic could be applied to a conflict between China and the United States over
Taiwan, but only if the United States has available sufficient strategic ASW assets to
hold Chinese SSBNs at risk—which it might not in the future. If the numbers were
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sufficient, however, and assuming China’s SSBNs left port, knowledge that U.S. SSNs
and other ASW assets were hunting them would force China to withdraw its best sub-
marines to protect its SSBNs. Due to geography of a Taiwan conflict, the U.S. Army and
Air Force would be hard pressed to join in a fight over Taiwan. Consequently, every as-
set that the U.S. Navy could muster to the region would be vital to success. Coté alludes
to such a challenging scenario in his concluding remarks:
The most challenging scenario for the Navy is one where U.S. access to overseas bases is greatly re-
duced, and where the proliferation of relatively low cost and easy to use access denial weapons—such
as modern diesel-electric submarines, antiship and antiaircraft missiles, and naval mines—continues
to grow. This is a world in which the Navy will have to provide a larger portion of national power pro-
jection capabilities, while also placing much more emphasis on sea control than it does now.137
Given the modest scale of its current ASW capability, the United States would likely be
completely occupied protecting its battle fleet while finding and destroying the numer-
ous Chinese submarines—including even the low-technology platforms that the PLAN
still operates. During a major conflict over Taiwan the United States would likely locate
one or more carrier battle groups within operational range of Taiwan. One can imag-
ine the “one-way conversation” that would occur when the local ASW commander told
the battle-group commander that it could take weeks to eliminate the subsurface threat
to his ships, due to the large number of Chinese submarines, not to mention the to
submarine-laid mines that China could employ.138 If China elects to threaten a nuclear
response to U.S. “interference” in what it considers an internal issue, the battle-group
commander would then presumably be forced to shift assets to strategic ASW, perhaps
rendering his own capital ships even more vulnerable.
Such dire scenarios can be prevented in the future if the right force-structure planning
decisions are made today. To prepare for the future and all of its conceivable threats,
the U.S. Navy needs a fleet of close to seventy SSNs and enough air and surface ASW
capability to support not only the missions the submarine force is already tasked with
but also strategic ASW, if China does in fact build a significant undersea nuclear deter-
rent.139 In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in June 2000, the
Commander Submarine Forces U.S. Pacific Fleet, Rear Admiral Albert H. Konetzni, tes-
tified that the United States needs a minimum of sixty-eight SSNs to meet current and
future requirements.140 If, after China begins deployment of the first of its new SSBNs,
it is evident that they will adhere to the habits of the past—remain pierside, employ
single crews, or stay within a defined geographic area—the American strategic ASW
force structure can be adjusted as necessary. It would be much easier to cut funding
and halt construction than it would be to respond suddenly to a threat, having been
caught unprepared.141
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The U.S. Navy cannot always rely on being “saved by the bell, as it has it has in the
past.”142 Recent and upcoming advancements like the Multimission Maritime Aircraft,
the Advanced Deployable System, the new Fleet ASW Command, the Littoral Combat
Ship, and the May 1998 engineering test143—to name only a few—represent significant
present day and future ASW achievements but they are not the complete solution.144
Force-structure planning involves identification of threats in the near, middle, and long
terms; the United States has the opportunity to “get a jump” on a threat now on the
horizon now, by reviving its former antisubmarine prowess. Ensuring that the U.S.
Navy has the right number of SSNs and air and surface ASW assets—more than it has
today—is vital to the security of the United States.
Conclusion
The development of the Chinese defense establishment over the past five decades has
been excruciatingly slow and turbulent, and so was the development of China’s first
SSBN. Having invested in a physical and intellectual infrastructure to create its early
strategic weapons programs, China is now reaping the benefits. China now has a solid
capability to design and construct SSBNs and SLBMs that are much more advanced
than their predecessors.
The debate will continue on China’s true intentions, but the strategic implications of a
more numerous and capable Chinese SSBN fleet are rather clear. China seeks an as-
sured nuclear strike capability, and SSBNs are well suited to the job. Such a force would
raise the risks of confronting China in a crisis and may even decrease American lever-
age in a given crisis, unless it can be effectively neutralized.
China has already a limited capability to threaten the continental United States, but the
introduction of new, more capable submerged strategic systems with far greater range
and accuracy would enable it to strike the United States from the relative safety of its
own waters. The rationale behind the decision to hold Soviet SSBNs at risk in the Cold
War are applicable today. By the time China’s new SSBNs are deployed, it is unlikely
that the United States will have developed a totally reliable ballistic-missile defense sys-
tem—especially against sophisticated countermeasures (see chapter 4 of this volume).
Therefore, as in the Cold War, it is incumbent upon the U.S. Navy to equip and train it-
self for strategic ASW.
Will the U.S. Navy be able to resume a more aggressive strategic ASW posture in re-
sponse to a new and improved fleet of Chinese SSBNs? As a result of the future ad-
vances in Chinese attack submarines, improvements in the PLAN education and
training, the numerous Chinese submarines in existence today, Asian-Pacific
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geography, an anemic American ASW capability that is likely to continue to decline,
the U.S. Navy could be ill prepared to do so.
It is quite conceivable that strategic ASW will once again rise to the highest national
importance. The period remaining before China deploys a larger number of SSBNs—
within the next five years—affords the United States and its navy a vital opportunity.
The United States should plan now to stop the decline in U.S. strategic ASW capability,
by halting the decline in the number of SSNs, increasing SSN end-strength to at least
seventy, and build up air and surface ASW capability. After all, nuclear-powered sub-
marines, aircraft, and surface ships are cheap—compared to the cost of replacing the
city of Los Angeles.145
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China has recently become one of only three nations that have achieved human space
flight. This considerable achievement has served China, its government, and its people
on many levels, and it will continue to do so. It has symbolized to the world the tech-
nological power of a nation ascendant; it affirmed the legitimacy of China’s political
system some fifty-four years after the communist revolution; and it has provided China
the national prestige to bring it ever closer to assuming its place among the great pow-
ers of the twenty-first century.
Another, less heralded beneficiary is the ongoing effort undertaken by Beijing to mod-
ernize its strategic nuclear capability. The military significance of the success of the
Chinese civil space program—largely overseen by the People’s Liberation Army—
should not be underestimated. Indeed, the contemporary linkage between missile de-
velopment and China’s burgeoning civil and commercial space operations has deep
historical roots. This civil-military nexus, common to space programs the worldwide,
has over a period of decades led to both direct and indirect improvements in China’s
strategic nuclear forces.1 Initially, China’s nuclear program drove its intercontinental-
ballistic-missile delivery requirements, thereby galvanizing China’s space program.
Now that both programs have matured, the dynamic seems to be mutually reinforcing.
Potentially significant examples of the military benefits of this symbiotic relationship
include improvement in: ICBM range, accuracy, and survivability, as well as space-
based intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), targeting, counter-space
weapons, and ballistic-missile-defense countermeasures.
One need not appeal to Sun Tzu’s injunction that “all warfare is based on deception” to
understand the significance of this relationship.2 The theoretically civil Chinese space
program—including the human space flight component—is simultaneously accelerat-
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China’s Star Rising
The launch of Shenzhou V on 14 October 2003, China’s first manned space mission,
brought Beijing acclaim both at home and around the globe.3
The achievement capped an extraordinary half-century effort,
accelerated in the 1990s, to gain access to an exclusive club of
space-faring nations that had previously comprised only the United States and the So-
viet Union/Russia. This membership will help affirm China’s place among the great
powers of the twenty-first century. Lieutenant Colonel Yang Liwei, China’s first
yuhangyuan to venture into space, has become an instant hero;4 he is to an electrified
Chinese public a legendary figure—on the order of Yuri Gagarin
and Alan Shepard.5 The success of the mission, and corresponding
public approval, has also provided a boost to the political legiti-
macy of the communist leadership at a time of considerable uncertainty regarding the
party’s future role in Chinese society. It has touched a deep nationalistic chord as another
example of the new China, reborn after two centuries of decline. Internationally, its appear-
ance on the world stage of as a third space-faring nation may be viewed as yet another indi-
cation that China, long considered backward and hopelessly outclassed, is rising.
Chinese technical and political leaders have stated repeatedly that Shenzhou will only
be the beginning of an exciting future of space stations, reusable space shuttles, and
missions to the moon and planets. Given the current moribund state of the U.S. civil
space program in the wake of the Columbia shuttle disaster of 1 February 2003, and
with the much downsized Russian program only a shadow of its former greatness, one
can only marvel and share in the excitement of a Chinese civil space program, appar-
ently on track and reaching for the stars.6
But what about the strategic implications of this putatively peaceful and scientific quest for
the heavens? One need not look very far for the answer. The July 2003 appointment of Gen-
eral Li Jinai, director of the General Armaments Department, as the new head of the
Manned Space Project provides an essential clue.7 In fact, lying largely out of public view is
the influence exerted by the PLA over the entire civil space effort. More importantly, how-
ever, it may be the long-standing relationship between the PLA Second Artillery Corps
(China’s strategic rocket forces) and the civil and commercial launch and satellite programs
that provides the best indication that China’s success in space will inevitably contribute to
the state’s growing military power.
The codevelopment of launch vehicles for both military and civil purposes has a long
history, dating back almost fifty years. More recently, civil space-related technologies,
whether indigenously developed or purchased internationally, are spilling over into the
military realm. This technology transfer has direct military applications, especially in
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the arena of major ICBM improvements. Indirectly, but closely related, are improve-
ments in space-based ISR and targeting, as well as the development of space weapons.
Not surprisingly, then, while China forges ahead in space, its strategic nuclear forces
have likewise undergone a modernization effort that continues unabated.
In PRC development of a robust manned space presence, are we witnessing a “grand
vision for the future to explore space [that is] inspiring to the Chinese people,” as re-
lated by Huang Chunping, chief commander of rocketry for the Shenzhou project?8 Or
are we seeing China’s attempt to gain all the military advantages of “the new high
ground” (a common reference to space during the Cold War) along the lines of the So-
viet manned space program of the last century? In pursuing both goals simultaneously,
will China become the new “Red Star in Orbit?”9
This chapter addresses the linkage between the rise of the Chinese space program and
the PLA’s ongoing strategic nuclear modernization program. First, the historical roots
of that linkage are examined to gain a better understanding of the “spin-on/spin-off ”
relationship of the two programs. Second, some current examples of both direct and
indirect military benefits resulting from that relationship are presented in order to ap-
preciate more fully the military implications of China’s success in space and also to
outline areas of potential future concern. Finally, current Chinese efforts will be com-
pared to those of the American and Soviet space programs at their height in order to
gain insight into the possible future course of the Chinese manned space program. This
comparison will then be used shed light on the impact for China’s strategic nuclear
modernization.
Linked at Birth: The Role of Qian
One can hardly appreciate the modern history of China’s ballistic missile and space de-
velopment without encountering an almost larger-than-life figure—Qian Xuesen, a
Chinese-born, MIT and Cal Tech–educated scholar who, deported to China in 1955
under suspicion of being a communist, was (and still is) probably the most influential
personality in this story.10 Qian’s contributions to early theories on rocket aerodynam-
ics and space travel as one of the founding members of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory
in Pasadena are legendary. Other studies by him laid the foundations for development
of both the U.S. Air Force and the national space programs. The ultimate loss to Wash-
ington (and gain for Beijing) of this brilliant visionary was of such magnitude that
Undersecretary of the Navy Daniel Kimball declared, “I’d rather see him shot than let
him go. . . . He’s worth three to five divisions anyplace.”11 Echoing that sentiment was
Qian’s Cal Tech–appointed attorney, Grant B. Cooper: “That the government permitted
this genius, this scientific genius, to be sent to Communist China to pick his brains is
one of the tragedies of this century.”12
C H I N A ’ S N U C L E A R F O R C E M O D E R N I Z A T I O N 5 1
T:\Academic\Newport Papers\Newport Paper 22\Ventura\NP22a.vp
Friday, March 11, 2005 9:20:09 AM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
Notes
Back in China in 1955, Qian pledged “to do my best to help the Chinese people
build up their nation.”13 In fact, he went to work to initiate and develop China’s
ballistic missile program. One of Qian’s first recommendations to the Chinese gov-
ernment in 1956 was patterned on the study he had done for the U.S. Air Force for
its long-term weapons development. The plan placed emphasis on atomic energy,
missiles, computer science, semiconductors, electronics, and automation technol-
ogy. Qian also emphasized the exploitation of foreign—especially U.S.—technical
materials as guides for indigenous development. Most importantly, Qian convinced
the Chinese government that missile development should take precedence over air-
craft development.14
Qian became immersed in turning this plan into reality. Confronting the backward-
ness of China’s industrial base in the mid-1950s, Qian set about almost single-
handedly to develop the science and technology infrastructure that would be critical
to China’s success. He was instrumental in establishing the Fifth Academy of Na-
tional Defense, China’s first institute for missile design. Today, many of the various
Chinese state organs of science, technology, and industry relating to defense and
space trace their lineage either directly to the Fifth Academy or to one of its sub-
academies.15 Iris Chang observes:
He was capable of organizing, decades in advance, gargantuan projects involving thousands of scien-
tists, as well as introducing the kind of engineering systems that could track the tiniest details within
an organization. He played a key role in taking a primitive military establishment and transforming it
into one that could deliver nuclear bombs intercontinentally; he initiated and guided numerous pro-
jects that brought China into the space age.16
5 2 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
1955—Mao Zedong initiates nuclear weapons program
1964—China detonates first atomic bomb
1966—China undertakes unprecedented nuclear-armed missile test
1967—China detonates first hydrogen bomb
1980—First operational test of DF-5 ICBM
1988—JL-1 SLBM successfully launched from Xia SSBN
1995—Successful test of DF-31 ICBM
2001—First submerged launch of JL-2 SLBM, from Golf-class submarine
2003—Deployment of first brigade of DF-31 ICBMs
2004—Type 094 SSBN launched; JL-2 test failure
Strategic Weapons Time Line
Sources: Brian Harvey, China’s Space Program—From Conception to Manned Spaceflight (New York: Springer-Praxis, 2004) pp. 323–
328; John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988); Globalsecurity.org.
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The first modern missiles in China were two R-1s—Soviet copies of the German V-2—
purchased in 1956. By late 1957, Qian had arranged for the delivery of the first R-2 mis-
siles, an improved version of the R-1. Despite the 1960 break in Sino-Soviet collabora-
tion, China succeeded that year in launching its first indigenous atmospheric-sounding
rocket, the T-7. In September 1960 China launched a Soviet R-2 filled with indigenous
propellant, and in November it successfully launched the first Chinese-built replica of the
R-2, from the new Jiuquan launch site in the Gobi Desert.17 Building on these successes,
Qian and his growing legions of personally trained engineers and technicians worked on
a series of missiles, ultimately producing the Dong Feng. The initial goal, set in 1961, for the
“DF” was a ten-thousand-kilometer-range missile capable of striking
the continental United States. Beset by technical difficulties coupled
with the chaos surrounding the Great Leap Forward, Qian was
forced to lower the bar.18 After some initial overconfidence and overstretch, a methodical
development of a series of missiles began of successively greater capabilities, each model
having its own specific purpose: the DF-1 was a simply a renamed R-2, but the DF-2
would be capable of hitting Japan, the DF-3 the Philippines, the DF-4 Guam, and the DF-
5 the continental United States.19
The Cultural Revolution had a severe impact on all of China’s strategic weapons pro-
grams. It is a wonder that any significant progress was achieved in this tumultuous and
disruptive period. During these years the Chinese engineers conducted under political
pressure one of the riskiest and most dangerous missile test launches of all time (as de-
scribed in chapter 1). Barely two years after successfully detonating its first atomic
weapon, on 27 October 1966 China launched a modified DF-2 intermediate-range
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1955—American missile expert Qian Xuesen returns to China
1960—China launches first indigenously manufactured rocket
1970—PRC launches Dong Fang Hong-1, its first Earth satellite
1975—PRC launches first remote sensing satellite, FSW-0
1985—China offers first commercial launch services
1992—Jiang Zemin approves Project 921, PRC manned spaceflight program
1993—PLA Chief of Staff Chi Haotian visits Russia’s Star City, inaugurating bilateral
space cooperation
1999—Shenzhou 1 prototype initiates active testing stage of manned space program
2000—Beidou 1, first PRC navigation satellite, launched
2003—Shenzhou 5 launches Lt. Col. Yang Liwei, China’s first astronaut
Space Program Time Line
Sources: Brian Harvey, China’s Space Program—From Conception to Manned Spaceflight (New York: Springer-Praxis, 2004) pp. 323–
328; Globalsecurity.org.
Dong Feng (East Wind)
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ballistic missile (IRBM) with a live twelve-kiloton atomic warhead, which impacted in
the western Xinjiang desert.20 According to a communiqué, “China successfully con-
ducted over its own territory a guided missile nuclear weapons test. The guided missile
flew normally and the nuclear warhead accurately hit the target at the appointed dis-
tance, effecting a nuclear explosion.”21 By 1969 the deterioration of relations with the
Soviet Union had reached the point of military confrontation, leading to a redesign of
the DF-4 to increase its range enough to reach Moscow.22
Qian’s technical and organizational achievements were not limited to military missile devel-
opment. The Soviet launch in May 1958 of the 1.3-ton Sputnik III geophysical observatory,
the third and most successful of the Sputnik series, was viewed in China as an impressive
advance from the ten-kilogram Sputnik I of only seven months prior.23 Chairman Mao’s re-
action to Sputnik III prompted the creation of Project 581—to develop and launch China’s
first satellite. Although the effort would take over eleven years to bear fruit, Qian’s personal
leadership in the design, development, and successful launch of China’s first satellite, Dong
Fang Hong (DFH-1), is undisputed. The chief result of this ef-
fort, after the satellite itself, was the coincidental development
of China’s first civil (and later commercial) launch vehicles, the
Chang Zheng (CZ series). The CZ-1 evolved directly from the DF-4 IRBM (also known as
the CSS-3).24 On 24 April 1970, the DFH-1 was successfully launched atop a CZ-1 three-
stage booster, making China only the fifth country to conduct sat-
ellite operations.25 On 1 May 1970, Qian was “hailed as a hero” by
Mao amidst much fanfare in Tiananmen Square.26
In the subsequent decades, China’s space program made impressive gains, in part
due to the new stability that followed Deng Xiaoping’s ascendance in 1978–79.
However, one of Deng’s important initiatives was to cut military spending—a fac-
tor that probably encouraged China’s missileers to examine the possibility of sup-
plementing government funding with revenue from commercial launches. In 1985,
the nearly simultaneous Challenger disaster and failure of Europe’s flagship Ariane
booster provided new international demand for China’s launch services. Moreover,
Beijing in April 1992 undertook Project 921 (a PLA designation)—the manned
space program—giving additional impetus to China’s overall space efforts.27 The
rise of Jiang Zemin, a technocrat and confirmed space enthusiast, over the course
of the 1990s also accelerated the Chinese space program.
The success of the CZ series has continued nearly unabated for over thirty years and
has produced an extensive family of launch vehicles, with over twelve distinct types and
more under development.28 The follow-on to the CZ-1, known as the CZ-2, is the civil-
ian, commercial version of the DF-5 (or CSS-4) ICBM; it now has a twenty-five-year
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history of broad applications.29 Variants can now place payloads of upward of five
thousand kilograms in low earth orbit (LEO) and 2,500 kilograms in sun-synchronous
orbit.30 The launch vehicle chosen for the Shenzhou manned missions was the CZ-2F, a
two-stage rocket with four strap-on boosters, capable of lifting over nineteen thousand
pounds to LEO.31 This rocket has flown successfully five times since 1999, culminating
in the launch of Shenzhou V. Through Qian, therefore, the launch vehicle carrying
Lieutenant Colonel Yang, and with him the hopes of Project 921, can trace its lineage
directly back to the earliest DF ballistic missiles. Moreover, according to Joan Johnson-
Freese of the Naval War College, “The symbiotic nature of the technology and the in-
tertwined nature of the Chinese military and civil space program allowed parallel devel-
opment of a missile/launcher for dual application purposes.”32
Notwithstanding such triumphs, China suffered a series of launch failures during the
1990s that made its commercial satellite launch industry virtually uninsurable. Subse-
quently, suspicions that American satellite technologies were being illegally transferred to
China by U.S. satellite manufacturers led to a Congressional investigation which became
known as the Cox Committee. The commission’s report, issued in May 1999, charged
that China had dramatically improved its launch vehicle reliability and warhead minia-
turization through a coordinated program of espionage, both in China and at American
national laboratories.33 The “Cox Report” has proven immensely controversial, receiving
ample criticism from a range of scholars and policy analysts.34 Much of this criticism,
however, has attacked the report’s context and tone (“The [Chinese Communist Party’s]’s
main aim for the civilian economy is to support . . . the aims of the PLA”) rather than dis-
puting allegations concerning Chinese “information gathering” practices or the export-
control violations for which Loral Space & Communications and the Hughes Space and
Telecommunications Company ultimately paid multimillion-dollar fines.35
Regardless of the Cox Report’s claims, it is worth noting that China has not suffered a
major launch failure since allegedly receiving assistance from Loral and Hughes. China
has become one of the global leaders in commercial satellite launchers, with over forty-
seven successful attempts by October 2000.36 A source of much-needed revenue for
China’s space program, commercial satellite
launches also provide a mechanism for space coop-
eration (and technology acquisition) with interna-
tional partners, among them Germany, France, Brazil, and countries of the
former Soviet bloc. Additionally, China has fielded several series of its own sat-
ellites. The DFH family of communication satellites was
soon joined by the Fanhui Shi Weixing (or FSW) recover-
able military reconnaissance satellites and by the Fengyun
(FY) meteorological satellites.
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Is it possible that one man could have an impact on such a wide scale? In fact, Qian’s
influence was even broader. He also had a hand in other programs of great military im-
portance, including antiship cruise missiles, nuclear submarines, and the development
of the tracking, telemetry, and control network used to monitor military, civilian, and
commercial space launches.37 Qian officially retired in October 1991, but his presence is
still felt in both the Chinese space program and within the Second Artillery Corps. It is
too easy to compare Qian Xuesen to Werner Von Braun in the United States or Sergei P.
Korolev in the Soviet Union.38 A more appropriate analogy might be to Admiral
Hyman P. Rickover, the father of the American nuclear navy and a figure who also
loomed larger than life, a presence in every aspect of the nuclear program. Of Qian’s
legacy, three lasting imprints on the development of China’s ballistic missile and space
programs have been noted:
• Confidence that China can match the West in its technological development
• Top priority for the strategic nuclear and missile industries in the defense industrial
hierarchy
• A forward-looking approach, bold in its engineering ambitions, to defense science
and technology strategy.39
Escape Velocity: Reaping the Benefits of Interdependence
Whereas Qian Xuesen was the best-understood link in the commingled history of the
development of China’s space and ballistic missile programs, the “activities and tests in
the former used to advance objectives in the latter” form the basis for concern today.40
Qian and his “activities” had woven an intricate, inseparable relationship between the
two programs, one that continues to reap benefits for China’s strategic nuclear mod-
ernization now under way. Those military benefits have yielded direct qualitative im-
provements in ICBM accuracy, range, and survivability.41 In fact, two recent examples
of ICBM improvements are directly attributable to this civil-military nexus.
Currently only three types of ICBMs in the Chinese inventory are capable of strik-
ing the continental United States from bases in China: two versions of the liquid-
fuel DF-5 (CSS-4 Mod 1 and Mod 2) and the new solid-fuel DF-31. Though first
successfully flown in September 1971, the twelve-thousand-kilometer DF-5
achieved initial operating capability only in 1981, its development and production
having been prolonged to ten years by the Cultural Revolution.42 An improved ver-
sion, the DF-5A, extends this range a thousand kilometers. Both are identical cop-
ies of what ultimately became the CZ-2C commercial booster, which was
codeveloped during this period. Their single warheads and the silo-basing (and
two-hour fueling) requirements were but two of shortcomings that led to the
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development of the DF-31. The eight-thousand-kilometer, solid-fuel, road- (or possi-
bly rail-) mobile DF-31 is the land-based version of the Julang 2 (JL-2) submarine-
launched ballistic missile (see chapter 2). The missile is reported
to be MIRV capable, using the smaller seven-hundred-kilogram,
one-megaton warhead developed for the JL-1 SLBM developed in
the 1980s.43 The DF-31 is reportedly now being fielded in small numbers; a longer-
range variant (twelve thousand kilometers) is in development.44
Emerson Niou of Duke University has offered an innovative theory suggesting that
Chinese strategic planners now have the elements a potential fourth delivery system,
one with roots in the early satellite development program. Modern development of
solid rocket motors (SRMs) in China dates back some forty years. This technology was
used in the FG-2 third (upper) stage of the first CZ-1 launch vehicle, as part of the
DFH-1 satellite program of the early 1970s.45 The CZ-1D production line having re-
cently been reopened for ostensibly civil, commercial launches, the Second Artillery
Corps could replace the satellite payload on the CZ-1D with a seven-hundred-kilogram
warhead. Since the CZ-1D is directly descended from the DF-4 IRBM, such combina-
tion of an FG-2 SRM third stage and JL-1 warhead would extend the range of the mis-
sile to that of an ICBM.46 To be sure, the CZ-1D (DF-4) still possesses a liquid-fuel first
stage and thus requires a fixed launch site and fueling infrastructure. However, this rel-
atively rapid conversion and upgrade of an existing launch vehicle would provide the
Second Artillery with the ability to increase dramatically the numbers of its ICBMs.
Why might such an option be important to Chinese strategic planners? Clearly,
China is alarmed at U.S. efforts to deploy a ballistic-missile defense system (see
chapter 4 in this volume). By rapidly expanding the ICBM force through IRBM
conversion and using the MIRV capability of the DF-31, Beijing may well hope to
saturate American missile defenses, to overcome the strategic impact of BMD
through sheer volume, thereby preserving the deterrent quality of its force.47
The second recent ICBM breakthrough concerns the survivability aspect of the new
road-mobile DF-31. Thanks to SRM technology, the DF-31 has the mobility, with its
transporter-erector launchers, to reduce its vulnerability to targeting in the earliest
stages of hostilities, and even, possibly, to evade a counterstrike. This degree of second-
strike capability would give Chinese strategic planners options, overcoming what is
now considered the “use-or-lose” nature of the twenty or so fixed-site DF-5s.48 Addi-
tionally, the DF-31 SRMs offer operational flexibility, not having to be fueled, like the
DF-5, immediately prior to use.
The relationship between China’s space program and its strategic nuclear forces effec-
tively adds space warfare to the options before Chinese strategic planners—an option
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offering a wide array of new capabilities and technologies available for exploitation.
Beijing clearly appreciates the role space has played in recent conflicts—from DESERT
STORM to the present day—and intends to develop space-based defense and intelligence
assets to support its strategic nuclear modernization efforts. To that end, several new
families of satellites are under development—including radar imaging, electronic recon-
naissance, and electro-optical reconnaissance types—all of which will improve current
space-based ISR capabilities.49 Here again, cooperation with international partners under
ostensibly civil frameworks has yielded another military application: “In January 2003,
the Chinese launched their second Zi Yuan (ZY-2) photoreconnaissance satellite, capable
of resolution in the range of ten to twenty centimeters. It is a military version of a satel-
lite jointly developed by China and Brazil for remote sensing (the ZY-1, or China Brazil
Earth Resource Satellite [CBERS])—evidence of how development of a civil program can
have clear military benefit.”50
In fact, yet another Chinese product of SRM technology is the small, solid-fuel
Kaituozhe 1 and 2 (KT-1/2) satellite launch vehicle, designed to provide rapid reliable
access to space in times of crisis or increased ISR require-
ments.51 According to China Defense Today, the Kaituozhe is
“possibly based on the technology of the DF-31” ICBM.52 Also
instrumental to China’s pursuit of space influence is the development of microsatellite
technology designed to reduce lift requirements sharply. It may improve China’s al-
ready demonstrated ability to place multiple satellites in orbit with a single launcher.53
Moreover, a larger constellation of smaller satellites would theoretically increase indi-
vidual satellite survivability in space, being less susceptible to antisatellite (ASAT)
weapons.54 Improved space-based ISR will have a significant impact on targeting for
both regional and global scenarios. Combining rapid launch capability with improved
ground processing capacity could allow real-time imaging that would provide decision
makers much-needed information in the prehostilities phase of any conflict.55
China is attempting to reduce its reliance on the U.S. Global Positioning System (GPS)
satellite network by joining Europe’s competing Galileo project. Meanwhile, Beijing has
developed a rudimentary two-satellite supplement to GPS known as
Beidou. This may ultimately insulate the PLA against restrictions
upon GPS in wartime, as well as increase the accuracy of conven-
tional and strategic systems.
China has taken much interest in the 2001 Report of the Commission to Assess
United States National Security Space Management and Organization, a report of a
panel chaired by the current secretary of defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld. China, while
officially taking a position against weaponization of space, seems nevertheless to be
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developing systems that could be used in an offensive counterspace role, even con-
ceivably for space-based missile defense.56 According to a senior fellow at the
Jamestown Foundation, “China needs to be able to deny to the United States access
and use of space, as they themselves expect to be able to support their own
forces.”57 To that end, the Chinese are “seeking to minimize the space technology
gap with the United States.”58 Integral to these efforts appears, once again, to be the
acquisition of foreign technology:
Beijing already may have acquired technical assistance that could be applied to the development of laser
radars used to track and image satellites and may be seeking an advanced radar system with the capa-
bility to track satellites in low earth orbit. It may also be developing jammers that could be used
against Global Positioning System (GPS) receivers. In addition, China may already possess the capa-
bility to damage, under specific conditions, optical sensors on satellites that are very vulnerable to
damage by laser. Beijing may also have acquired high-energy laser equipment and technical assistance,
which probably could be used in the development of ground-based ASAT weapons.59
For a nation struggling with modernizing its industrial base and raising its technical
standards, all the while asserting itself on the world stage, it seems only reasonable to
seek foreign assistance in order to buy time to prepare its own technological base. Con-
sidering that 95 percent of space technologies are potentially dual-use, sharing technol-
ogy between the space program and the military is perfectly logical.60
Of course, codevelopment of ICBMs and civilian rockets was not invented by the Chi-
nese. One could even argue that the real beneficiary of the civil-military overlap is
the growing civilian, commercial booster family—the CZ-1 and CZ-2, derived from
the DF-4 and DF-5, respectively. The early U.S. space program relied heavily on
ICBM-derived launchers until purpose-built rockets like the Saturn V could be devel-
oped.61 In fact, the R-7 rocket used today by the Russians to loft Soyuz capsules to the
International Space Station (ISS) is little changed from the SS-6 Sapwood ICBM booster
that placed Yuri Gagarin in orbit (and in the history books) over forty years ago.
China’s exploitation of space as a war-fighting medium may be simply a response to
the stunning battlefield success enjoyed in recent years by the United States with space-
based assets. Prudence would therefore dictate that if one expects to face a space-faring
competitor like the United States, development of space weapons might be a good in-
vestment of limited resources. Nonetheless, disturbing characteristics of China’s inter-
woven military and civil space programs remain, in three respects.
First, unlike other contemporary space programs, which relate to a country’s military
establishment at some level, the Chinese space program has been described as “distinct
in the degree of its military involvement, the extent of its military functions, and the
scale of its military significance.”62 As such, China’s space program should be viewed
not as merely related to the military but as managed by it (as should all activities, deci-
sions, and events in that context).
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Second, until indigenous Chinese
technological development be-
comes a continuous source for cut-
ting-edge innovations and general
improvements for military and
strategic systems, China will re-
main wedded to foreign sources.
The PRC has always demonstrated
a propensity to acquiring, adapt-
ing, and applying technology de-
veloped outside of China. The
essentially one-way flow from for-
eign technology sources through
civilian and commercial space ap-
plications, and ultimately to strate-
gic nuclear modernization is likely
to continue for the foreseeable
future.
Third, beyond technology transfer,
China clearly sees the national stra-
tegic importance of a viable space
program. China desires to become
a space power and accrue all the benefits and prestige of that status, both domestically
and internationally. Despite public proclamations of peaceful intentions—the lofty
preamble to the PRC’s 2000 white paper on space is an example—the national security
motive plays a major role.63
When viewed in this light, the implications of China’s space program for strategic
nuclear modernization now under way become clear. China’s space ambitions will
continue to serve as the vehicle for the acquisition, adaptation, and application of
space-related technologies for military purposes.
The New Domain of the Dragon: Shenzhou and Beyond
The first manned flight of Shenzhou on 14 October 2003—the capstone event of Pro-
ject 921—was, predictably, a conservative, risk-averse, and brief (twenty-one-hour,
fourteen-orbit) mission, carrying only Lieutenant Colonel Yang.64 After all, this flight
was intended simply to validate the spacecraft’s systems—or was it? According to one
report, the spacecraft also deployed a “new Chinese military intelligence-gathering sat-
ellite.”65 Is this a key mission of Project 921 (properly, the National Manned Space
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Project, now headed by General Li Jinai)? What will the follow-on Shenzhou missions
be like? What will come after Shenzhou, and how will future programs relate to the
overall Chinese strategy for space?
China being only the third nation to achieve human space flight, only two other space
programs are available to serve as models for comparison. Both the United States and
Russia (and the USSR before it) can lay claim to certain “firsts” in space. During the
Cold War space race each country followed its own strategy and built a space program
that was based on its respective culture, ideology, goals, capabilities, and resources. The
intense competition that ensued reveals in retrospect the strengths and weaknesses of,
and ultimately insight into, the two programs, and so represents a lens through which
to view the nascent Chinese program. Already Project 921 has reflected characteristics
of both the early American and Soviet programs in terms of appearance, methodology,
aspiration, and ultimate purpose. Which program better “fits” what China is doing
(and therefore might be a predictive model) is not yet clear. China may yet choose an
entirely different path.
A Soviet Model
With the demise of their manned lunar-landing program in the early 1970s, the Soviets
recognized the limited utility of the Soyuz capsule for living and working in space.66
The design is highly suitable, however, as a space ferry; in that role it continues today,
largely unaltered, to service the ISS. Before that, the Soviet Union used the Soyuz, once
docking techniques were perfected, to ferry cosmonauts to and from the Salyut space
stations. The Salyut stations of the 1970s and 1980s, centerpieces of the post–moon
race Soviet manned space program, were the precursors of the highly successful Mir.
Of the seven then-operational Salyuts ultimately built, Salyuts 2, 3, and 5 are com-
monly referred to as the “military Salyuts” for their highly secretive military surveil-
lance roles.67 The distinctive feature of the military Salyuts was a separate recovery
module on the forward end of the spacecraft—the docking module was aft. The extra
module presumably served to transfer film canisters and other forms of collected data
from the station back to earth. Experience gained from the military Salyuts was more
than likely applied to next-generation Soviet space-based ISR systems, both manned
and unmanned.68
The Chinese began developing the Shenzhou in the 1990s, largely with Russian assis-
tance. Though the Chinese assert that it is an indigenous design, Shenzhou is in fact a
scaled-up version of the Soyuz, capable of accommodating up to three yuhangyuan.69 If
they are to progress to the more ambitious projects they have announced, the Chinese
are likely to outgrow the Shenzhou rapidly. Because the Shenzhou is basically of Rus-
sian design, the Chinese have also purchased the Kurs androgynous docking system
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from Russia.70 With this technology, China could conceivably dock two Shenzhous to-
gether, or one to a larger space station.
Just as its first manned spacecraft resembles a Soyuz, will China’s first space station be
reminiscent of a Soviet Salyut, at least in function? It is too early to tell; however, aside
from the military satellite placed in orbit along with the Shenzhou capsule, an indication
exists that a move in that direction is already apparent. As early as 15 February 2003,
General Li Jinai’s predecessor, Zhang Houying, publicly acknowledged that while no sci-
entific experiments would be carried on board Shenzhou V, mounted on the exterior of
the spacecraft would be “a CCD [charge-coupled device] transmission camera, with a
ground resolution of 1.6 meters. Its main use will be in military reconnaissance.”71
Space American Style
Whatever Beijing’s ultimate intentions, China will have to master orbital maneuver,
rendezvous, and docking. Without them the Chinese manned space program will
quickly become a quaint throwback to the earliest manned space missions of the Sovi-
ets and Americans. The Chinese appear determined to apply a step-by-step, exceed-
ingly cautious approach. In the early Soviet program, Premier Nikita Khrushchev,
obsessed with timing space events for maximum political gain, frustrated his engineers
(Korolev among them) by pushing for high-flying “circus acts.”72 These events, staged
for propaganda value, became the ends themselves, rather than means of achieving sys-
tematic program goals.
While international acclaim and recognition, as well as domestic politics, are surely im-
portant to them, the Chinese have modeled their program instead after the triumphant
American space effort of the 1960s. The Chinese have constituted their program, as-
sembled their infrastructure, and developed and tested their spacecraft and techniques
in an incremental fashion reminiscent of Projects Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. As il-
lustrated by the unmanned Shenzhou launches, a logical, methodical approach marks each
mission. The Chinese can be expected to carry out their ambitious program with a steadfast
singularity of purpose, each phase a necessary building block to some future goal.
That individual characteristics of the Chinese space program have roots in the Soviet
or American programs does not in itself portend a menacing future. China may con-
clude, as did the United States in the 1960s and the Soviets in the late 1970s, that a
manned ISR platform in space is neither economical nor sensible in light of the advan-
tages afforded by unmanned satellites. Additionally, although appearing to mirror the
goal-oriented approach taken by the United States in its own moon quest, China may
have determined that such a course would not be sustainable. The United States
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expended enormous resources on Project Apollo and the race to the moon.73 Economic
reality may force Beijing to scale back its more grandiose space-exploration aspirations.
Yet when considered in the aggregate, these characteristics take on a new meaning. The
synergy of combining civil and military functions in its manned space program might
prove irresistible to Beijing. Until a robotic substitute can be developed and fielded to
meet China’s remote-sensing and targeting needs, its manned space program may
shoulder part of this mission. It might indeed be some time before a true distinction
appears between China’s civil exploration of space and military exploitation of the
“new high ground,” if it ever does.
What of China’s potential plans to land on the moon? According to Robert S. Walker,
former chairman of the House Science Committee,
The Chinese have a long history of undertaking projects designed to enhance their national image. . . .
[A] nation with the technological capacity to do a sustained moon program would have achieved the
ability to build, integrate and utilize spacecraft. Without even ascribing any hostile intent to such a ca-
pability, our strategic planners would have to acknowledge the profound impact on the balance of
power. . . . Space dominance is a twenty-first century challenge we dare not refuse.74
The Real Legacy of Qian
China’s achievement of a place among the true space-faring nations caps a half-century
effort and well deserves the international acclaim that has been forthcoming. Nonethe-
less, the military significance of the event cannot be overlooked.
The Second Artillery Corps of the PLA is sure to benefit from the panoply of new tech-
nologies associated with this emerging capability. Each new cooperative agreement be-
tween China and any of its space partners—Russia, France, and Germany among
them—means potential assistance to its nuclear modernization. It is naive to accept at
face value public statements that the Chinese space program arises merely from the
peaceful aspirations of a nation ascendant, seeking to expand the realm of scientific
knowledge. To ignore the strategic nuclear implications of any new space breakthrough
or capability—including Shenzhou—would be irresponsible.
It is not difficult to see the military implications of China’s civil space program. This
program is not only managed by the PLA but was born in the same cradle as the ballis-
tic missile program, dating back to 1956. The space program certainly owes much of its
early development to its older sibling, but it is now repaying the debt with interest.
Further, and though it is steadily closing the technology gap with the West, China still
relies on foreign technology for military modernization; the symbiotic relationship be-
tween the two programs will continue to produce net gains in the acquisition, adapta-
tion, and application of foreign military technology. Such a gain has been recent
improvement in the range, accuracy, and survivability of the ICBM force. China has
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also exploited its newfound space capabilities for remote sensing, targeting, and space
weapons. Its manned space program appears poised to support that exploitation as well.
Missile and space codevelopment, once indispensably led by Qian Xuesen, has endured
obstacles and impediments, mainly to internal factors, over the past forty-eight years.
Yet Qian’s lasting legacy may be that he created the interdependence that exists between
the two programs. China’s relative economic prosperity and the growing scope and
successes of its diplomacy (for instance, with the European Union) now place Beijing
in an optimal position to reap the full benefits of that synergy. Accordingly, China to-
day is at once reaching out into space and modernizing its strategic nuclear forces.
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China’s BMD Countermeasures
Breaching America’s Great Wall in Space?
ANDREW S. ERICKSON
A significant component of contemporary naval transformation involves adapting the
force to meet the emerging ballistic missile defense challenge.1 With the advent of sea-
based BMD, the U.S. Navy has entered a new era. One naval strategist views the advent
of “missile defense task forces” within the surface warfare community as being on a par
with the dramatically successful transformation of the submarine force led by Admiral
Arthur W. Radford in the 1950s to embrace the strategic deterrence mission.2 For this
reason, maritime forces are poised to play a critical role in securing American interests
from the growing threat of missile attack in a variety of regions around the globe. In
Northeast Asia, the 2004 deployment of an Aegis cruiser equipped with the SM-3
(Standard Missile 3) for continuous patrol in the Sea of Japan heralded the dawn of
this new chapter in naval warfare.
Northeast Asia represents a highly complex military and diplomatic environment for
the United States. What impact will the U.S. Navy’s BMD initiative have on the volatile
region? What will be the larger geopolitical consequences of U.S. BMD as its architec-
ture continues to evolve? BMD’s significance for North Korea is frequently discussed
and is relatively straightforward; it is, rather, China’s reaction to American BMD, in-
cluding its naval component, that will have the most profound impact on global poli-
tics in the twenty-first century.
The question of whether U.S. BMD could or should address China-related contin-
gencies was raised by a debate in 2002 between two respected China specialists,
Heritage Foundation vice president Larry Wortzel and Council on Foreign Rela-
tions senior fellow Adam Segal. Wortzel advocated constructing BMD with China
in mind, arguing that “building a missile shield now will head off Chinese nuclear
blackmail later.” Segal opposed building BMD specifically against China, arguing
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States less secure.”3 Three years later, the debate is increasingly salient, and it re-
mains unresolved.
The United States has invested in BMD development sporadically since the 1950s, but
with little consensus regarding its limitations or ultimate purpose. Questions of overall
system effectiveness aside, the debate has centered on which nations would constitute
the proper “targets” of such a system. While some of BMD’s strongest proponents con-
tend that a robust multi-tier system is readily achievable and could ultimately protect
the United States from all intercontinental missiles, many policy makers have been con-
cerned about the costs and benefits—and even the feasibility—of defending against
certain threats. Virtually all missile-defense supporters believe that it is possible to de-
fend the United States against missiles launched from the territory of rogue states, but
regarding China there is much less consensus.
This chapter addresses China’s likely countermeasures against U.S. BMD and their im-
plications. The purpose is not to conduct a cost-benefit analysis on the merits of in-
vesting in BMD per se but rather to explore how current investments can be made to
yield the greatest security dividends for the United States given present geopolitical re-
alities. It begins by outlining the American BMD debate as it relates to China, review-
ing the evolution of BMD and countermeasures, and considering the potential impact
of ballistic missile defense on China’s nuclear strategy. There follows a detailed discus-
sion of China’s potential BMD countermeasures and a comparison of American and
Chinese missile-defense strategies. Finally, the chapter offers conclusions and policy
recommendations—for the nation and the U.S. Navy.
Uncertainty in U.S. BMD Strategy
Despite China’s potentially growing importance to American nuclear strategy, its rela-
tion to missile defense remains unclear. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations
have stated that American BMD is not intended to “target” China.4 A nascent American
missile defense could not block a barrage of Russia’s several thousand ICBMs,5 but it
could conceivably block a significant portion of the approximately thirty-two Chinese
missiles currently estimated to be capable of striking the continental United States.6
Recent American administrations have repeatedly and energetically attempted to reas-
sure Russia that it is not a target of U.S. ballistic missile defense.7 Russia has apparently
acquiesced to the construction of a U.S. national missile defense system. But China’s
situation is more problematic. While American policy officially states that BMD’s pur-
pose is to protect the nation against rogue states, many believe that its ultimate pur-
pose is to constrain China. “While Washington does not mention Chinese missiles as a
justification for missile defense,” it has been pointed out, “some private analysts do.”8
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For example, military scholar James Hentz asserts, “The U.S. NMD [national missile
defense], from a strategic and deterrent perspective, is essentially about China.”9 Wash-
ington Times reporter Bill Gertz declares that
because China is sharply building up its missile forces, a U.S. national missile defense directed at
countering China must be deployed as soon as possible. China has shown no willingness to curb its
building of short-, medium-, and long-range missiles, and the development and deployment of Amer-
ican missile defense to counter them must be speeded up. The missile defenses will neutralize the key
element of China’s program of power: nuclear missiles, both intercontinental and regional.10
Still other American analysts, a Chinese nuclear strategist notes, “argue that the USA
should not care about China’s reactions to NMD development and deployment be-
cause China will modernize its nuclear force in any case.”11
The question of whether BMD can help defend against China has also attracted the
attention of Congress. In this context, Senator Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.) has reportedly de-
clared that “China may be one of the countries that we will have to protect against
one day.”12 In May 1999 the House of Representatives Select Committee on National
Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China, known
as the “Cox Committee,” asserted in a lengthy report that China was making rapid
progress in ICBM development. Many in Washington now cite the report as evidence
of the need for BMD to deter Chinese aggression.
At the same time, however, the report also emphasized Chinese advances in BMD counter-
measures. The Cox Committee postulated that China seeks to threaten America’s strategic
capability by developing more advanced ICBMs and, possibly, developing technology to de-
feat a future American missile-defense system. The vulnerability of China’s silo-based DF-5
missiles has prompted Beijing to begin developing a road-mobile,
solid-propellant version, the committee asserted—as part of a
larger modernization program.13
As the Cox Report also noted, statements by Chinese officials demonstrate that China
is opposed to the development of both U.S. NMD and theater missile defense (TMD)
systems (such as one to protect Taiwan) that could counter Beijing’s currently limited
nuclear forces. China is already pursuing a variety of means to preserve its nuclear ca-
pability. China’s future initiatives could include expanding its ballistic missile force or
developing penetration aids, maneuvering reentry vehicles (MARVs), or multiple, in-
dependently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The first would be intended to confuse
a missile defense system, the second to outmaneuver it, and the third to overwhelm it.
The Cox Committee projected that “within 15 years” China could deploy an “ICBM
force consisting of up to 100 ICBMs.”14 The committee further argued that “the aggres-
sive development of a MIRV system by the PRC could permit the deployment of
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upward of 1,000 thermonuclear warheads on ICBMs by 2015.”15 These new weapons,
the report elaborated, require smaller warheads than China has yet deployed.
By contrast, Countermeasures, a detailed report produced by the Union of Concerned
Scientists and the Security Studies Program of the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy, contends that “the planned NMD system would not be effective against a Chinese
attack” because China
has indicated that it would take steps to permit it to penetrate the planned NMD system. China would
likely respond by deploying more long-range missiles capable of reaching the United States. More sig-
nificantly, as the 1999 [U.S.] National Intelligence Estimate notes, China has developed numerous
countermeasures. The United States must therefore expect that any Chinese ballistic missile attack—
whether using existing or new missiles—would be accompanied by effective countermeasures.16
Countermeasures has been criticized by proponents of an ambitious missile defense,
but it is taken seriously in China. A popular textbook on ballistic missile design written
by a popular professor and published by Beijing Aerospace University Press, for exam-
ple, adopts wholesale the report’s conclusions on BMD penetration methods.17 In a
separate technical article, the textbook’s author concludes:
The NMD system’s interception methods reveal some inherent system flaws. These inherent flaws
should be closely considered, as countermeasures are to be determined. The above-mentioned meth-
ods were only brief introductions from relevant literature abroad. In research of the NMD counter-
measures, our own practice should be combined and integrated with these known measures. Only by
doing so, [will] breakthroughs . . . be accomplished.18
Countermeasures was translated into Chinese and published by Beijing’s National De-
fense University Press the same year that it appeared in the United States.19 This seems
to suggest that a new generation of top Chinese missile engineers is being taught that
“‘Nothing is hard enough not to be destroyed,’ ‘Attack is always easier than defense,’
and ‘Attack is the best defense.’”20
Chinese analysts have closely followed the American debate over BMD and its relation-
ship with China policy.21 They are concerned about the implications for their nation’s
nuclear deterrent: “By 1996 there was rising concern in many circles in China that
America’s BMD strategy in Asia was being pursued as part of a covert containment
policy toward China.”22 Indeed, Qinghua University strategists Wu Rui and Li Bin em-
phasize that “U.S. NMD deployment is a new element that concerns China about the
effectiveness of its nuclear deterrence.”23 China is therefore carefully studying America’s
BMD development and appears to be actively planning a set of counterstrategies.
A Survey of BMD and Countermeasures Development
Ironically, U.S. ballistic-missile-defense deployment originated with China in mind.24
The first competitive impetus for missile defense emerged in 1966, when Defense Sec-
retary Robert McNamara announced Moscow’s deployment of the Galosh system.25
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President Lyndon B. Johnson felt pressured to respond, but had to acknowledge that
America’s available response—the SENTINEL system—could not defend adequately
against Soviet ICBMs. By contrast, China, though a growing nuclear and political
threat, had yet to develop ICBMs. On 18 September 1967, McNamara delivered a
speech at the San Francisco Press Club that argued against the possibility of defending
against Soviet missiles but for the potential to “defend against the predicted small Chi-
nese ICBM threat and accidental launches.”26
The Chinese rationale proved inadequate for President Richard M. Nixon, who delayed
SENTINEL deployment in order to review nuclear programs, before approving it the
next month as “SAFEGUARD.” The Senate barely approved deployment in August 1969,
with Vice President Spiro Agnew casting a tie-breaking vote.
In May 1972 Washington and Moscow signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty,
which prohibited national missile defense but permitted each party two missile defense
sites, each with a maximum of one hundred interceptors. In July 1974, by mutual
agreement, sites were reduced to one each.
SAFEGUARD began operation in Grand Forks, North Dakota, on 1 October 1975 but
was closed by the House of Representatives the following day. Three months later, the
Senate concurred. In an ironic twist of fate, it was Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
who announced SAFEGUARD’s demise, which was completed in 1978. The program had
fallen victim to a growing antinuclear movement and to fears that its nuclear intercep-
tors—themselves a potential source of fallout—would serve as a magnet for Soviet at-
tack. The North Dakota site had been chosen because citizens of more populous areas,
such as Washington, D.C., had refused to accept that risk.
It was President Ronald Reagan who resurrected NMD, rekindling a debate that contin-
ues to this day. Reagan introduced his Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in a dramatic
speech on 23 March 1983 that surprised even members of his cabinet. On 24 April
1984, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger signed the Strategic Defense Initiative Or-
ganization (SDIO) charter. Reagan injected deliberate uncertainty by threatening to
render the USSR’s nuclear arsenal “impotent and obsolete.”27 While the technical com-
munity was divided over SDI’s viability, many American and Soviet politicians and citi-
zens were convinced that it would prove workable. Some Soviet scientists may have
been skeptical, but their nation’s loss of the space race and its declining power deprived
them of the credibility to undermine Reagan’s claims. Moscow’s “ABM system, the Ga-
losh, was perceived as obsolete, while [its] economic capacity to engage in a new arms
race in NMD was already deemed suspect.”28
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Even the potential for effective development of national missile defense arguably
helped the United States to win the Cold War, by pressuring the Kremlin. But since
then, the metrics have shifted. NMD is now judged primarily on its anticipated effec-
tiveness. Unfortunately, it has evolved somewhat fitfully, because of political vicissi-
tudes and a resulting lack of consistent vision as to its ultimate architecture and use.
Phase I of the current U.S. NMD program occurred at the end of Reagan’s presidency,
between 1987 and 1989;29 thousands of ground- and space-based interceptors were en-
visioned to help deter a Soviet first strike. Phase II was President George H. W. Bush’s
1989–92 program for Global-Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). GPALS pro-
posed hundreds of ground- and space-based interceptors to guard against accidental or
unauthorized launch. Bush also reduced the Soviet nuclear threat, by signing the
START I treaty, arising from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with Premier Mikhail
Gorbachev, on 31 July 1989, by which each nation’s arsenal fell to six thousand de-
ployed strategic warheads. The START II agreement, which Bush later signed with the
Russian Federation’s first president, Boris Yeltsin, further reduced deployed strategic
warheads, to between three thousand and 3,500.
President Bill Clinton’s two terms, corresponding to Phases III and IV, reflected both a
struggle to adapt the U.S. military to a changing post–Cold War world and a pragmatic,
noncommittal attitude toward missile defense. In May 1993, as if to signal a retreat
from Reagan’s SDI ambitions, Defense Secretary Les Aspin renamed SDIO the Ballistic
Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). Phase III, known as “Technology Readiness,”
entailed the development of technology to expedite deployment of a ground-based sys-
tem between 1993 and 1995 but without fully committing the nation to such a system.
Two Chinese analysts have recently cited cost concerns as underlying the Clinton ad-
ministration’s hesitation to deploy NMD.30
Senator Robert Dole (R-Kans.), who ran against Clinton in the 1996 presidential elec-
tion, did not succeed in making the administration’s lack of enthusiasm for NMD an
issue.31 Dole was trying to build on a near success on 15 February 1995, when the
House of Representatives approved legislation requiring NMD deployment as rapidly
as technically possible. A similar measure failed in March 1996 because of cost. Pres-
sure from congressional Republicans, nevertheless, prompted Clinton to devote Phase
IV, from 1996 to 1999, to “Deployment Readiness,” by integrating systems so as to al-
low possible deployment of tens of exclusively ground-based interceptors. Clinton left
the decision of whether to deploy them to his successor.
President George W. Bush made NMD a 2000 campaign issue and has since withdrawn
the nation from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and pushed an ambitious
multi-tier defense system designed to incorporate ultimately hundreds of ground-
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based interceptors. Already partially tested by BMDO’s successor, the Missile Defense
Agency (MDA), the system achieved its first stage of deployment in October 2004,
when six interceptors were placed in silos at Fort Greely, Alaska. Its scope, purpose, and
effectiveness remain matters of heated debate.
Countermeasures Programs
In several major reports concerning BMD—such as Countermeasures, The APS Study,
and Technical Realities, panels of distinguished physicists have argued that China and
even other BMD opponents may well be able to exploit inherent asymmetries of phys-
ics to defeat BMD: “The defense faces the extremely difficult task of assessing and re-
sponding to an attack that is explicitly designed to defeat it. The attack may have
characteristics quite different from anything that has been anticipated or that the de-
fense has been tested against. And the defense will have to respond quickly and success-
fully the first time it is tried.”32
American countermeasures development started around 1958 and by 1964 was con-
suming the equivalent of two billion dollars annually in advanced research on decoys,
chaff, and other countermeasures.33 As the Cold War subsequently threatened to heat
up, the United States produced decoys for the Atlas F and Titan 2 ICBMs and for the
MIRV “buses” of the Minuteman ICBM and the Poseidon submarine-launched ballis-
tic missile. When first deployed in 1971 the Poseidon SLBM could carry as many as
fourteen MIRVs, giving the U.S. Navy confidence that it could defeat Moscow’s allow-
able hundred interceptors. The United States also developed other SLBM countermea-
sures, such as the Trident’s Mark 500 MARV. All current U.S. ICBMs likely have
countermeasure capacity.
Aware of BMD’s potential weaknesses, the United Kingdom and France, like other ad-
vanced nuclear-weapons states have long pursued sophisticated countermeasures ini-
tiatives; research remains highly classified, but broad outlines have emerged. British
and French countermeasures programs were more limited, being focused on Moscow.
Britain’s Polaris SLBMs, which entered phased retirement in 1995, employed the ad-
vanced CHEVALINE system. CHEVALINE carried two warheads and four decoys (each
rocket-motored to facilitate simultaneous reentry), all six of which may have been “en-
closed in gas-filled metal-coated balloons” to be released among many empty balloons.
While lack of indigenous SLBM production experience ultimately caused London to
seek American help in developing the system’s maneuvering bus, CHEVALINE’s sophisti-
cation alone is impressive. Britain’s current Trident II SLBMs, the basis of its long-
range missile force, may employ even more advanced countermeasures. France’s single
warhead S-3 intermediate-range ballistic missile and M-20 SLBM also used decoys. The
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M-4 SLBM, now France’s sole ballistic-missile type, carries up to six MIRVed warheads
and apparently boasts “nuclear hardening and reduced radar cross sections.”
Sophisticated countermeasures development has been the province of the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, and Russia—as well as, to some extent, China, the
related initiatives of which are addressed below. There seems to be a consensus that de-
veloping states would not likely be capable of fielding sophisticated countermeasures
(not only for boost phase, the most difficult, but also for midcourse and terminal
phases) without significant assistance or outright purchase from such aerospace pow-
ers as China or Russia. According to a report prepared for BMDO, in the absence of
such mentoring, planners in rogue states tend to “exploit existing information . . . [;]
[e]mphasize available technology . . . even if [it] is considered ‘obsolete’ or ‘low-tech’ by
the West[; c]hoose simple solutions over ‘high tech’ ones to countermeasure require-
ments [;] and [a]dopt a broad range of countermeasures initially and then rely on sub-
sequent combat experience to prove which are more effective.”34
Even if such states obtained them for prestige purposes, without effective testing coun-
termeasures might prove impossible to use successfully. Few American experts seem to
argue that rogue states, with their resource and technical limitations, would be capable
of reliably defeating a robust, even if limited, U.S. missile defense.
Relative Countermeasure Vulnerability of BMD Phases
BMD intercept is divided into three categories: the boost, midcourse, and terminal
phases of an enemy missile’s flight. Some scientists and other experts are especially
concerned about the possibility that U.S. BMD could be foiled in the midcourse and
terminal phases. Midcourse intercept is the current focus of the evolving American
NMD system and hence today the most fully developed. However, according to Richard
Garwin, an experimental physicist who has assisted the U.S. government with missile
defense since the 1950s, emphasis on midcourse intercept is misguided, because “the
countermeasures are all too simple. The money and skill needed to implement them
are trivial compared with the effort required to design, build, and care for the ICBMs
themselves.”35 In fact, Garwin contends, America’s “present missile defense approach is
utterly useless against ICBMs of new or existing nuclear powers because midcourse
countermeasures are so effective.” To be sure, Garwin’s claims may apply more to China
than to (less technologically capable) rogue states. But Garwin’s experience as chair of
the State Department Arms Control and Nonproliferation Advisory Board from 1994
to 2001 and as a member of the Rumsfeld Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United States in 1998 merit that his assessment be considered seriously.
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Terminal phase intercept is even more problematic, because the need to distinguish be-
tween incoming missiles and decoys requires the system to wait until atmospheric re-
entry to attempt interception, leaving little margin for error. It requires positioning of
interceptors no more than fifty kilometers from the targets they defend, potentially in-
volving an exorbitant number of interceptors to protect even a small percentage of the
nation’s vulnerable sites. Also, by the time of atmospheric reentry, incoming missiles
could already have deployed multiple warheads or submunitions (e.g., biological weap-
ons). In any case intercepting nuclear weapons at this late stage could blanket Ameri-
can territory with fallout.
The one aspect of BMD, then, that many of its critics—including Garwin and an out-
spoken specialist at MIT, Professor Theodore Postol—have endorsed is boost-phase in-
tercept, primarily because it is very difficult to use countermeasures at this stage. As
Garwin points out, “credible decoys cannot be released from the ICBM while the
rocket is still firing—they would soon be left behind.” The American Physical Society
concludes that while “such [extremely advanced] countermeasures as multiple launch
[including that of dummy missiles], maneuvering, rotation, ablative coatings, or phase
shortening could be used during boost phase,” nonetheless “boost-phase systems po-
tentially offer three important advantages: [1] the possibility of destroying missiles be-
fore they can deploy multiple warheads or submunitions, [2] the presumed difficulty of
developing countermeasures, and [3] the ease of tracking the bright exhaust plumes of
ICBMs in powered flight.”36
Garwin believes that the APS study is “in reasonable agreement of my qualitative esti-
mates of 1999,” which led him to “urge [BMDO] . . . to abandon the midcourse defense
and assign higher priority to boost-phase intercept instead.” The approval of both
Garwin and the APS study suggests that boost-phase intercept may be worthy of spe-
cial consideration for future U.S. BMD systems.
BMD’s Impact on China’s Nuclear Strategy
China currently maintains a limited nuclear deterrent with a somewhat credible
second-strike capability. This is a logical outgrowth of China’s nuclear policy, an-
nounced when it detonated its first atomic bomb on 16 October 1964. China developed
its nuclear capability to “prevent nuclear blackmail,” “break the superpowers’ monop-
oly,” and also to secure great-power status. Chairman Mao Zedong’s dialectical vision
shaped Beijing’s nuclear policy. That is, Mao condemned nuclear weapons as a “paper
tiger” and vowed not to stockpile a large arsenal. He declared that “nuclear weapons
and their delivery systems could not alter the basic nature of warfare or require the re-
vision of his People’s War doctrine.”37 Yet he ordered for such purposes the expenditure
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of resources that China scarcely had and the exploitation of technological capabilities
that China would have to develop.38 For much of the Cold War, China decried arms
control as imperialist monopolism;39 it still views many arms control agreements as in-
herently unequal.40 Due to dysfunctional strategic management, “until the early 1980s,
there were no scenarios, no detailed linkage of the weapons to foreign policy objectives,
and no serious strategic research.”41
China has pledged never to use nuclear weapons in a first strike, and it has pointed to
the comparatively small size of its nuclear arsenal as evidence that its purpose is strictly
that retaliatory second strike. The inaccuracy of China’s initial ICBMs necessitated a
focus on countervalue, as opposed to counterforce, targeting. Throughout most of the
Cold War, including conventional hostilities with the Soviet Union in the late 1960s—
during which Moscow reportedly considered surgical strikes on China’s nuclear facili-
ties—it was far from certain that China had a fully reliable second-strike capability,
given its relative paucity of weapons and their relative lack of sophistication (e.g., liq-
uid fuel, etc.).
China’s leaders themselves were concerned that their second-strike capability might be
unreliable and hence not fully credible to a potential opponent. In the short term, the
People’s Liberation Army attempted to make the most of its arsenal by dispersing and
concealing its ICBMs in caves and hardened silos and by constructing decoy silos.
China’s long-term strategy was to modernize its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems
gradually, in order not to alarm its neighbors and trigger a regional arms race. Hoping
to take advantage of post–Cold War disarmament and “multipolarity” to make time for
strategic modernization, Beijing adopted the ABM Treaty as a key link in its arms con-
trol strategy.
Ironically, China had come around to embracing the ABM Treaty just as the United
States was about to abandon it. As the Bush administration prepared to withdraw from
the ABM Treaty, China launched a diplomatic initiative to fight for its preservation.42 In
1999, Ambassador Sha Zukang, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department of Arms Con-
trol and Disarmament Director General, charged that “any amendment, or abolishing
of the [ABM] treaty, will lead to disastrous consequences. This will bring a halt to nu-
clear disarmament between the Russians and Americans, and in the future will halt
multilateral [e.g., Chinese] disarmament as well.”43
China’s diplomatic offensive crumbled when Russia, having few alternatives, acquiesced
to American withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in June 2002 in return for fairly minor
concessions.44 On 24 May 2004, Moscow and Washington signed the Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty, committing each side to reduce its strategic nuclear warheads to be-
tween 1,700 and 2,200 by 31 December 2012.45 Since then, China has taken a principled
7 4 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
T:\Academic\Newport Papers\Newport Paper 22\Ventura\NP22a.vp
Friday, March 11, 2005 9:20:12 AM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
Notes
stand against missile defense but has moderated its rhetoric.46 China’s current relative
silence on the issue reflects both acknowledgement of a temporary setback and of the
emergence of a new calculus that if BMD cannot be prevented outright, it must be ren-
dered harmless to China.
China contends that BMD would enable Washington to engage in “nuclear blackmail.”47
Credible U.S. BMD capabilities, if attainable, would threaten China’s current limited
deterrent. That could encourage China to rely even more heavily on secrecy and decep-
tion to promote nuclear deterrence, thus creating the dangerous potential for miscalcu-
lation.48 As Chinese nuclear strategist Li Bin points out, “China will most probably
maintain the policy of quantitative ambiguity as a way of protecting its nuclear de-
terrence until it has built up a survivable nuclear retaliatory force that relies on geo-
graphical ambiguity instead.”49 Long a practitioner itself of strategic ambiguity,
Beijing views American uncertainty concerning its nuclear and aerospace power as a
source of security.
Desire to retain its limited deterrent without a major increase in spending is only one
reason why China officially opposes U.S. ballistic missile defense. Beijing’s vocal resis-
tance seems in fact based far more on regional concerns than on actual fear that BMD
might prove effective and irrevocably neutralize China’s nuclear deterrent.50 Indeed, Li
Bin contends that the United States “will not be able to build a real national missile de-
fense capability quickly because some of the technical problems are difficult to solve.”51
Another analyst emphasizes that while “NMD has its tactical defense value against ‘en-
emy countries’ other than major nuclear powers or intermediate-level nuclear coun-
tries that possess a certain long-range nuclear strike capability . . . NMD, no matter
how perfect it becomes, could not truly stop a nuclear war or a nuclear strike on the US
continent.”52 Rather, China is concerned that U.S. national and theater missile-defense
systems might (1) embolden Taiwan, by increasing domestic support for pro-independence
leaders; (2) trigger Japanese rearmament, by involving Tokyo more closely in American mil-
itary planning and missions—particularly those involving Taiwan; (3) consolidate Amer-
ica’s hegemony, by making its deterrent more credible to current and potential allies; and
(4) undermine existing arms control initiatives.53
The United States has made only limited attempts to involve China in BMD policy, and
these have had little success. For instance, President Bush and members of his adminis-
tration have attempted to reassure China that it is not the “target” of ballistic missile
defense. Immediately after President Bush’s 1 May 2001 speech on BMD, and again in
October 2001, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly met with Chinese officials. Sec-
retary of State Colin Powell met with Chinese interlocutors in July 2001. In December
2001, just before the United States formally announced its intent to withdraw from the
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ABM Treaty, Assistant Secretary of State Avis Bohlen met with her Chinese counter-
parts. Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman followed suit in September 2002.54
President Bush himself called Jiang Zemin (then General Secretary of the Chinese
Communist Party, as well as president of the PRC and chairman of the Central Military
Commission) to inform him that Washington would withdraw from the ABM Treaty
and “to express interest in holding strategic stability talks.”55 He later hosted Jiang at his
ranch in Crawford, Texas. These efforts may have helped to avert the most dire Chinese
suspicions, but the face-conscious Chinese government could not help noticing that
Russia had received firmer assurances, from higher-level officials, sooner than China
did. Furthermore, these reassurances tended to warn China that it had no reason to
build up its nuclear arsenal to counter BMD without addressing the issues that might
motivate precisely such a response. According to Admiral Eric McVadon (U.S. Navy,
Ret.), Secretary Powell’s arguments that the U.S. missile defense system would be lim-
ited and no threat to Chinese long-range missiles was, for the Chinese, drowned out by
other signals from outside (but close to) the administration and silence within it as to
how the concept would evolve.56
“Americans can insist that they mean no harm with national missile defense,” Council
on Foreign Relations vice president James Lindsay and Brookings Institution scholar
Michael O’Hanlon contend, “but that will not stop China and Russia from taking steps
to protect their interests.”57 In fact, new American and Russian strategic flexibility has
come at China’s expense. “The Bush administration has reportedly told the Russians
[that] they could MIRV . . . their missiles should they feel uncomfortable with U.S.
BMD plans, and, accordingly, the Russians have effectively revoked START-II in June
2002 to allow them to place multiple warheads on their strategic missiles.”58 China, by
contrast, has enjoyed none of these reassurances and accordingly feels anxious about
Washington’s and Moscow’s quests for strategic flexibility. There is increasing concern
in Beijing that with the Soviet Union gone, and despite the War on Terror, China has
become the new focus of American military pressure.59
China’s ballistic missile modernization began before it assessed that the United States would deploy a
missile defense, but China likely will take measures to improve its ability to defeat the defense system
in order to preserve its strategic deterrent. The measures likely will include improved penetration
packages for its ICBMs, an increase in the number of deployed ICBMs, and perhaps development of a
multiple warhead system for an ICBM, most likely for the CSS-4.60
In 2003 a Council on Foreign Relations task force determined that “in accordance with
published CIA estimates . . . China has straightforward means available to overcome
the U.S. [NMD] now planned for deployment and that China will do what is required
to maintain and strengthen its nuclear deterrent.”61 A Chinese expert agrees that
“China will certainly seek possible approaches that help maintain the effectiveness of
its nuclear deterrent.”62 That is why China is already investing in countermeasures to
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defeat BMD: because China “places a premium on ensuring [that] its ballistic missile
force would be able to penetrate any future missile defense architecture, collection of
information that would support development of effective missile defense countermea-
sures has a relatively high priority.”63 China would prefer not to be forced into such a
course of action but believes that it can maintain deterrence: “In the long run, analysts
are confident that China will be able to counter BMD.”64
China’s Potential BMD Countermeasures
China’s rapidly growing technological and defense industrial capabilities—particularly
in aerospace—give it increasing symmetric and asymmetric options to defeat U.S.
BMD. This discussion relies on open sources to address a topic on which information
is severely restricted due to China’s lack of transparency.
Quantitative and Prelaunch Countermeasures
China could deploy prelaunch, postlaunch, and infrastructure-targeting countermea-
sures. Some measures are already likely deployed, others are undergoing development
and testing, and still others perhaps remain at the conceptual stage for consideration if
the perceived need for them becomes sufficiently urgent. Achieving reliable capability
to defeat U.S. BMD would require significant investment and testing, but China has the
resources and would be likely to commit them if its nuclear deterrent were truly threat-
ened. According to one report, the majority of Chinese policy makers support a three-
fold response to American missile defense: “(1) increase the total number of warheads
deployed to a level just beyond the saturation point; (2) develop MIRVs (multiple in-
dependently targetable reentry vehicles that can overwhelm missile defense); and (3)
pursue other effective countermeasures to defeat the U.S. system.”65 China has a wide
variety of options to support each of these three counterstrategies.
The most straightforward course of action for China would be to continue to improve
and expand its nuclear arsenal and delivery systems with the goal of saturating de-
fenses. China has already enhanced the prelaunch survivability of its nuclear weapons
by shifting to solid propellants; improving C4ISR (command, control, communica-
tions, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance—see chapter 1 in this
volume); using camouflaged, hardened silos; and developing road-, rail-, and barge-
mobile ICBMs. Possible sub-elements of this process could include increasing missile
accuracy, developing a robust submarine-launched second strike (see chapter 2), and
even ultimately replacing Russia as the “second nuclear power.” Chinese strategist Shen
Dingli projects that a ninefold increase in Chinese ICBMs capable of hitting U.S. tar-
gets would defeat even a BMD system with a 90 percent interception rate, and at the
manageable cost of several billion dollars over one or two decades.66 According to Li
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Bin, “Although the costs could be large, the buildup option cannot be ruled out.
The reason for this is that the buildup option is so mathematically simple to un-
derstand and so certain to work. So, in the Chinese debate this idea would easily
win some support from nontechnical people. Another advantage is that the
buildup would be visible to the outside and would therefore help discourage any first
strike against China.”67
The unclassified version of the U.S. National Intelligence Council’s December 2001 re-
port estimates that “Chinese ballistic missile forces will increase several-fold by 2015”
and that by that year “Beijing’s . . . ICBM force deployed primarily against the United
States . . . will number around 75 to 100 warheads.”68 A Chinese missile buildup would
facilitate, among other things, wartime launch of strikes incorporating the use of dif-
ferent types of missiles in “synchronized launches from a wide range of azimuths in or-
der to stress active missile defenses and associated battle management systems.”69
China could also conceivably increase the deterrent power of its current nuclear arse-
nal, by altering its nuclear doctrine. This might entail placing its forces on a higher
state of alert or even abandoning its no-first-use policy in favor of “launch on warn-
ing.” China might seek to improve its nuclear weapons capabilities by slowing or re-
versing arms control commitments. This could entail continuing “production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons. China may also fail to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), particularly given the rejection of that treaty by the U.S. Senate, or may
even resume nuclear testing in order to develop countermeasures to the NMD system
or warheads for multiple-warhead missiles.”70
A more radical approach, which would represent a significant problem for Washington,
could be “horizontal escalation.” China’s nuclear buildup might improve not only Chi-
nese but also—through technology transfer—Pakistani capabilities vis-à-vis India, pos-
sibly triggering a regional arms race: “Because the United States needs China’s
cooperation in limiting missile proliferation, a deterioration in U.S.-China relations
may also lead to an increased missile threat from other countries.”71 An antagonized
China could increase the missile capabilities of rogue states like North Korea and Iran.
According to a Carnegie Endowment study, China is “a major supplier of nuclear tech-
nology and equipment in the developing world, and its past behavior in the nuclear
and missile fields is a significant non-proliferation concern.”72 Indeed, Li Bin suggests
that China’s current compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime hinges
on American respect of its strategic interests.73 Li and fellow Qinghua University strate-
gist Shen Liangyin note that while unilateral export controls are popular in U.S. Con-
gress, they typically have limited utility in halting technology transfers.74
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Postlaunch Countermeasures
A technologically advanced nation like China could deploy a wide variety of countermea-
sures to enhance the postlaunch survivability of its nuclear weapons. Postlaunch counter-
measures, which include counter-intercept measures and penetration aids, can be
combined to increase their effectiveness.
Counter-intercept measures, which are designed to prevent interceptor target engage-
ment, include multiple warheads placed on multiple reentry vehicles (MRVs) or multi-
ple independently targeted reentry vehicles, maneuvering reentry vehicles, and the
hardening or spinning of ballistic missiles.75 MIRVs can be placed in different trajecto-
ries by a bus platform that changes position slightly as it launches them in succession.
MARVs, even more sophisticated, are capable of independently altering their trajecto-
ries even in the terminal phase. Spinning and rolling (spinning off-center) a ballistic
missile makes a specific portion of it more difficult to target, complicating particularly
the use against them of lasers, which may need to focus on an object for several sec-
onds in order to destroy it. Laser cladding involves protective coatings that harden mis-
sile exteriors against laser beams.76 Lasers are also vulnerable to smoke, which can be
emitted from a canister on the missile itself.
Warhead miniaturization decreases the infrared signal of a reentry vehicle, making it
much harder for an interceptor to target.77 Miniaturization could also permit the use of
MRVs and MIRVs. According to a noted American expert on the PLA, “It should prob-
ably be assumed that MRV, and quite possibly MIRV . . . research and development has
been under way for some time [in China], and that the question of force size is being
seriously . . . debated within Beijing’s community of security strategists.”78 Indeed, Li
Bin claims that “China has the capability to develop . . . MIRVs . . . but has not done
so.”79 Because MRVs are easier to develop than MIRVs, “the U.S. intelligence commu-
nity assesses that China could develop a multiple [reentry vehicle] RV system for the
DF-5 ICBM in a few years.”80
R&D on multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs) was initiated as early as 1970. . . . The current
force of DF-5A missiles is deployed with single warhead[s], but in November 1983 China inaugurated
a DF-5 modification program to arm these ICBMs with MIRVed warheads. Technical difficulties,
however, have stalled the program. The DF-5A, able to strike targets in the continental United States
(CONUS), was the designated recipient of the MIRVs, although there is no evidence that they have
been deployed. Some sources claim that at least four DF-5As have already been MIRVed, though it is
generally asserted that while MIRVing may occur within the next few years no DF-5s have yet been fit-
ted with MIRVed warheads. Based on the DF-5A throw weight and warhead shroud the missile could
be equipped with . . . six reentry vehicles with each RV [reentry vehicle] weighing six hundred kilo-
grams (the size of the single warhead on the DF-21). The DF-5A second stage apparently has four ver-
nier engines, which reportedly fire for 190 seconds after the main missile engine cuts off. Thus the DF-
5A could direct a warhead bus over a fairly large arc covering an array of aim points. But the exact sta-
tus of this program cannot be confirmed based on open sources.81
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Penetration aids have been, and will likely continue to be, a focus of anti-BMD efforts.
According to three Chinese experts, penetration aids “are inexpensive and they have a
low political cost. Further, it is technically unlikely that a U.S. defense system would
ever work so well that it could sort out penetration aids from warheads. That would
ensure that China’s retaliatory force would remain viable.”82
China has already begun to develop and test decoys to some extent. Of two major de-
coy variants, the simpler saturation option, decoys (such as balloons), are designed to
overwhelm midcourse or terminal defenses. Deception decoys (such as fast-burn mo-
tors and boost-phase maneuvering) are designed to evade interceptor vehicles by com-
plicating predictions of flight trajectory.83 Decoys can mimic the warhead’s visual
appearance or infrared signature. They can utilize active electronic countermeasures,
such as radar-jamming signals. They can even physically protect the warhead from an
interceptor. Exoatmospheric decoys accompany warheads during the midcourse phase,
but because of their light weight they separate upon reentry; endoatmospheric decoys
reenter the atmosphere with the warhead.
As American interceptor test failures in three out of nine recent tests have demon-
strated, “to pick out the warhead from deliberately designed decoys is one of the most
challenging problems to the development of a missile defense system.”84 Some question
whether these tests were even representative of the countermeasures challenges that
NMD might face: “Basic physics argues strongly that decoys closely resembling real
warheads simply cannot be distinguished from actual threats by the U.S. sensor system
now in development.”85 Li Bin states that “decoy technology is not too complicated for
China. This means that the deployment of decoys is a much more efficient and simple
way than MIRVs for China to defeat the NMD system.”86 Intercept could be compli-
cated by a combination of decoys. Chinese ICBMs could be designed to “discharge
chaff just prior to releasing decoys and warheads—to prevent radars from seeing what
happens during the release—or by [developing] a more sophisticated release mecha-
nism that makes decoys and warheads indistinguishable even at the moment of separa-
tion from the bus. It is for these reasons that the decoy problem is acute, and possibly
not solvable for the foreseeable future, in the case of midcourse defenses.”87
Other postlaunch countermeasures include cold launch, trajectory manipulation, and
infrared stealth. Cold launch, also known as “ejection” or “soft launch,” is a means of
reducing the infrared signature of a missile by propelling it out of a silo with com-
pressed air or other gas before engine ignition. For example, the silo-based American
LGM-118A Peacekeeper missile, which is fully encased in a canister, would be “ejected
by pressurized gas some fifty feet into the air before first stage ignition.”88 In 1975, the
UR-100MR/SS-17 Spanker became the first Soviet missile with a cold-launch system.89
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Even a highly effective boost-phase defense would technically be susceptible to the cold
launch of missiles, which delays detection of launch slightly and thereby reduces time
in which to launch an interceptor. Fortunately, cold launch may well be too difficult for
rogue states to employ for the foreseeable future; only the United States, Russia, China,
and South Korea have mastered it. China cold-launches the JL-1 solid-propellant SLBM;90
in December 1998 China conducted a cold-launch test on the new DF-31 ICBM.91
Trajectory manipulation involves “depressed” and “lofted” trajectories.92 Depressing a
missile’s trajectory means flattening its flight path, bringing the normal apex of 1,200
miles as low as sixty miles in order to minimize its time outside the atmosphere and
thus its exposure to space-based and midcourse defenses. Chinese testing and modeling
indicates that the trajectory of the DF-31 could be reduced from 330 miles to sixty
miles, albeit with a significant loss in range.93 Lofting a missile’s trajectory raises its
apex altitude in order to increase reentry speed.
Finally, infrared stealth “can be implemented by several means, such as using low-
emissivity coatings or a cooled shroud.”94 Fast-burning motors shorten the duration of
boost phase.
Aside from the challenges of cold launch and fast-burning motors, a boost-phase inter-
cept system would also have extreme difficulty in defending “against missiles launched
from large countries such as Russia or China,” because of the difficulty of getting
American interceptor platforms close enough to launch sites in the interiors of these
large continental powers.95
Infrastructure Targeting
China might also consider targeting the U.S. BMD system’s structure directly, through
antisatellite attacks, direct attack on ground-based radars, and indirect electronic at-
tack on elements of C4ISR structure.
A successful U.S. test on 13 September 198596 and three follow-up tests,97 indicated that
ASAT is technically feasible. China has conducted extensive research concerning Amer-
ican military satellites and ASAT weapons.98 “In the military realm, microsatellites will
play an indispensable role in future information warfare,” one Chinese analyst has
stated, reflecting a view widespread in China’s defense industrial sector.99 China could
exploit a variety of options to defeat space-based interceptors (a laser, for instance),
such as pellet clouds, ground-based rockets, or space mines.100 The Department of De-
fense 2004 Annual Report on the Military Power of the PRC states, “A Hong Kong news-
paper article in January 2001 reported that China had developed and ground-tested
and would soon begin space-testing an antisatellite (ASAT) system described as a ‘para-
sitic microsatellite.’101 This claim is being evaluated.”102 Such a capability would be
C H I N A ’ S N U C L E A R F O R C E M O D E R N I Z A T I O N 8 1
T:\Academic\Newport Papers\Newport Paper 22\Ventura\NP22a.vp
Friday, March 11, 2005 9:20:13 AM
Color profile: Generic CMYK printer profile
Composite  Default screen
Notes
extremely useful to China. According to one PRC countermeasures expert, using a
“‘suicide satellite’ . . . to destroy both SBIRS [Space-Based Infrared System]-high and
SBIRS-low on the NMD system would paralyze its early warning and surveillance capa-
bilities. Then preemptive attacks can be launched at each component of the defense sys-
tem.”103 Two nongovernmental analysts dismiss the source that the Pentagon report
cites.104 However, the majority of analysts agree that China is conducting research to en-
hance its space-control capacity.105
Electromagnetic-pulse weapons could completely disable U.S. radars. Active electronic
countermeasures include the use of devices to jam X-band and upgraded early-warning
radar systems. U.S. BMD ground stations are themselves vulnera-
ble to attack. China’s growing submarine force may permit it to
use SLBMs, submarine-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), or
land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), against radars and support facilities. China is
making a concerted effort to develop the Chang Feng and Hong Niao series LACMs.106
Even the best BMD system is incapable of defending land targets
against SLCMs and LACMs.107 A Chinese source arguing for the po-
tential of such weapons asserts that “special forces may be trained to
effectively infiltrate and destroy the [missile defense] stations.”108
Both types of Chinese missiles might be susceptible to U.S. GPS jamming.109 This, how-
ever, is a larger problem that Beijing is working to address—possibly through improve-
ment and expansion of its currently rudimentary Beidou satellite navigation system.110
According to China Defense Today, Beijing is developing Beidou “to
improve the accuracy of its weapons and the situational awareness of
its military forces.”111
Chinese Countermeasures Testing and Deployment
China’s potential to deploy countermeasures to foil U.S. ballistic missile defense—while
not yet proven by a vigorous testing program—has long since passed the theoretical
stage. The father of modern Chinese rocketry, Qian Xuesen, first called for “the devel-
opment of an advanced DF-5 warhead with penetration aids” on 4 January 1966.112
Thanks to a Cold War–era need to deter the Soviet Union, with its Moscow-based
BMD system, China had long ago established a record of developing and testing vari-
ous BMD countermeasures to improve ICBM survivability.113 Early measures focused
primarily on improving prelaunch survivability through more rapid fueling of liquid
propellants and on cleverer means of concealment. These pragmatic measures periodi-
cally alternated with ambitious responses to American and Soviet advances. According
to a Carnegie Endowment study, American initiation of SDI “reportedly spurred
[China’s] plans to develop multiple-warhead technology. The first test of a multiple-
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warhead missile took place in September 1984.”114 Lack of warhead miniaturization ca-
pabilities impeded deployment of MRVs or MIRVs at the time; today those capabilities
should finally be within China’s grasp. Chinese experts have carefully studied Russia’s
Topol-series advanced ICBMs as the model of an advanced BMD-defeating missile.115
China’s more recent tests suggest a trend toward a more systematic evaluation of coun-
termeasures. CSS-5 (Dong Feng-21) Mod 1 and 2 tests in November 1995 and January
1996 apparently employed decoys, as did that of the new road-mobile DF-31 on 2 Au-
gust 1999.116 DF-31 tests on 10 November 1995 and 10 January 1996 may have included
endoatmospheric reentry decoys.117 A third test in November 2000 “involved decoy
warheads traveling on a shorter flight path.”118 In July 2002 China reportedly “test-fired
a medium-range missile [CSS-5, DF-21] containing [six to seven] dummy warheads
designed to defeat BMD.”119 A Russian reporter cites the Pentagon as having observed
that the missile “successfully avoided several ‘airborne destructive objects.’”120 Accord-
ing to Jamestown Foundation analyst Richard Fisher, “the emergence of penetration
aids all points to the [CSS-5, DF-21] as a highly survivable and accurate missile that
will have the capability of defeating future American theater missile defenses.”121 A ma-
jor Japanese newspaper reports that China tested the DF-21 with MIRVs in December
2002 and “has begun testing the DF-31 with multiple warheads.”122
China is also known to have tested chaff and other penetration aids. Since the existence
and capabilities of its countermeasures are generally highly classified, China may well
have conducted other tests not reported in open sources—or even, as for component
testing, observable to the U.S. military. Russian cooperation could give China access to
advanced technologies specifically designed to counter an American ballistic missile de-
fense system. There is no reason to believe that China will not be capable of improving its
techniques in the future, particularly as its overall aerospace capabilities continue to ad-
vance. While it has been projected that “PRC countermeasures on longer-range ballistic
missiles are unlikely to keep pace with U.S. technology,” inherent asymmetries favoring
missile offense may more than compensate for any shortcomings in this regard.123 Cer-
tainly American policy makers cannot afford to assume otherwise.
At the same time, Russian countermeasures technology—which has long targeted
the United States, with a series of different systems—may be both most available
to, and most relevant for, China. It will be important for American analysts to de-
termine the extent to which China is gradually improving early-generation coun-
termeasures designed to target Moscow and that to which it is actually developing
innovative new countermeasures specifically to target American defenses. A sudden
and intensive search for foreign expertise in a specific area might indicate that
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China had run up against a technological roadblock, just as the United Kingdom
suffered in developing CHEVALINE.124
Chinese Responses to U.S. BMD Strategies
What potential PRC responses to missile defense would most threaten American inter-
ests? How will BMD affect China’s strategic triad? What would be America’s optimal
strategy, given such realities?
U.S. BMD deployment will probably affect prioritization within China’s strategic triad,
by making more attractive the development of SLBMs and ICBMs. SLBMs arguably of-
fer greater survivability. As chapter 2 of this volume emphasizes, China is rapidly im-
proving its submarine force; an improved submarine force will allow China both to
assert better control of its vast maritime periphery and to create a more effective plat-
form for nuclear deterrence. Range improvements may allow China to develop a robust
second-strike capability relying on SLBMs on board submarines hidden and protected
in territorial water bastions.
As asserted above, ICBM-related improvements may offer China the potential to defeat
American BMD either by saturating it or foiling it with countermeasures. If its nuclear
deterrent seems vulnerable, China is likely to build up its ICBM force and possibly to
multiply its effectiveness by developing the capacity to MIRV its nuclear warheads.
Strategic bombers would likely remain a lower priority for China. Aside from nuclear
deterrence, China’s primary strategic flashpoints are close to its current territory; also,
it lacks overseas bases for power projection.125 China’s aircraft construction capabilities
have thus far been modest, and China does not yet have an advanced long-range
bomber to deploy. Moreover, China has not yet demonstrated the capacity to develop
aircraft with stealth or electronic jamming. Therefore, bombers do not appear to be an
especially promising leg of the nuclear triad for China now or for the foreseeable fu-
ture.126 A Carnegie Endowment study concludes that China is unlikely to “invest sub-
stantial resources in its airborne nuclear capability unless it is able to purchase the
[advanced] T-22M Backfire [bomber] from Russia.”127 Moscow will use Backfire
bombers in a joint military exercise to be held with Beijing in 2005. It may feel pres-
sured to offer them for sale to secure Chinese aerospace purchases in light of Brussels’
potential lifting of the EU arms embargo imposed on Beijing in 1989.128
Potential Chinese responses that would be most detrimental to American interests in-
clude a major nuclear buildup to preserve the deterrent. Such a buildup might be trig-
gered by NMD development that does not address China’s core national interest in
maintaining a limited deterrent. The key issue “is whether China could and would re-
taliate in ways that could counter or even outweigh the benefits of having missile
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defense. China clearly has the means.”129 If its limited nuclear deterrent were threat-
ened, China would also have the motive.130 It thus seems reasonable to conclude that
Although many Americans might desire a shield against a possible Chinese ICBM attack, it almost
certainly cannot be achieved given China’s ability to take measures to defeat it. Even worse, the act of
trying to build NMD capability against China would worsen U.S.-China relations significantly, while
increasing the odds that China would help the likes of North Korea gain [some of] the technical capa-
bility to overcome whatever U.S. missile defense system is built.131
Washington will probably not be able to use NMD to goad Beijing into Soviet-style
military overextension. China’s leadership has carefully studied the Cold War’s out-
come and is “determined to avoid the ‘overreaction to [SDI] which contributed to the
downfall of the USSR.’”132 Rather, China’s leaders acknowledge the true state of
China’s development, and do not hope to directly match U.S. military might in the
near future.133 In fact, robust BMD might even favor Chinese interests, by consuming
American resources that could otherwise have been invested in such systems as subma-
rines, for which China has only more limited and less asymmetric options. Some Chi-
nese experts, indeed, view American national missile defense as “more of ‘a waste of
U.S. effort than it is a great problem for China.’”134 Two have concluded that America’s
current NMD system “would have only symbolic meaning rather than fighting capabil-
ity in the real world. In the long term, some budgetary and cost problems could hinder
the NMD development.”135 Indeed, it is already rumored that MDA may suffer substanial
imminent budget cuts because of competing priorities. Interviews conducted by Admiral
McVadon with Chinese interlocutors in 2002 confirmed that many Chinese analysts believe
“NMD will cost a lot and not work.”136 McVadon judges that such statements seem “most
likely” to reflect genuine opinions and are not merely coordinated misinformation.137
While North Korea’s ability to absorb Chinese assistance is unclear, China’s long-term
capabilities should not be underestimated. Whereas construction of aircraft carriers
could trigger a costly reallocation of Chinese economic resources, something that
Beijing has thus far studiously avoided, attempts to contain China with NMD could
place the United States at a disadvantage by emphasizing expensive technology that is
highly susceptible to asymmetric countermeasures—“Offense is always going to be
much cheaper and less technologically demanding than defence.”138 In fact, like the War
on Terror, BMD may play a vital U.S. national security role and yet fail to enhance
American capabilities vis-à-vis China—or even make them lower than they otherwise
would be, by diverting resources from the Pacific theater.139 Even if Washington does
force China into an arms race, “there is no reason to believe that when the race ends,
the United States will have a defense that can defeat a modernized Chinese arsenal.”140
The Chinese response most favorable to the United States would be a nonresponse—
that is, refusal to build up rapidly its nuclear and space weapons capabilities. But
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China will not likely voluntarily restrain itself if it perceives its core national interests
to be threatened.
Some might invoke China’s capabilities and BMD vulnerabilities to argue against U.S.
development of any sort of BMD system. But that nonresponse would be a mistake, for
several reasons.141 First, the United States continues to face a proliferation of missile
threats. Missile threats from rogue states, while not the greatest single threat to U.S. se-
curity, are increasing. Second, the low probability associated with missile threats is off-
set by their potentially catastrophic effect, particularly if such threats are accompanied
by weapons of mass destruction. To be sure, some argue that even the most revisionist
dictators are deterrable, that radical leaders are unlikely to cooperate with terrorists.
They emphasize further that terrorists are unlikely to be capable of deploying WMD by
missile.142 But the instability currently threatening Pakistan and continuing attempts to
assassinate its leader suggest that loss of control of a nuclear arsenal is not a categorical
impossibility. Third, defending against rogue state missile launch is a realistic goal. The
force size and countermeasures potential of even the most capable rogue state falls far
short of China’s. Rogue states are likely to remain just that, because they lack China’s
tremendous resource, technology, and talent base.143
Finally, while no ballistic missile defense is likely to be flawless, even a partially effective
system can give American leaders significant leverage in terms of perception. Here
again, China’s capabilities must not be conflated with those of less advanced states.
BMD could give the United States important leverage over North Korea and Iran. Un-
like potential scenarios involving China, those with North Korea or Iran typically lack
asymmetry of interests, thus making a U.S. threat more credible. But attempting to use
BMD against China could lead to crisis instability or costly miscalculation. The nexus
of the most likely potential U.S.-China crisis, Taiwan, is so important to China that
Beijing would be extremely difficult to deter regardless of American capabilities. Ac-
cording to Li Bin, “The Taiwan issue has always been the most sensitive and important
issue for the bilateral relationship and it could cause a serious confrontation between
the two countries if not managed carefully. In this context, the effects of nuclear weap-
ons cannot simply be excluded. Nuclear issues could become very important if the
Sino-U.S. relationship deteriorates because of the Taiwan problem.”144
For all these reasons, the question for the United States should be not whether to de-
velop BMD but how. Washington can encourage a best-case security outcome by devel-
oping a system that focuses on rogue states and eschewing a futile attempt to negate
China’s nuclear deterrent. Perhaps some combination of sea-based platforms and
boost-phase intercept could best provide this form of security.
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Removing China from the Missile Defense Calculus
This chapter offers four major propositions:
• Despite reassurances, China perceives itself to be the target of U.S. BMD.
• China fears that BMD threatens its limited nuclear deterrent, a cornerstone of
its security.
• China likely has the capacity to overwhelm U.S. BMD by developing and proliferating
missiles, and possibly sophisticated countermeasures as well.
• By focusing more closely on sea-based and boost-phase BMD, the United States could
maximize defense against rogue states while minimizing negative Chinese responses.
American policy makers have not been able to reach consensus concerning the true
utility of ballistic missile defense. If the United States is to succeed in development and
deployment of such challenging technology and avoid unintended negative conse-
quences, they would do well first to agree on BMD’s purpose.
Missile defenses against China might trigger the expansion of the Chinese nuclear arse-
nal. It might even tempt Beijing to renounce previous arms control agreements in or-
der to increase its strategic flexibility and opportunities for weapons testing. That
suggests it would be counterproductive for the United States even to attempt to deploy
defense against Chinese missiles. U.S. BMD capability, which will likely take time to
perfect, is best directed not against China but against rogue states. China can meet the
challenges necessary to counter BMD, and rogue states generally cannot—unless aided
by a more capable power, such as China.
Based on his interviews with American experts, Chinese strategic expert Wu Rui con-
cludes that “there are divergent views on whether U.S. NMD should be aimed at China.
To convince China that NMD is not aimed at it, the United States could put some con-
straints over NMD capability and explain the constraints to China. This could help [to
eliminate] the Chinese concern over the negative impact of NMD on China’s nuclear
deterrence.”145 While such Chinese claims should not be accepted uncritically, the
United States could realize significant benefits with such a policy. American interests
might be best served by ballistic missile defenses—such as a sea-based boost-phase sys-
tem—that target rogue states without threatening China’s nuclear deterrent.
By making it clear that U.S. BMD does not target China per se (as the White House
seems to have done with Russia), the United States might be able to minimize diplo-
matic fallout and to avoid an asymmetric arms race in which China would be able to
ratchet up American defense spending with a far smaller investment of its own. Ar-
guments concerning the counterproductive nature of BMD—primarily that it would
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trigger an arms race that would expend tremendous resources yet leave all parties,
even the United States, less secure—would be neutralized were China removed from
the equation.
Space is emerging as a new high ground of great-power competition, thus far a fairly
peaceful one. Here the United States can promote its interests, but only if it acknowl-
edges the needs of the other major players. China is the major potential obstacle to
American security in space and in BMD development on earth; it is a power with an
economic base and technical capabilities that cannot simply be ignored.146 By address-
ing Chinese and Russian concerns about preserving nuclear deterrence, the United
States can avoid pressuring those space powers into aggressively threatening its own
wide array of space assets with ASAT and other asymmetric weapons. Washington has
already begun to address Moscow’s concerns concretely; now it is time to look to
Beijing’s as well. If the United States can reach an understanding with China in this re-
gard, growing international opposition to missile defense—which could frustrate mul-
tilateral cooperation in such areas as counterproliferation—may be diffused.147 The
aerospace frontier is too important for the United States to goad China into threaten-
ing its progress there.148
Russia, which has already received substantial American reassurances, lacks the re-
sources for a significant weapons buildup. Rogue states lack the technological base and
economic resources to nullify U.S. BMD. Some members of the international commu-
nity might still fear that even limited ballistic missile defense could increase American
propensity toward unilateralism, but this is likely to be an issue in any case. It is still the
great powers, including Russia and China, that define the international system. As long
as their major national security concerns are addressed, the United States is unlikely to
face insurmountable international opposition to providing for its own defense needs.
Chinese propaganda periodically rails against American “hegemonism”;149 as long,
however, as Beijing’s core security needs—such as limited deterrence and energy ac-
cess—are respected, it tends to be cautious and reactive in international fora, such as
the UN Security Council, that could affect U.S. interests. Also, given its modernization
imperative, and with the exception of Taiwan-related initiatives, China could thereby
be induced to pursue a more gradual pace of military development. The sooner that
Washington agrees that BMD has limited utility against China, the sooner it will be
able to focus on the real and growing missile threat posed by accidental launch, by
rogue states, and even by terrorists.
To meet these larger objectives, the United States could offer China voluntary and
nonbinding assurances, similar to those that it has already given to Russia, demonstrat-
ing that American ballistic missile defense has not been “sized” to China. A new focus
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on boost-phase intercept would help greatly. It could pave the way for a broader series
of arms control discussions, as President Bush suggested to President Jiang, to demon-
strate American understanding of China’s security concerns, just as the United States
has briefed Chinese decision makers on its future military basing plans without giving
them a veto or opening American policy to foreign debate.
In return, Chinese decision makers would be expected to understand America’s need to
protect itself from attack by rogue states and to constrain the latter’s missile or coun-
termeasure capabilities. It would be particularly dangerous, assuming it was technolog-
ically feasible, for China to market missiles with built-in countermeasures, which
might be extremely attractive to developing states incapable of producing them in-
digenously.150 Even absent a quid pro quo, discussion could recalibrate in a positive di-
rection both sides’ strategic positions. If progress were realized in this area, it would
become a key example of strengthening the United States’ own security by voluntarily
limiting the nation’s power to threaten others. Such restraint helped to make the twen-
tieth century one of American global leadership, and it has an important role to play in
the twenty-first century as well.151
The U.S. Navy’s Role: Supporting Sea-Based and Boost-Phase BMD?
Many supporters of the current midcourse system deployment advocate the creation of
a layered defense that will ultimately include a boost-phase component. Perhaps the
best near-term solution to likely missile threats would be a BMD system that focused
more closely on a combination of SM-3, submarine platforms, and boost-phase inter-
cept. These Navy assets could offer maximum protection against rogue-state missile
threats without needlessly provoking China by threatening its nuclear deterrent.
Boost-phase BMD offers manifold potential benefits. Most importantly, it targets an
enemy missile in its earliest and most vulnerable flight stage, when it is most difficult
to deploy countermeasures. Second, because boost-phase BMD relies on proximity to
launch sites, it does not threaten China’s or Russia’s nuclear deterrent, concentrated in
the remote interiors of those states. This seeming weakness is actually an advantage, in
the sense that both powers would probably otherwise be motivated to use their vast
aerospace capabilities to defeat U.S. BMD with countermeasures. Boost-phase intercept
also means that any debris or fallout is more likely to fall on the offending nation
rather than over the United States.
Air-based platforms may not be the best solution for boost-phase BMD. Of course, a
laser travels at the speed of light, and time is at a premium during the short boost
phase. Further, airborne lasers (ABLs) have made steady progress.152 But the ABL plat-
form is vulnerable to air defenses; it is difficult to imagine how an ABL platform could
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approach Chinese airspace. The laser itself is susceptible to specific countermeasures,
including “coatings on offensive missile bodies that reflect rather than absorb the la-
ser’s energy.”153 While rogue states could find decoys like balloons too difficult to de-
ploy, they might be able to buy protectively coated missiles from a more technologically
capable country, such as China. In any case, both ABL and space-based systems are ex-
pensive to operate and resupply. A cheaper, less vulnerable sea-based platform would
have considerable advantages in this respect—the “radars and missile interceptors re-
quired for defense against ICBMs are large and heavy. Placing them aboard a ship is a
very cost-effective way to make them mobile.”154
No longer constrained by the ABM Treaty, sea-based BMD plays to America’s strength
and exploits rogue states’ weaknesses. All nations that the United States must currently
defend against—particularly North Korea and Iran—are of subcontinental size and
possess coastlines, rendering them vulnerable to sea-based and boost-phase BMD.155
Unlike Russia and China, such states lack strong antisubmarine warfare capabilities
and are unlikely to sustain the investment necessary to develop them. According to
Jane’s Defense Weekly, Defense Department officials believe that “sea-based capabilities
offer inherent advantages over fixed land systems” because “BMD ships would have the
ability to manoeuvre and deploy to areas of conflict or in preparation for anticipated
hostilities.”156 Under international law, American vessels are free to remain indefinitely
twelve nautical miles off any nation’s coast, where they can conduct electronic eaves-
dropping, detect missile launches, and prepare to attack. Vessels are not subject to host-
nation approval, can move to avoid attack, and can be redeployed to protect against an
emerging threat, such as short- or medium-range missiles appearing off U.S. coasts.
The SM-3 forms the basis of the U.S. Navy’s midcourse Aegis BMD System (previously
known as “Navy Theater-Wide”). It is now based on three Aegis destroyers, the USS
Curtis Wilbur (DDG 54), USS John S. McCain (DDG 56), and USS Fitzgerald (DDG
62).157 One of them has already been deployed to the Sea of Japan to defend against
North Korean missiles. SM-3 was first field-tested in June 2002, on the day that the
United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty.158 In a subsequent test in December 2003,
the cruiser USS Lake Erie (CG 70) hit a target warhead with an SM-3.159 The ship has
now joined the Seventh Fleet.160 The Pentagon has already delivered five SM-3 intercep-
tors to the U.S. Navy and “plans to field a total of up to 30 SM-3s on Aegis ships by
2007.”161 SM-3 currently targets enemy missiles in midcourse, but ship-based BMD
should be readily adaptable to boost-phase targeting.
SM-3 is rightly heralded as an innovative system that promises to reduce the threat
posed by such rogue states as North Korea; nonetheless, the nature of its platform
raises questions about its long-term utility. The proliferation of antiship cruise
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missiles, even among the states of concern, suggests an increasing threat to American
surface vessels in years to come.
It is much harder to find and attack a submarine, and it is much more difficult to “pur-
chase” the requisite capabilities. While ship-based interceptors and radars are now be-
ing deployed, therefore, submarine-based intercept also merits careful consideration:
According to a recent article in Sea Power, “‘You buy yourself lots of flexibility with
sub[marine]s as a basing mode. You can move a lot closer to the [adversary’s launch
sites]. And the closer you get, the easier it becomes to [intercept the attacking missile]
in the boost-phase. That is a huge advantage.’”162 Submarines can patrol with relative
economy, particularly in contrast to air-based systems like ABL. Though hardly a pana-
cea, submarines offer BMD launch platforms that are more cost-effective and reliable
than many other potential platforms and stealthier than any. Trident submarines could
fire several kinetic interceptors from their missile canisters, submerged or surfaced.163 If
firing while submerged, submarines could avoid a key vulnerability of other boost-
phase-intercept systems—their “susceptibility to direct attack and neutralization from
a state with numerous cruise missiles [e.g., Iran] or other advanced technologies.”164
Maintaining reliable communication from a submerged position would be the key
challenge for submarine-based BMD.165 Notwithstanding the survivability of subma-
rines, the employment of several of them backed by a surface-ship radar platform
(standing off at a considerable distance) would increase efficiency and ensure redun-
dancy of missile targeting.
While other naval platforms merit close attention, the already deployed SM-3 system is
extremely promising for coping with the present missile threat. SM-3 can address spe-
cific threats without risking strategic instability in other areas. Regarding China, the
versatility of sea-based BMD is already proving advantageous. As with virtually all ar-
eas of U.S. military development, Chinese sources are monitoring SM-3 development
closely;166 encouragingly, preliminary indications suggest they do not view SM-3 as a
major threat. PRC analysts appear to have realized that, because SM-3 is deployed to
the Sea of Japan and not closer to Chinese territory, it is in fact directed against North
Korea. Land-based systems, for example the site now under development at Fort
Greely, do not allow deterrence to be channeled so directly.
Designing BMD to pressure China would be a strategic mistake. The U.S. Navy’s SM-3,
as well as follow-on sea-based BMD options, will enable the United States to target its
real enemies without making new ones in the process.
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Far from inevitable, conflict between the United States and China is, fortunately, rather
unlikely, because of numerous potent constraints, the most obvious of which is a bur-
geoning trade relationship. Could workers and consumers or business and political
elites on either side of the Pacific really accept an indefinite hiatus in or—worse yet—
destruction of their livelihoods? Beyond this simple but powerful reality, Washington
and Beijing appear to have found a modus vivendi that allows them to cooperate in im-
portant circumstances of mutual concern. After the 9/11 attacks, the Chinese political
leadership quickly made it clear that Beijing would stand by Washington in its hour of
need. Indeed, China appears to have taken the crucial step of counseling Pakistan to al-
low U.S. troops to enter the country in support of operations in Afghanistan, and it has
actively supported the new regime in Kabul as well. Moreover, there is still hope that
U.S.-China cooperation will prove instrumental in a lasting resolution of the ongoing
nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula.1
Even the nettlesome Taiwan issue may be amenable to a negotiated solution. Economic
and other forms of interdependence are expanding at a prodigious rate and are having
an ever greater impact on relations between the PRC and Taiwan. In 2002, some three-
quarters of Taiwan’s companies had investments on the mainland, totaling approximately
sixty billion dollars.2 Such statistics prompted one PRC official to claim exuberantly,
“Our economy is our best weapon. We won’t attack them. We will buy them. It’s
very Chinese.”3 Cross-Strait marriages are becoming increasingly common; approx-
imately thirty thousand brides went from the mainland to Taiwan in 2003, and
thousands of Taiwan residents have opted to move to the PRC.4 Meanwhile, a “mini
three links” agreement has enabled the smaller islands close to the mainland (Jinmen
and Mazu) to open direct trade, transport, and postal services. And on January 29,
2005, the first direct commercial flights in fifty-five years occurred between Taiwan
and mainland China. Those six flights, and another forty-two over the next three
weeks, were scheduled to celebrate the Lunar New Year.5 Had Lian Zhan won the
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March 2004 presidential elections on Taiwan (instead of losing by a razor-thin mar-
gin), he might well have embarked on a “journey of peace” to Beijing, as he had
pledged during the campaign.6
Nonetheless, and as discussed in the introduction to this volume, Sino-American stra-
tegic rivalry in the twenty-first century remains a real possibility, and armed conflict
between these two nuclear powers cannot be ruled out. Even if the volatile Taiwan issue
is set aside, a variety of potential flashpoints still come readily to mind: the South
China Sea, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, Central Asia, and even in the distant future
perhaps the Middle East. Disturbingly, it is quite plausible that such a conflict could re-
sult from the actions of a variety of third parties, Taipei foremost among them.
Military institutions are bound to focus on (often low-probability) worst-case scenar-
ios and on the doctrines and capabilities arising therefrom. This study is part of a
broader analytical effort to understand the contemporary PLA and its future trajectory,
accepting the broad caveat concerning the basic stability of U.S.-China relations out-
lined above. A second caveat is also essential—that this study in no way assumes that
nuclear weapons will necessarily be employed in a U.S.-China war. Quite the contrary;
the assembled papers generally view these arsenals as deterrent weapons that may be
brandished to gain leverage in the midst of crises, or perhaps even to prompt
deescalation during actual hostilities. Even if nuclear use seems outlandish, one can
easily envision how nuclear shadows might affect decision makers in both Beijing and
Washington, not to mention commanders in the theater of operations. For example,
would Chinese political leaders order all-out strikes on American carrier battle groups
without considering the possibility of nuclear retaliation, especially if those strikes
were successful? Would American decision makers undertake major conventional
strikes against targets (airfields, ports, missile bases, etc.) without regard to Chinese
nuclear retaliation?
Such questions illustrate the potential importance of nuclear strategy for the possible
dynamics of a U.S.-China conflict. However, war-fighting dilemmas presented by nu-
clear capabilities on both sides are not the major focus of this study. Instead, the papers
assembled here present straightforward descriptions of several dimensions of emerging
PLA nuclear capabilities. The value of such descriptions in an unclassified venue is that
they significantly widen the scope of discussion concerning the strategic implications
of these emerging capabilities. In other words, these capabilities merit consideration
beyond the realm of military and intelligence analysts.
Chapter 1, by Lieutenant Commander Stephen Polk, U.S. Navy, described develop-
ments in PLA nuclear command and control. It provided background on the theory of
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nuclear command and control as it evolved during the Cold War, followed by a brief
synopsis of the PLA’s overall experience with military command and control generally,
and NC2 specifically. Next, the paper reviewed current developments in PLA NC2, fo-
cusing on the evolving processes for release authority; on ample technology upgrades,
including fiber optic, satellite, and microwave communications; and the likelihood of a
more ambitious alerting posture. A crucial insight to take from Polk’s review of re-
vamped Second Artillery Corps training practices is the fact that lessons from the ac-
tive and highly proficient SRBM force are likely to be disseminated quickly and
efficiently into the new mobile long-range nuclear forces now being deployed. In the
end, Polk concluded that while there may actually be benefits to China’s moving to a
nuclear posture of “credible deterrence” with robust NC2—for example, a reduced
chance of accidental launch—there are also dangers, including the possibility of so-
phisticated PLA coercion and even limited war-fighting strategies.
The second chapter, by Lieutenant Christopher McConnaughy, U.S. Navy, depicted
rapid progress in China’s SSBN force. The late 2004 announcement that the prototype
of Type 094, the PLA Navy’s second-generation SSBN, had been launched in July 2004
reinforces the importance of this detailed examination of China’s efforts to develop a
sea-based deterrent. The first half of this chapter was a synopsis of research by John
Lewis and Xue Litai on the subject of China’s first-generation SSBN, the Xia (Type
092). The author asserted that analysts have mischaracterized the 092 program as a
complete failure. He argued instead that the arduous steps toward developing an indig-
enous SSBN are best viewed as an essential down payment on the research and devel-
opment groundwork that underlay the likely success of the follow-on Type 094 project.
The second part of the chapter explored 094’s probable capabilities, basing modes, and
doctrine. Special analytical attention was devoted to the notion that Beijing might
adopt the Soviet “bastion” strategy of the late Cold War. The chapter concluded with a
stark warning that current plans for the future U.S. submarine force may not be ade-
quate to cope effectively with an invigorated Chinese SSBN program.
The close relationship between China’s civil space program and its strategic nuclear
modernization was the subject of the third chapter, by Commander Dominic
DeScisciolo, U.S. Navy. The author argued that the two programs were “linked at
birth,” as each was profoundly influenced by the American émigré scientist Qian
Xuesen, who instilled in both programs “the confidence that China can match the West
in its technological development.” As in other space programs, it asserted, the commin-
gling of civil and military space and rocketry efforts is readily apparent: thus, the DF-5
ICBM is extremely similar to the CZ-2A commercial booster, and the DF-31 ICBM
likely has its civilian analog in the Kaituozhe launch vehicle. Using the civil space pro-
gram as a conduit for foreign technology, DeScisciolo maintained that recent
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improvements in ICBM range, accuracy, and survivability may be partly attributable to
the synergy between PRC civil and military space programs. Appraising the success of
China’s recent manned space vessel, Shenzhou V, DeScisciolo noted that General Li
Jinai leads that program; further he voiced concern that the program may have direct
military applications, especially in the vital realm of remote sensing. The chapter con-
cluded with a comparative analysis of Soviet and American paths for space develop-
ment, tentatively finding that China’s methodical approach more closely approximates
the American approach. This conclusion suggested that Beijing will become a potent
future challenger to the United States in the realm of space.
The last chapter, written by Andrew Erickson, represents an attempt to fathom PRC
responses to the U.S. deployment of ballistic missile defenses. Erickson found that
American strategic planners are deeply divided concerning the value of U.S. BMD for
China-related contingencies. Next, the author demonstrated that BMD countermea-
sure systems, including specifically Chinese variants, have a long history of develop-
ment, reaching far back into the Cold War era. A brief review of the evolution of
Chinese nuclear strategy suggested that American BMD poses a rather direct challenge
to the PRC emphasis on minimal nuclear forces. The analysis subsequently revealed a
plethora of options for countering U.S. ballistic missile defense that Chinese planners
appear to be exploring, including especially saturation, decoys, and multiple methods
for direct attack on the BMD system itself. Chinese nuclear strategists appear to have
high confidence that U.S. BMD can be overwhelmed. Given the PRC’s increasingly im-
pressive defense science and technology infrastructure, the author concluded that
American ballistic missile defense should focus on defending against threats from
smaller, less capable rogue states, such as North Korea or Iran. Based on the efficiency,
stealth, and flexibility of sea-based platforms, Erickson suggested that the U.S. Navy
must play a central role in the ongoing evolution of BMD architecture.
As acknowledged in the introduction, this study makes no claim to comprehensiveness
in its treatment of this subject. Instead, we have opted to make selective probes, aiming
to improve knowledge in certain, rather narrow, domains of this complex subject, rely-
ing where possible on the unique professional experience and abilities of the student
authors. A rather predictable, but nonetheless significant, finding of this research is the
need for continued focused study. Specific analytic areas that are not treated adequately
here include nuclear-tipped cruise missiles, tactical nuclear weapons, preemption strat-
egies, nuclear threats during the 1996 crisis, Taiwan’s calculations concerning nuclear
weapons, and the impact of China’s nuclear forces on the strategies of such critical re-
gional players as Japan, South Korea, India, and Russia.
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During the process of research, two overarching lessons emerged. First, the asymmetri-
cal nature of the present U.S.-China nuclear relationship is unique and makes the situ-
ation rather different from that with Russia, with its several thousands of nuclear
weapons, at one end of the spectrum, or with North Korea on the other. The impact of
this asymmetry on nuclear rivalry in general and crisis interaction in particular de-
serves special study. There are some historical analogies available—including the
much-studied Cuban missile crisis of 1962. The second lesson is methodological and
applies to the study of China’s military as a whole. A wide variety of new Chinese
sources must be carefully analyzed to gain the closest possible understanding of China’s
ongoing military modernization. This method, if undertaken in a methodical manner,
can mitigate the recognized problem of “mirror imaging,” and it can produce major re-
search findings, such as the pathbreaking studies by John Lewis and Xue Litai, that can
better inform policy.
The four papers assembled here are careful to point out continuing weaknesses in
China’s nuclear force (for instance, in its early warning network) and not to exaggerate
the pace of the ongoing nuclear modernization (which has been, if steady, not particu-
larly swift). Collectively, however, they demonstrate significant progress and indeed a
profound upgrade in the quality, and potentially the quantity as well, of China’s nu-
clear forces. The most potent symbols of China’s transition to credible deterrence are
the new DF-31 ICBM, as well as the 094 SSBN and associated JL-2 SLBM, but this
study demonstrates a broad front effort that goes well beyond these two systems.
This development should not surprise anyone. After all, China has been the target of
nuclear coercion more times than any other single state. The lesson that nuclear weap-
ons have significant strategic utility is not lost on China’s present leadership. Moreover,
the world is faced with the challenge of integrating a rapidly transforming China—af-
ter more than two decades of stability and double-digit economic growth—into the
evolving international system. Beijing, no longer constrained by momentous threats or
resource austerity, now has the opportunity, for the first time in its history, to create
systematically its nuclear forces and strategy it believes optimal.
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ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile (Treaty)




BMDO Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
CMC Central Military Commission
C2 command and control
C4I command, control, communications, computers, and
intelligence
C4ISR command, control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance
ELF extremely low frequency
GPALS Global-Protection Against Limited Strikes (program)
GPS Global Positioning System
GSD (Chinese) General Staff Directorate
ICBM intercontinental ballistic missile
IRBM intermediate-range ballistic missile
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
ISS International Space Station
LACM land-attack cruise missile
LEO low earth orbit
LPAR large phased-array radar
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MARV maneuvering reentry vehicle
MDA Missile Defense Agency
MIRV multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle
MMA Multimission Maritime Aircraft
MRV multiple reentry vehicles
NDIO National Defense Industry Office
NC2 nuclear command and control
PAL permissive action link
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy
PRC People’s Republic of China
RV reentry vehicle
SDI Strategic Defense Initiative
SDIO Strategic Defense Initiative Organization
SLBM submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM submarine-launched cruise missile
SM-3 Standard Missile 3
SRBM short-range ballistic missile
SRM solid rocket motor
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine
SSK hunter-killer (diesel-powered) submarine
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
START (I, II) Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (treaties)
TMD theater missile defense
VLF very low frequency
WMD weapons of mass destruction
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